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GENERALIZATIONS FROM THE MALAYSIAN
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POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE NEW NATIONS:

GENERALIZATIONS FROM THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE

by

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SUMMARY

This study represents an attempt to define and account for the basic patterns of political ideology among Westernized elites in new nations. The data from which the analysis is drawn consists of lengthy interviews with a random sample of Malaysian civil servants and a series of questionnaires designed to test conclusions from the interviews.

Three basic value orientations and their political implications are examined in some detail: the orientation toward human nature, to nature itself, and to time. A view that man is by nature inclined to asocial self-seeking leads to a distinctive conception of political life and of politicians, and contributes to the desire for firm rulers who can enforce community-serving behavior. The orientation to nature is what we have called a "constant-pie" orientation; one which assumes a fixed scarcity of desired material goods. Political and economic life becomes, in this context, a zero-sum game in which social distrust is widespread, in which cooperation and compromise are difficult, and in which distributive justice rather than service is the focus of political evaluation.

The origin of the constant-pie orientation lies in the fixed social product that is characteristic of the existential base of traditional society. In the West, lengthy experience with an expanding social product has gradually extinguished this orientation, while in much of the non-West neither the rate nor duration of growth in per capita real income has been sufficient to transform the politics of scarcity into the politics of affluence.

In traditional society, a variety of social control mechanisms contained the centrifugal potential of a constant-pie environment but, in transitional society, these mechanisms have broken down. The Hobbesian qualities of the environment have consequently increased and short-run personal goals are more easily realizable than long term group goals. Thus not only the constant-pie orientation but also the "exploitationist" time orientation are congruent with the existential base of transitional society rather than the result of a pathological response to colonialism and rapid social change as some analysts have contended.

Neither primary nor secondary socialization in new nations contributes to the growth of a "democratic style." Instead, manifest political training and satisfaction with the effectiveness of the system are the core resources of a democratic regime. A crisis of effectiveness would thus place the democratic regimes of new nations in grave jeopardy.

Support for liberal democracy is comparatively low among Malaysian elites and tends to crumble when more important values such as unity and stability are threatened. Support for a more paternalistic, authoritarian regime is widespread since the assumptions such rule makes about the environment are more congruent with Malaysian realities—e.g., communal tension, illiteracy, narrow loyalties, the elite's monopoly of modernizing skills—than the assumptions of liberal democracy. The existential base is again a more compelling explanation for ideology than the pathology generated by social change.

To the Memory of my Parents,

Dr. Parry M. Scott
Augusta B. Scott

By the way, Odili, I think you are wasting your talent here. I want you to come to the capital and take up a strategic post in the civil service. We shouldn't leave everything to the highland tribes. My secretary is from there; our people must press for their share of the national cake.

The hackneyed phrase 'national cake' was getting to some of us for the first time, and so it was greeted with applause.

Chinua Achebe, <u>A</u> <u>Man</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>People</u>

Then I say to myself, "Surely our society will crystallize; surely it will be solidified; surely it will be welded into a strong homogeneous whole. All that is required is to strain every nerve to hold our ground during this period of transition."

Gamal Abdel Nasser, <u>The</u> <u>Philosophy</u>
<u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>Revolution</u>

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my thinking and written expression. I could have not asked
for a more sympathetic critic or a more devoted mentor. The
insights of Joseph LaPalombara have also contributed a great
deal to whatever merit this study has and I thank him for his
many attentive comments. My research, like that of many
others at Yale, originates from the work and teaching of Rob-
ert Lane. His broad concern with the development and mainte-
nance of political ideology has inspired me to attempt a sim-
ilar exploration in a non-Western area. I only hope that my
efforts here begin to justify the care and generosity he has
lavished on my intellectual development.

With such intellectual sources at my disposal, it is
obvious that the shortcomings of this study must remain my
own responsibility.

My wife shared the satisfactions and burdens of this
project from beginning to end. But for her considerable edi-
torial skills, the reader would scarcely be able to find his
way through the text. Her understanding of a distracted--
even slightly deranged--husband was at times the only thing
that sustained me.

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CHAPTER I

THE SETTING

A. The Cosmopolitan Pyramid

The drive from Malaysia's modern air-conditioned uni-
versity outside Kuala Lumpur to my interview in the city with
Ja'afar bin Musa takes a scant fifteen minutes. In that
brief span alone any scepticism about the cosmopolitan char-
acter of this administrative capital is quickly dispelled.
The satellite town of Petaling Jaya occupies either side of
the broad, new Federal Highway leading to the city. It is
barely saved from resembling the drab suburban sprawls of
Western cities by its red tile roofs and the surfeit of or-
chids thriving in sunny front lawns. Here, in this neatly
laid out residential area, live a good portion of the profes-
sional men, higher civil servants, and businessmen who work
in the city. Distinguished largely by their comparative
wealth and often by English education, Malays, Indians, and

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Chinese live here side by side and share common middle-class concerns about the education of their children, the install-ment payments on their new cars, and their domestic help. This class of industrious, educated, nouveaux riches is in large measure a product of the colonial past. And it is this class too with its skills and learning which, for the moment at least, is entrusted with the building of a post-colonial nation.

Not more than five hundred yards further along the Federal Highway toward Kuala Lumpur live some of the presum-ably ultimate beneficiaries of this post-colonial society. They are Malay squatters who have established a small kampong or village on the higher ground beside the highway. Their poverty is mild compared with that of Javanese villagers in Indonesia, or even when compared with the lot of their rural kinsmen in thousands of kampongs scattered throughout Malay-sia's countryside. But it is poverty nevertheless. Women dressed in baju kurong must fetch water from across the road in five gallon tins secured to either end of a long pole. The kampong houses are hastily built fragile affairs, for these are squatters, and one day they will have to move on to make way for some new building needed by a new Malaysia.

But already they benefit in some measure from this new Malaysia. The Ministry of Labor helps the menfolk locate jobs, the Welfare Department looks after the handicapped and needy, and the Ministry of Health tries to cope with the med-

ical problems of the kampong. Long lines of neatly dressed
village children--boys in blue shorts, girls in blue sarongs
--dawdle on their way to the Sekolah Kebangsaan (National
Primary School) two hundred yards down the road. The school
itself is an unpretentious frame building with a small play
area surrounding it. Boasting neither the air conditioning
nor the bold modernity of the University, it nevertheless is
equally symbolic of the new Malaysia. Chances are the chil-
dren studying here will know the Malay roman script and the
National Anthem before their parents. Their generation is
the first generation which will be more than 50 per cent lit-
erate and the first to be instructed en masse in the heady
ways of nationalism.[1]

　　　That such benefits as these were not entirely absent
in pre-independence Malaysia should not obscure the fact that
the relationship between rulers and ruled has changed in a
fundamental way. These kampong folk have, for the first
time, a measure of power, however tenuous. The mere giving
or withholding of their votes makes a difference in the for-
tunes of greater men in the State Assembly and Federal Par-
liament. Their small measure of power over these orang besar
(big men) ensures that these services will continue to expand
and that when they are forced to move, a new piece of land
and building materials will be offered them by politicians
anxious to please. To be sure, the chief beneficiaries of
the power the British left behind are represented by the

middle-class of Petaling Jaya, but these kampong Malays enjoy
their own modest share as well.

On approaching town, a multitude of small but prosper-
ous stores and restaurants owned by Chinese and Tamils cater
to their daily clientele. The scene is familiar for the Chi-
nese, and to a much lesser extent the Indians, dominate small
commerce and industry in Malaysia and, indeed, in much of
Southeast Asia. Just across the road are the modest cement
quarters built by the government for the largely Tamil labor
force of Malaysian Railways. Brought originally to Malaya by
the British, they, together with their countrymen who were
imported to tap rubber trees in vast plantations or work on
the roads for the Public Works Department, have forged a
strong trade union movement. Through their organization they
too have wrested a share of the new nation's economic pie as
have the Chinese shopkeepers who benefit from the increasing
wealth of their clients.

Kuala Lumpur is a boom town in a "boom nation." Con-
struction gangs of Chinese girls mix concrete or scurry about
carrying baskets of stone and sand for the new office build-
ings which rise on every hand. With the starched cloth sun
visors they wear, they could easily be mistaken for a crew of
welders who had momentarily tipped back their face shields.
While the commercial skyscrapers on which they labor are the
most dramatic evidence of Malaysia's new wealth, the con-
struction boom has left its mark on more modest edifices as

well. Across the street a Sikh cloth merchant helps hoist a bright new sign above his entrance and two doors down the modern facade of a popular Chinese restaurant receives its final touches.

The prosperity that makes all this activity possible has come about comparatively recently and rests on shaky foundations.[2] Who would have thought 15 years ago that television sets would be within the reach of a modest civil servant; that those who then aspired to a motorcycle now own a car while those who hoped for a new bicycle now ride proudly on their Japanese motorscooters?[3]

Amidst this new wealth there is some uneasiness. A prosperous Chinese shopkeeper still takes care to fill his huge earthenware pot to the brim with rice each year--just in case. He hopes "good times" will continue but he is not foolish enough to act as if they will, for he has a long memory. Only too vividly does he recall the drastic fall of rubber prices in the late 1920's which made his father a poor man almost overnight. The family had slowly recovered some of its former wealth by trading in gold when the Japanese occupation forced them to flee Kuala Lumpur and become subsistence farmers. Even today, when he is rich beyond his father's fondest hopes, he remembers what has happened and sets aside enough rice for his family's needs in the event everything else is lost. The war with Indonesia, the breakup of Malaysia, communal riots in Singapore; all remind him that

his prosperity is a tenuous achievement.

There is a lot of money to be made in any boom town, but it must be made quickly, for no one knows exactly when the vein of gold will give out. The trick is to get as much out as fast as you can before the opportunity has disappeared for good. The premonition that a "pain economy" will return is precisely what gives this and every other boom town its frenetic character.

B. Che' Ja'afar bin Musa and the Selangor Club

The Ministry of Information where Che'[4] Ja'afar works at an important job is just off the center of the old town. Across a wide padang or green from the Ministry's offices lies the Selangor Club, a rambling Tudor structure looking self-conscious and out of place in its tropical setting. A brief decade and a half ago it was a spot to which Englishmen could retire in the company of their countrymen for an evening of dancing, billiards and amiable conversation free from the rigors of their administrative or business affairs. Like hundreds of identical sancta sanctorum throughout the once vast British Empire, it was not so much a symbol of racism as of public school snobbery extended to colonial peoples.[5] It was only in 1952 that General Templer, a grammar school product appointed head of operations against communist insurgents, made a symbolic dent in the colonial social system by threatening to turn the august Club into an army barracks un-

less Asians were admitted immediately. Today the barriers to
membership are really only financial and Asian ministers and
higher civil servants pass freely through its portals. But,
most ironically, that is all that has changed; the style of
evenings at the Selangor Club remains essentially the same,
only the members are new. Whether what has happened at the
Selangor Club is seen as a credit to the British or a credit
to the Malayans does not matter here as much as what it says
about the colonial history of Malaya and the civil servant we
are about to meet.

From behind an enormous desk Che' Ja'afar presides
over a smallish room filled almost to the ceiling with old
files dog-eared by countless reverential clerical hands. The
piles of folders seem almost an essential structural feature
of the building. The impression is given that if one were
removed hastily the entire ceiling would immediately col-
lapse. Peering out owlishly through a slot created by two
columns of files, Che' Ja'afar smilingly bids me be seated
and sends one of several office boys scurrying off to fetch
coffee. He is a middle-aged Malay and, although he has risen
quickly in the civil service, he feels frustrated by younger
superiors whose very presence limit his future chances. Un-
der the circumstances he has turned his thoughts to retire-
ment and the quiet pastoral life he hopes to establish for
himself and his family. The relaxed, affable manner in which
he speaks of his boyhood, his job, and his political ideals

always makes our regular two hour interview seem shorter than
it really is. He obviously welcomes this diversion from the
normal bureaucratic chores.

If Che' Ja'afar were suddenly to find himself chatting
with the former members of the Selangor Club during its hal-
cyon days, he would not feel much out of place. Like the co-
lonial elite he is well educated and, what is more, his polit-
ical ideals are entirely British. Even if the conversation
turned to the prospects for democracy in Malaysia, Che'
Ja'afar's comments would be quite in keeping with the company.
In particular, he is saddened by the opportunism of politi-
cians, by the inability of the Malays to compete with the
Chinese, and by the lack of civic consciousness and national
loyalty among his people.

> The people I work with have no fixed idea--we're all
> British trained. We think things here haven't reached
> the standard we expect. Maybe we expect too much though.

His whole tone is one of regret rather than condemna-
tion. Where the British might feel some compulsion to exag-
gerate Malaysian shortcomings so as to justify Western rule,
Che' Ja'afar labors under no such psychic handicap. He and
his colleagues would readily agree with many an Englishman's
appraisal of democracy in Malaysia, but for them, the ap-
praisal is a cool-headed and realistic one in which animus
toward the subject people plays little or no role.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Che' Ja'afar's

political views, however, is the almost complete absence of
anti-colonial or anti-British sentiment. The same is more or
less true for the other sixteen civil servants I spoke with,
but since Che' Ja'afar expresses himself more explicitly than
the others, I have chosen his views to portray an essential
part of the setting for our later discussion. The familiar
declarations issuing forth from Afro-Asian meetings do not
speak for Che' Ja'afar and he is quite clear about it. In
his personal case, some training in England itself may help
account for his views, but for many young men from British
colonies a similar experience had quite the opposite effect.
When talking of the crisis in Southern Rhodesia he speaks of
the "low level of civilization" of the Africans and con-
cludes, "I wouldn't want a quarter of a million whites to be
governed by seven million half-civilized blacks."

While some of the racial myths of colonialism seem to
have rubbed off on Che' Ja'afar, I should hasten to point out
that he considers himself a nationalist and a patriot and is
proud of Malaysia's independence. What is missing are the
traces of bitterness one might expect to find: the standard
diatribes of colonial rule. Instead, he feels the British
governed Malaya "impartially" and even muses ". . . perhaps I
was unconsciously pro-British myself." All this from someone
who gave serious thought to entering politics himself during
its nationalist phase.

How is it that for Che' Ja'afar and others, being a

nationalist does not mean being anti-British or anti-West, and being proud of independence does not mean villifying the whole of colonial rule? I would like to briefly suggest here that the cause for this anomaly is to be found largely in the nature of Malaya's colonial experience.

Malaya was colonized rather late compared with, for example, Burma, Ceylon, and India and a good many of its constituent states were governed in a way which preserved, perhaps artificially, much of the pre-colonial power structure. The human suffering attendant on economic dislocation which characterized lower Burma's colonial history[6] was much less severe in Malaya. Education policies failed to produce the large, unemployed, alienated, educated elite which formed the core cadre of nationalists in many other colonial nations. With the exception of the Chinese who by and large considered themselves temporary residents, the great bulk of the English educated were absorbed into the administrative structure of the colony.[7] Finally, unlike India, which for the greater part of its colonial history was governed by an alien elite with an unshakeable conviction of its right to rule, British rule in Malaya was barely consolidated when doubts about the white man's burden had begun to sap the confidence of imperialists. The relative briefness of colonial rule, a measure of indirect rule, the lack of overwhelming economic hardship, the absence of a substantial, unattached "shadow" elite, and the early loss of the colonial raison d'etre all conspired to

make Malaya's colonial experience comparatively untraumatic. The basis for large scale bitterness just did not exist, nor were there many unattached intellectuals available to organize it.

The nationalist movement was slow in coming and when it did arrive after World War II, the issue which touched it off was the British Malayan Union proposal which Malays felt threatened their political rights vis-a-vis other communities. Inevitably a split developed in nationalist ranks and a more Indonesian oriented, populist faction of Malays including Islamic reformers under the leadership of Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, pitted itself against a liberal democratic, Western educated group of moderates who drew considerable support from the ranks of the civil service. That the latter group won was made possible by the vagaries of colonial history as mentioned above and some crucial concessions by the British in the face of Malay opposition to the Malayan Union proposals. British concessions made it unnecessary for the Malays to turn to more radical political leadership, while the struggle against a powerful communist insurgency required close cooperation with the British lest there be nothing at all to hand over after independence.

By the time independence did roll around in 1957 the British were already old hands at giving way graciously. There was no long, bitter struggle against the colonial regime, no struggle which could have produced the enduring

hatreds and humiliations that cast a long political shadow.
The transfer of power was almost purely an administrative
transfer as the local political leadership was virtually
identical in education, outlook and social background with
the local bureaucratic elite. One could say of Malaya as has
been said of Ceylon that

> . . . the 1947 transfer of sovereignty consisted of the
> replacement of conservative, moderate, aloof British civ-
> il servants by conservative, moderate, aloof British edu-
> cated Ceylonese notables who, to more natavistic eyes at
> least "resembled the former colonial rulers in everything
> but the color of their skin."[8]

Is it any wonder then that Che' Ja'afar could emerge
from the colonial period without any of the crystalizing ex-
periences of a long, anti-colonial struggle which would have
made him more acceptable in the Afro-Asian fraternity? For
him, and for the political elite as well, independence came
naturally--enough conflict to be a source of pride and self-
respect but not so much that he cannot retain a good measure
of respect and admiration for his former colonizers.

When we examine the beliefs of Malaysian civil ser-
vants in more detail, it will be useful to recall Che'
Ja'afar's lack of bile. Through his eyes, an essential por-
tion of our study's setting has been portrayed. To broaden
this setting still further, we must meet another civil ser-
vant.

C. Lim Fong Soon and the National Mosque

On the way to Mr. Lim's house one passes the high min-aret of the recently completed National Mosque. Audaciously modern to more traditional eyes, it is a source of enormous pride to Malays throughout the country, not least to the muezzin who is provided with an elevator to the top of the minaret for his five daily trips. Rural Malays from every part of the nation come in chartered buses to pray to Allah and admire their national mosque while the Malay dominated Alliance Party government hopes that the experience will still any suspicions that too much is being done for the In-dians and Chinese and not enough for the Malays. The hope is not at all naive, for as Che' Mustapha in the Health Depart-ment remarked about the prospects for democracy in Malaysia:

It depends on the result of what democracy has brought to the citizens of this country _____ that's why the govern-ment wants results immediately so that the people can see. Many people who are illiterate _____ they have to see _____ the Mesjid Negara [National Mosque], the museum _____ the new roads; those people believe this is democ-racy _____ not to work or contribute to it _____ but they believe these things stand for democracy.

Impressed by the power and wealth of their government as sym-bolized by their mosque, Malays are indeed more firmly bound not only to the present government but also to democracy. The loyalty of the Malays in this instance is not achieved without some cost. Long before the mosque's completion grum-

blings could be heard from Chinese and Indians about the cost
of such a monument, notwithstanding frequent grants to Bud-
dhist and Hindu temples. Nothing illustrates better the pre-
carious business of politics in a multi-racial society than
the National Mosque--what is given to one community is per-
ceived to have been taken from the others.

Mr. Lim is a senior member of the new class who lives
in the middle income residential area of Petaling Jaya. His
progress up the bureaucratic ladder has been slow but steady
and he now finds himself holding a high post in the Railways
Department. Presently responsible for the quality of passen-
ger service in trains and answering complaints from the pub-
lic he appears a little overwhelmed by the pressure of re-
sponsibilities; responsibilities he never anticipated being
given. Unexpected though the promotion was, it is his last,
and retirement seems to represent the promised land for him
as it does for Che' Ja'afar.

Like many other civil servants, Mr. Lim prefers to be
interviewed away from office anxieties in the relaxed atmos-
phere of his home. His pleasant house is rented from the
government and precariously guarded by an aging, phlegmatic
mongrel more concerned with his losing battle against ticks
than with the approach of strangers. Mr. Lim and his wife
greet me at the door and at once place a cold Tiger Beer on
the inevitable glass-topped table surrounded by four rattan
chairs. Both my hosts dress Malay style, Mr. Lim in a <u>sarong</u>

and Mrs. Lim in a colorful sarong kebaya, for they are
"Straits Chinese" whose parents were born in Malaya. They
call this country their "home" while at the same time regret-
ting the decline of Chinese culture in the Malayan Chinese
community.

Calling a place your home is not necessarily the same
thing as "feeling at home" there. Mr. Lim is well aware of
this paradox and it is for precisely that reason I have cho-
sen him to illustrate one of the personal consequences of
living in a multi-racial society. Time and time again during
the interviews he voices his concern over the unsure future
of his family and of the Chinese community as a whole in Ma-
laysia. Greatly worried about the most recent political is-
sue between the Chinese-dominated People's Action Party and
the Malay-dominated Alliance Party,[9] Mr. Lim whispers twice
with great feeling, "We feel very apprehensive." When Malays
shout at Chinese in the Parliament House to "sit down and
shut up" he regards it as a foreboding of similar events on a
larger scale outside Parliament. This anxiety he exhibits is
coupled with scepticism about the religiosity of the Malays
and also with a morbid fascination in the fatal concoctions
of bamboo hairs and ground glass Malays are reputed to pre-
pare for enemies. But most important for our purposes, Mr.
Lim's worries about the fragility of the multi-racial society
he calls home appear to be generalized into a fear of poli-
tics. Asked if he likes to discuss politics with his friends

outside work, he answers, "We shouldn't talk about politics even with our friends —— we don't know what can be conveyed to the authorities." The undercurrent of fear is a strong one when he speaks of politics and its effects on his political style cannot be underestimated. It is, unhappily, an inevitable part of the setting in a multi-racial nation like Malaysia.

It would be a mistake, however, to see Mr. Lim's uneasiness about the Malays solely in the light of the tensions generated by a fragile, multi-racial nation. Communal animosities may provide a convenient focus for his anxiety, but he finds other targets as well. Everywhere he looks in today's Malaysia, "The big fish eat the small fish and the small fish eat worms." The public only feigns respect for civil servants in order to take advantage of them, political parties "fizzle out and work only for their own personal gains," and the industrialist "cares only for his own pockets." As Mr. Lim surveys it, this world is "all governed by 'vitamin M,'" and selfish interests are apt to lurk behind even the most innocent facade. The strains of multi-racialism help direct and organize his suspicion, but this is only the most prominent facet of his generally misanthropic nature.

The present racial composition of Malaya's population of about seven million is roughly 3.4 million Malays, 2.6 million Chinese, and .8 million Indians.[10] Until independence, British colonial policy established some special Malay

privileges, some of which are retained, while the increasing numbers of Chinese and Indians were largely dealt with as if they were not permanent residents. The net result is that there has been precious little interpenetration of identities which might soften political differences. The Chinese are largely urban laborers or businessmen, Buddhist or Christian, and Chinese speaking, while the Malays continue generally to be rural agriculturalists, Muslims, and speak their own tongue. The history of relations between the two groups has been broadly characterized by a mixture of active and passive coexistence (mostly passive) marred occasionally by communal violence, most notably immediately after World War II and again during September 1964 in Singapore.

What collaboration has occurred has been for the most part among that thin upper stratum of Western educated Chinese, Indians, and Malays, many of whom are civil servants. Working with each other at some short-term sacrifice and under great handicaps, they have managed thus far to keep the fabric of the nation tenuously whole. This stratum alone has the common experiences of English education and modern, urban occupations that permit some common outlook and interpretation of events. Politics outside this stratum would have to be treated almost as three different political systems, each corresponding to a racial group, and conducting "international relations" with one another at arm's length within the Federation of Malaysia.

Even for this small elite to which Mr. Lim belongs, fear plays its role. If they collaborate because of common Western ideals and education, they collaborate as well because the Chinese fear submersion in a Greater Indonesia and the Malays fear a similar fate in a Greater China. Constantly in their political minds is the obvious fragility of their nation, the awareness that the future is uncertain, that all could be lost tomorrow or the day after, a general apprehension that cool heads may not, in the end, prevail. For most of their adult lives, after all, they have lived in an atmosphere of political crisis: first the Japanese Occupation, then the return of the British, then the communist threat during the Emergency, and most recently, _Konfrontasi_ with Indonesia. Their fear has an ample basis in the realities of the Malaysian experience quite apart from any personal or collective pathology. These pressures can lead to an emphasis on conciliation and compromise in politics, as typified by Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman, but they could also lead, at the personal level, to autism or to a messianic style. If Mr. Lim favors any of these alternatives, it is autism, but our purpose in introducing him was merely to illustrate a portion of the background against which any discussion of political ideology in Malaysia must take place.

Che' Ja'afar has served to illustrate an important consequence for beliefs of Malaya's colonial history while Mr. Lim's views underscore the consequences for beliefs of

that nation's multi-racial character. The particular coloni-
al experience of Malaya tends to make politics milder and
less explosive, while communal feelings have the opposite ef-
fect. They do not, however, by any means cancel each other
out, for each is relevant to a different area of experience
and beliefs. The reason we have introduced these two consid-
erations so soon is because, although not entirely unique,
they seem to us to be peculiar in one way or another to Ma-
laysia and therefore important. On the other hand, in this
study we are concerned largely with finding patterns of be-
lief which are common to recently independent nations and
must eschew many of the unique qualities of Malaysia which
would merit study elsewhere. These two eccentricities, how-
ever, are of such prominence in the landscape that our pic-
ture would be woefully incomplete without them.

FOOTNOTES

1. Total school enrollment increased by over 400,000 to 1.39
   million from 1956 to 1962, and the rate of increase has
   accelerated since. Moreover, the number of pupils in
   English language schools more than doubled from 199,689
   to 406,480 in that same period. Malaysia, Buku Rasmi
   Tahunan, Official Year Book (Kuala Lumpur: Government
   Press, 1964), p. 532.

2. The foundations of Malaysia's prosperity are shaky both
   politically and economically. We shall examine political
   problems later, but it goes without saying that any new
   nation set amidst the turmoil of Southeast Asia and trou-
   bled internally by communal tensions cannot take its se-
   curity or stability for granted.

   Economically, Malaysia has the best rate of economic
   growth in Southeast Asia over the past decade. Nonethe-
   less, the economy is still largely dependent upon natural
   rubber for foreign exchange earnings and the rising costs
   of production coupled with a downward trend in the world
   price and the competition of synthetic do not augur well
   for the future. Replanting schemes designed to raise per
   acre yields and diversification into palm oil, etc., may
   offer some hope but they do not appreciably affect Malay-
   sia's vulnerability as a primary producer to world market
   trends. Cf. Gayl D. Ness, Bureaucracy and Rural Develop-
   ment in Malaysia (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1967), pp. 66-69.

3. Between 1955 and 1962 the number of private motor cars
   more than doubled (from 53,545 to 112,843) while the
   figure for motorcycles increased almost five-fold
   (17,999 to 88,207). If anything, the rate of importa-
   tion has increased since then. Malaysia, Buku Rasmi
   Tahunan, Official Year Book, op. cit., p. 528.

4. Comparable to "Mr."

5. James Allen, "MCS, Fact and Fiction," unpublished manu-
   script, p. 22.

6. See J. S. Furnival, Colonial Policy and Practice (New
   York: New York, University Press, 1948, 1956).

7. Unpublished paper by the author, "Education in Malaya."

8. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," pp. 105-
   157, in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New
   States (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 121.

9. Our discussion occurred before the split between Malay-
   sia and Singapore on August 9, 1965.

10. Projected from the figures given in Malaysia, Buku Rasmi
    Tahunan, Official Year Book, 1963, op. cit., p. 43. The
    figure for Malays includes a small number of aborigines
    as well and the figure for Indians includes both those
    of Ceylonese and Pakistani origins.

CHAPTER 2

AN ORIENTATION AND A METHOD

A. The Westernizing Elite

The purpose of our study is to examine the ideology of
a Westernizing elite group of civil servants. If one were to
ask Mr. Lim and Che' Ja'afar if they were part of a "Western-
izing elite" they would probably be discomfited and shyly de-
cline the honor. Nonetheless, they have a consciousness of
this role which becomes apparent when they speak of the re-
sponsibilities of civil servants and the future of democracy
in their nation. Both realize that a great deal of Malay-
sia's future depends on them and others like them. They be-
lieve that as more and more Malaysians become like themselves
--educated, civic-minded--the better off it will be.

Looking at the newly independent nations ten or even
five years ago, one's impression of the process of change
might well have coincided with that of Mr. Lim and Che'

Ja'afar. These new states were being governed, as they had been governed under colonialism, by an alien elite--alien by virtue of education and acquired Western beliefs and ideals. By an irony of history their very anti-colonialism and, often, anti-Western orientation, had its roots in the West. The bankruptcy of colonialism was shown not by its failure to satisfy traditional cultural values but rather by its hypocrisy when measured against Western ideals. That the new elites were "indigenous-aliens" who enjoyed legitimacy in a nationalist world should not obscure the fundamental fact that a great gap separated them from the masses whom they ruled--a gap produced by Western education and values.

The cultural process involved in the immediate post-colonial period was not far removed from the colonial process. Quasi-Western values were now diffused directly from the capital city of the ex-colony rather than from the metropolitan capital as before. In a sense, the source of imposed cultural change had shifted, but the direction of the change remained the same. Phrasing the new situation in this manner, one could say that the basic problem was whether this "indigenous-alien" elite could succeed in changing the values of enough of the important sectors of their populations so that the process could continue. If the new elite failed to retain its legitimacy, if the masses became mobilized before they became sufficiently acculturated or "domesticated," then this Westernized elite group would be replaced by a more

ruly indigenous elite whose significantly different vision
f the future would presumably change the process altogether.
'he contest was thus one between two social processes, that
if acculturation of the masses by the Westernized elite, and
:he mobilization of these masses as a political force.

Malaysia is still the scene of this contest, the out-
:ome of which is far from decided. It is therefore important
to ask what are the values which the elite hopes to diffuse.
Are they Western? If so, in what ways and with what selec-
tive emphasis? If these values are not entirely Western then
what other values and beliefs does this new elite represent?
The outcome of the contest depends, for the elite, upon its
numerical strength, the power it exercises, and, most funda-
mentally, on the values and beliefs it stands for--that is,
its ideology. Inasmuch as the future of the new nations is
contingent upon the ideology of their post-colonial elite,
this study represents a starting point for that enterprise.

If the contest we speak of in Malaysia is still being
joined, it has proceeded far enough in many other nations to
allow us to assess, in a preliminary way, the strength of the
contestants. Nigeria and Algeria, to mention only two, are
nations which have seen their initial political elite cast
rudely aside in favor of new political rulers who, notwith-
standing the fact that they are sometimes less anti-West in
their policy orientation, represent more truly indigenous
values.[1] It may well be that the Westernized, post-colonial,

political elites have already been given their brief, historical opportunity and have failed, although there is some indication that this judgment is premature.[2] One thing, however, is clear: the eclipse of the Westernized post-colonial elite seems to be a general phenomenon in Africa and Asia, whether it represents a temporary or permanent decline.

At first impression, it may seem that the decline of this elite group considerably dilutes the significance of our study. But the decline is, in a sense, more apparent than real because when we speak of this eclipse we must be careful to specify that, for the most part, it entails the decline of the political and not the bureaucratic elite. In fact, the new, more indigenous elites have an even greater need for the experience and skills of civil servants than their more Westernized predecessors who often shared a common background and training with these civil servants. The more indigenous elites in these nations often preside over roughly the same development programs as their predecessors even though the atmosphere for planning and executing such programs may have drastically changed.

It is really not so amazing that the inertia created by bureaucratic plans and programs can often survive changes in political leadership since the West is no stranger to this phenomenon. But I would suggest that it is more pronounced in new nations where the bureaucracy has generally broader responsibilities than in the West and where new political

elites are apt to have vaguer policies and less experience in translating these diffuse notions into concrete programs. The civil service remains, often by default, the major center from which plans for a new society emanate and by which they will be executed. Given this continuing central role for the bureaucracy the ideology of civil servants remains of crucial importance for the future of the post-colonial world regardless of political changes. The long-term chances for the creation of an open, participant society and for economic development depend, in large measure, on the beliefs and ideals they represent.

A study of the ideology of civil servants is important in still another sense. We remarked above about the common background and training shared by members of the initial, post-colonial political elite and the higher civil servants. The similarity of these two groups was especially striking in such nations as India, Ceylon, Nigeria and Senegal, while not at all relevant in countries like Algeria where a long, violent struggle for independence precluded its development. Nonetheless, the experience of the former nations parallels that of the bulk of the post-colonial world. Using this similarity in outlook--in ideology--as a tool, it may be possible to find in the beliefs of civil servants some of the reasons why the Westernized political elite seems to have fared badly. Although it is not a primary purpose of this study to use the ideology of bureaucrats as a Trojan horse to evaluate

the ideology of political elites, we may discover along the way that a knowledge of civil servants helps us to understand why politicians, of similar training, experience and outlook, failed to establish their own legitimacy and to enlist wide popular support for their plans. The key to the failure of these politicians may lie in the common ideology they shared with higher civil servants.

It should be quite clear now that this study of ideology among civil servants in Malaysia is undertaken less for what it can tell us about the uniqueness of the Malaysian experience than for its value in clarifying the role of ideology in post-colonial settings. If we sometimes fail to do justice to the peculiarities of that experience, it is not because we are unaware of its peculiarities, but rather because our concern is a broader one. We feel that there is enough similarity between the colonial and post-colonial experience of most new nations to allow us some modest generalizations about the ideology of elites.

B. Selecting the Sample

Obviously, if we are to talk of the ideology of civil servants we must talk to some civil servants. The men to be intensively interviewed were selected, using a random table of numbers, from the 1964 Federal Establishment List (Senarai Pegawai-Pegawai Persekutuan), which is a roll of senior bureaucratic posts and their present occupants by ministry and

department.[3] The term "senior bureaucracy" requires some explanation. Bureaucratic posts in Malaysia are divided hierarchically into Division I, II, III, and IV, with Division I posts the highest category and Division IV the lowest. The Federal Establishment List includes all of Division I and some Division II posts as well. The List itself is the nearest thing to the Bible or Koran for civil servants whose copies, studied reverentially, are filled to the margins with notations of promotions and retirements which might affect their own anxious progress up the bureaucratic ladder. All in all some 3,000 Division I posts are listed[4] and, from among the incumbents of these posts, seventeen were selected for intensive interviews by the random process I have described.

Several initial exclusions from the Establishment List were necessary.[5] First, with regard to monthly salary, those earning less than M$700 per month (US$233) were excluded as were those earning in excess of M$1400 (US$466). The reason for not interviewing those earning less than M$700 was that they constitute the lowest ranks of Division I and we wished to draw the sample from a higher elite. Excluding those above M$1400 was regrettable since we omitted la crème de la crème, but it was felt that this small group of civil servants held such high and heavy responsibilities that they would be both less willing to talk frankly and less able to spare the twelve hours or so needed for the interviews.

Numerically, this group is quite minute since in most minis-
tries only the Permanent Secretary and two or three others
have such exalted status.[6] Furthermore, among those receiv-
ing more than M$1400 per month, there are still many expatri-
ates whom we obviously did not wish to interview.

As we are primarily interested in civil servants as a
sector of the ruling elite, we omitted from the sample the
professional and technical degree holders such as teachers in
the Education Service, doctors in the Medical Service, engi-
neers in the Public Works Department, etc. More obvious rea-
sons dictated the omission from the sample of not only a con-
siderable number of expatriates (mostly British) still serving
Malaysia but also the few women holding responsible posts.

The kind of research this study represents is a novel-
ty in most young nations and is apt to arouse some initial
suspicion. In order to minimize this anxiety at the outset
we reluctantly excluded civil servants in the following min-
istries: Home Affairs, External Affairs, Defense, and the
Police Service. Together with the omission of holders of
professional and technical degrees these exclusions represent
the largest number dropped from the sample. While it is a
serious limitation of the research, this decision contributed
to the ease with which the interviews could be arranged and
conducted.

Finally, purely tactical considerations required that
only civil servants posted within a twenty-five mile radius

of Kuala Lumpur be interviewed. This meant that the sample
was skewed slightly toward those holding more responsible
posts in the Federal capital as opposed to the District Offi-
cers whose responsibilities are broad but are cast within the
directives issuing from Kuala Lumpur. The men in the Federal
capital are more likely to hold policy posts while those
serving "out station" are apt to have "line" responsibilities.

To summarize; the group from which the sample was se-
lected includes Division I, male, non-European, non-profes-
sional, civil servants in the Federal Civil Service serving
in or near Kuala Lumpur in ministries not responsible for de-
fense, public order, or foreign relations. If all the exclu-
sions are totalled, the universe from which the sample is
drawn totals roughly 500 individuals.

C. Characteristics of the Sample

Below, I give a brief description of each of the civil
servants actually interviewed. All of these men in the
course of our long talks confided in me and, in return, I
guaranteed their anonymity by changing names and posts.
Since Malaysia is a small country and Kuala Lumpur a small
administrative capital where any high civil servant is very
likely to know personally many other administrators, the need
for anonymity is all the more apparent. I have tried to be
vague about income and place names where they might betray
identities, but in all other respects the information and the

quotes used throughout the text are accurate. Each of the
men whose conversations form the basic evidence for this
study are introduced below by the new identities they will
assume throughout.

> Md. Amin bin Yassin: a Malay approaching middle age,
> serving in the Postal Service; no post-secondary
> training.[7]

> Abdul Karim b. Yussof: a young Malay in the Malayan
> Civil Service (MCS)[8] now posted to the Dept. of Social
> Welfare; no post-secondary training.

> Nordin b. Abdullah: a Malay approaching retirement
> age, serving with the Inland Revenue Dept.; no post-
> secondary training.

> Hussain b. Jamil: a young Malay in the MCS now posted
> to the Immigration Dept.; no post-secondary training.

> Ismail b. Ya'acob: a young Malay in the MCS serving
> with the Federal Establishment Office;[9] university de-
> gree.

> Zaharuddin b. Md. Nasir: a young Malay in the MCS now
> posted to the Ministry of Labour; university degree.

> Zulkifli b. Ahmad: an elderly Malay nearing retire-
> ment in the Postal Service; no post-secondary train-
> ing.

> Abu Bakar b. Md. Said: a Malay near middle age in the
> MCS and working in the Telecommunications Service;
> university degree.

> Ja'afar b. Musa: a middle-aged Malay serving in the
> Ministry of Health; post-secondary training abroad.[10]

> Mustapha b. Ridzwan: a middle-aged Malay holding a
> high post in the Ministry of Health; post-secondary
> training.

> B. Sundram: a Tamil approaching retirement employed
> in the Customs Dept.; post-secondary training.

> R. Jeganathan: a Tamil nearing retirement and posted
> to the Telecommunications Service; no post-secondary
> training.

S. Kamalam: a middle-aged Tamil with the Education Service; no post-secondary training.

V. Mahalingam: a Tamil approaching middle age posted to the Ministry of Information; university degree.

Khoo Swee Fah: a Chinese nearing middle age serving in the Audit Dept.; university degree.

Tay Kuan Teck: a Chinese also nearing middle age who serves in the Education Service; post-secondary training abroad.

Lim Fong Soon: a Chinese close to retirement age posted to Malaysian Railways; no post-secondary training.

TABLE 1. Distribution of Sample by Communal Origin

Community	Number of Respondents
Malays	10
Tamils	4
Chinese	3

TABLE 2. Distribution of Sample by Age

Age	Number of Respondents
20 - 30	3
31 - 40	6
41 - 50	3
51 - 60	5

TABLE 3. Distribution of Sample by Educational Level

Education	Number of Respondents
Post-Secondary	9
No Post-Secondary	8

The age and education figures are proportionately similar to the universe from which the sample was drawn and, as usual, those with more education are apt to be younger. Dis-

tribution by community is skewed slightly toward Malays with
the Chinese a bit underrepresented, while among the various
Indian communities only the Tamils (the largest group) are
present in the sample. Finally, the income distribution
within the sample (ten respondents with an income of between
M$700-900 per month and seven between M$900-1400) reflects
the distribution in that portion of Division I from which we
selected. With the exceptions just noted, the racial, educa-
tional, and age distribution in the sample actually chosen
approaches what we might have obtained had we decided to
weight the sample to reflect the distribution of these char-
acteristics in the general population we are studying.

Two men originally selected declined to be inter-
viewed, requiring us to select two more to replace them. Cu-
riously enough, the reasons for the refusals became apparent
not long after, as one left the civil service and joined a
large commercial firm, while the other was publicly embar-
rassed by having to declare bankruptcy after being swindled.
For obvious reasons, both would have been interesting sub-
jects. Nevertheless, the loss of two from a sample of 17
cannot be regarded as a severe limitation. By coincidence,
the name of a civil servant who had helped me arrange pilot
interviews was drawn in the sample. His prior knowledge of
the interview material was sufficient to preclude much spon-
taneity in the interview situation so another name was se-
lected as a substitute. Aside from these three special prob-

.ems, the remainder of the sample agreed to be interviewed.

D. The Interviews

Respondents were first telephoned at their office by an Assistant Secretary of the Federal Establishment Office who assisted me. He explained that he was calling in his personal capacity on behalf of a research student and that their participation in the study would be entirely voluntary and unofficial. If they wanted to hear more, and they all did, I then met them and explained that I would like to talk with them about their backgrounds and their philosophies of life as a part of my research in developing nations. At this time I told them that their name had come up "by chance" and guaranteed their anonymity--in writing if they requested it.[12] We then arranged the first of many long conversations and thereafter met every week or two until the material in the interview guide had been covered. The interviews often extended over a four to five month period.

The place of the interviews varied according to the preference of whomever was being interviewed. Some were held at my home, some at the subject's house, and still others at government offices on a "slow" morning or afternoon. For a few respondents the location of our talks mattered; who came to whom said something about our relative statuses and many, for this reason, preferred that I come to their home or office. The uniformity of venue sacrificed as a result was

nore than offset by having the subject feel that he was, in a sense, in control and could choose a place and time which suited him.

As far as the total length of the interviews with each subject is concerned, they were anywhere from eight to sixteen hours long, averaging approximately eleven hours. A single interview might last an hour or two until weariness set in and we would then arrange to meet another day. Each session might have been longer but for the fact that I could not use a tape recorder. My original intention was to record each interview but I quickly discovered, before the first interview, that the mere mention of a tape recorder sends civil servants fleeing across the horizon. Instead, I took notes and taped them immediately afterwards. With the experience of two full-scale pilot interviews held at the Staff Training Center, I felt I was able to capture almost all the interview material intact. The transcripts thus produced form the central core of this study.

The content of the interviews was as broad as I could possibly make it. Roughly one third concerned the civil servant's experience, his opinions of his job, his opinions of other civil servants and of the civil service in general, plus a number of hypothetical decisions which he was asked to discuss.[13] Another third of the interview dealt with life history, family, childhood and school experiences, his estimate of his own personality, his attitude toward friends and

soney, and his personal values and religious views.[14] The
remaining third of the interview guide, which often consumed
well over one third of our discussions, was devoted to the
respondent's attitudes toward political leaders in general,
toward social classes, his conception of the ideal society,
his notions of democracy, equality, freedom, the causes of
war and poverty, his political interests and activity, and so
on. A more complete account of the interview guide can be
found in Appendix A below.

The instrument for our conversations was the interview
guide we have described. Virtually all the questions were
open-ended, permitting a variety of responses from the sub-
ject. Quite frequently I departed from the guide in order to
probe clichés or to let the respondent continue talking about
topics which interested him. The advantages of an interview
technique of this sort are multiple: it allows a richer ex-
pression of opinion or experience; it permits us to see atti-
tudes and beliefs in the context of personal experience and
personality needs; and it provides a more relaxed, open at-
mosphere for the interview.

I should emphasize here that the interviews differed
fundamentally from the classic psychoanalytic situation.
While I expressed no opinions of my own, I did agree with the
respondents frequently and tried, as much as feasible, to be
supportive of their notions and values rather than adopting a
neutral stance. The disadvantages of participation and over-

encouragement inherent in this strategy were outweighed by
the confidence subjects felt in expressing beliefs in tradi-
tional superstitions and in other non-Western values. Such
beliefs are generally not raised with Westerners since they
are expected to be either faintly mocking or openly contemp-
tuous. As the question of rapport is crucial in interviews
with someone from another culture, I felt this departure from
neutrality a necessary one.

E. Additional Supporting Evidence

After we had finished the last of our conversations I
asked each subject to complete a number of psychological
forms. These forms were intended to measure authoritarian-
ism, social trust, dominance, social and neurotic anxiety,
and anomie.[15] Initially, I had hoped that the use of these
scales, employed also in Robert E. Lane's Political Ideology
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), would afford an interesting
comparison between American and Malaysian subjects. But all
of these measures were developed in the United States and
their validity in the Malaysian context is open to very seri-
ous question. The results from these scales are therefore
used sparingly and only when they seem to contribute signifi-
cantly to the analysis.

As the interviews progressed, I detected a number of
belief patterns which seemed important enough to merit test-
ing in a separate, larger group of civil servants so as to

confirm their existence and significance. Some of the meas-
ures that resulted were developed de novo, some were borrowed
from the field work of anthropologists, and still others were
drawn from the more familiar regions of political science.
Each of these scales was administered to roughly 100 civil
servants enrolled in training courses run by the various min-
istries in Kuala Lumpur. The results offer, I believe, im-
portant support for some of the conclusions of this study as
well as representing independent confirmation of the patterns
found in the interview transcripts. In view of the signifi-
cance of these measures for the analysis, they are reproduced
together with a description of their origins and administra-
tion in Appendix B.

The sources of evidence for our analysis of the ideol-
ogy of the bureaucratic elite in Malaysia are, then, three-
fold. The basic evidence is, of course, the transcripts of
the extended interviews with a random sample of higher civil
servants. But to this evidence we may add the psychological
measures administered to to this sample and the scales devel-
oped to test preliminary conclusions on a broader sample of
civil servants.

FOOTNOTES

1. Occasionally this metamorphosis can occur as a result of a change in the style of an elite rather than as a replacement of one elite by another. Nkrumah in Ghana and Sukarno in Indonesia, notwithstanding their unique qualities, became "symbol manipulators" who drew increasingly upon the indigenous culture for their raw material. While both were more consciously "ideologizing" than the new elites of Nigeria or Algeria, the decline of Western styles and values, and we make no value judgments here, is evident in all four nations. The term "symbol manipulators" comes from Herbert Feith's impressive study, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1962).

2. The election victory of D. Senanaike over Mrs. Bandaranaike in Ceylon signaled the return to power of the more Westernized group of professional men and civil servants which had steadily lost ground under the regimes of Mr. and Mrs. Bandaranaike. This, I believe, was the first reversal of the trend I have described, although Indonesia's post-Sukarno military rulers may qualify as well.

3. Significant exceptions to this method of listing are the Malayan Civil Service (MCS), an elite corps restricted mostly to the Malay community by law, whose members can be posted to any ministry; the Malay Administrative Service (MAS), a "junior" MCS restricted exclusively to

Malays; and the Executive Service, not restricted to any community, whose members can be similarly posted anywhere.

4. Projection from figures in Robert O. Tilman's study of the Malayanization of the civil service in Malaya, Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya (Durham, North Carolina: Duke Univ. Press, 1964), p. 70.

5. The List itself excludes Division I civil servants who are members of a State civil service, e.g., Johore Civil Service, Kedah Civil Service, rather than the Federal Civil Service.

6. This is true of the 1964 Staff List which was used in this study but the 1965 Staff List has more posts above M$1400 due to a general augmentation in salaries and the addition of some posts.

7. The term "no post-secondary training" means that the respondent has passed his Senior Cambridge Certificate, High School Certificate, or equivalent examination at the conclusion of his secondary studies. A number of those who passed this stage could have entered a university or other post-secondary institution but elected not to. The academic achievement represented by these examinations is difficult to assess, but among the older respondents the more restricted educational opportunities available made the possession of such a certificate a mark of greater distinction than it represents today. In contrast with

times past, the holder of one of these certificates to-
day can no longer count on receiving an exalted post in
the bureaucracy.

8. Cf. Footnote 2, this chapter.

9. This office might be called "the administration of the
administration." It deals with pay scales, General Or-
ders, the posting of administrative generalists, etc.

10. "Post-secondary training" as opposed to university de-
gree indicates special training lasting at least one
year for which a certificate was awarded, or one year or
more at a university without winning the degree.

11. The multi-racial character of our sample provides some
unique advantages in interpretation over a sample con-
taining only one ethnic group. These advantages will be
treated later in this chapter.

12. Only one respondent asked for such a letter.

13. A good many of these questions were taken or adapted
from the interview schedule used in Morroe Berger,
Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1957).

14. Most of this and the following section of the interview
guide was patterned after the schedule used by Robert E.
Lane in his Political Ideology (Glencoe: The Free Press,
1962).

15. All measures were selected from among the various scales
employed by Robert E. Lane in his Political Ideology

(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 494-495. The origins of each measure is detailed below:

a. Authoritarianism: Ten items (five reversed), from F-scale used by Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes in The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960).

b. Faith-in-People: Five items, from Morris Rosenberg's "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), pp. 690-695.

c. Dominance: Lane's eleven items selected from sixty items used in Harrison G. Gough, Herbert McClosky, and Paul E. Meehl, "A Personality Scale for Dominance," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46 (1951), pp. 263-269.

d. Anomie: The five items from Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), pp. 709-716.

e. Social and Neurotic Anxiety: Twenty four items adapted for Lane by David Sears from an unpublished scale developed by Seymour B. Sarason and Irving L. Janis.

CHAPTER 3

FORGING ANALYTICAL TOOLS TO EXPLORE PERSONAL IDEOLOGY IN NEW NATIONS

A. Aspects of Ideology

1. Ideology as Personalized

The choice of the term "ideology" may be an unfortunate one for the word has meant many things to many people. To confuse matters still more, the way in which we choose to employ the term does not conform to its popular usage. The best known "ideologies," for most, are socialism and communism, each of which refers to a highly organized system of beliefs and values about society as it is, and as it should be. Ideology in this sense is <u>apart</u> from individuals and has an independent existence regardless of whether it is accepted in whole or in part by any individual.

We use the term "personal ideology" because in our treatment we do not wish to set ideology apart from individu-

ls. Broadly defined, a personal ideology is "an organiza-
tion of opinions, attitudes and values--a way of thinking
bout man and society"[1] which is unique to an individual.
he relationship between a formal ideology like socialism or
ommunism and a personal ideology is as varied as the diver-
ity of human experience and personality can make it. To
ay, for example, that socialism is the personal ideology of
n individual would be a woefully incomplete statement. One
ould, at a minimum, have to go further and discover what as-
ects of socialism he emphasizes, what personal needs of his
re fulfilled by a belief in socialism, and so on. His be-
lief in socialism came about as a result of his unique expe-
rience and personality needs, and each must be seen as part
of a whole when we speak of personal ideology.

It is entirely possible for a personal ideology not to
be influenced by any of the formal ideologies available, al-
though life as it is now lived outside purely folk societies
makes this state of affairs increasingly rare. Still, we
suspect that it is easy to overemphasize the influence of
formal ideology on personal beliefs and neglect the mundane
but important impact of personal relations, occupation, and
status. Lane has shown us that a man's experiences at work
and in social life can, because they are generalized, have
crucial consequences for his broad economic and political
views.[2] A man helps build his personal identity with his
personal ideology--it must orient him in space and time; it

aust hold up certain ends and give him a basis for choosing among means; and it must tell him something about his society and his place in it. In fact, the process of constructing an ideology is, for the individual, virtually the same as constructing a personal identity. If a formal ideology does find a niche in a man's personal ideology there can be no doubt that it becomes highly personalized in the process.

2. Ideology as Patterned

Not only is an individual's ideology highly personalized but it is also coherent or patterned at some level. Just as the psychoanalyst can find underlying, latent patterns in the manifest statements of his patients, so too can one find broad themes in a personal ideology which penetrate a great variety of seemingly disparate beliefs. Such underlying patterns may be stylistic in nature. Milton Rokeach has devoted an entire book to the subject of dogmatism as a "style," independent of the content of beliefs.[3] Thus, if a person who believes in communism and one who believes in capitalism each strongly reject all differing views and those who hold them, they both are dogmatic with respect to style, even though the content of their beliefs places them at different poles on the subject of the state's role in economic affairs.

Underlying patterns may refer to content too. The belief that human nature is selfish, for example, may influence attitudes toward leaders and followers alike and affect no-

tions about cooperating with others to realize common goals.
Inasmuch as these uniformities of style and content are rare-
ly expressed explicitly but must be sought out as common
themes in many disparate beliefs, they are examples of what
we call latent ideology. It is this latent ideology among an
elite group in Malaysia which we hope to seek out and de-
scribe.

The degree of cohesion in a personal ideology varies
greatly from individual to individual and depends to a large
extent on whether one set of beliefs is "in contact" with
others in the conscious mind. In order to maintain a rela-
tively stable identity the mind tends to eliminate the static
caused by dissonant beliefs and to restore some coherence be-
tween them by making suitable alterations, by repression,
etc.[4] How effective the reduction of dissonance is depends
not only on the mechanism available for its reduction and
their efficiency, but also on the awareness of dissonance in
the first place. Absolute logical coherence of views is nev-
er reached but, on the other hand, some reduction of disso-
nant beliefs is almost always achieved. Were it not for dis-
sonance reduction it would be more difficult to talk of the
underlying themes in a person's ideology.

We may also see that some coherence is created between
the cognitive and the emotive or evaluative aspects of a per-
sonal ideology. The cognitive portion of an ideology is a
notion of what reality looks like--the properties of objects

and of people--while the evaluative aspect of an ideology
:asts blame and praise, tells what is good and what is bad,
and provides its sentiment and passion. To distinguish be-
tween the cognitive and emotive aspects of a personal ideolo-
gy is, of course, a purely analytical exercise as the dis-
tinction is seldom if ever made by its possessor. The two
are mutually interdependent because a personal ideology tends
to achieve and maintain some degree of cohesion as cognitive
dissonance theory has shown. A cognitive belief that other
people are helpful and friendly will, for instance, usually
be found together with the evaluative belief that one should
cooperate and love one's fellow man. Sorensen has expressed
the connection between the cognitive and evaluative aspects
of a person's ideology in this way: "A stable positive af-
fect toward a certain object will be accompanied by beliefs
or knowledge about its potentialities for being an instrument
of an end in the realization of desired goals."[5] To put Sor-
ensen's statement in more concrete form, positive affect to-
ward other people, often called "faith-in-people," will gen-
erally be accompanied by a belief that they will actually
help one achieve desired goals. The fact that a measure of
coherence is achieved between the cognitive and evaluative
elements of a person's ideology is important for our analy-
sis. Its importance will be seen now as we turn to the rela-
tionship between political ideology and ideology.

3. Ideology as Politicized

A person's political ideology can be seen as a more specific sub-ideology together with his religious ideology, economic ideology, ideology of social relations, etc. His political ideology is simply that system of beliefs, ideas, values, and feelings which constitutes his orientation toward the world of politics. The relation between different sub-ideologies varies greatly from person to person and often within the same person over time. For a religious zealot, religious ideology may virtually crowd out political ideology as he casts political conflicts solely in terms of the struggle of the faithful against the heathen. It is not that his political ideology does not exist, far from it, but rather that for him political and religious life are identical. For another more secular individual, political and religious ideology may maintain more nearly separate existences, although a complete compartmentalization of spheres of belief would probably never be found.

The strength of relationship between sub-ideologies such as the religious and the political may vary greatly from individual to individual, but the relationship between a person's broad ideology and his more specific political ideology is almost invariably strong. An individual's orientation toward political leaders is apt to form a part of his attitude toward authority figures in general; his feelings about political conflict are, in the same fashion, likely to come

under the influence of his reaction to disputes and conflict
at the personal level, and so forth. More specifically, in
developing nations we might expect that the prevalent view
among traditional people that floods, disease, and other
"natural" disasters cannot be avoided, would in turn have
some impact on feelings of political efficacy and the degree
to which a society can affect its own destiny. This rela-
tionship between a person's broad, latent ideology and his
specifically political beliefs and values is a crucial one
for our study. It clearly indicates that we must often look
behind the political to get at the underlying themes which
will help us weave the broad fabric of which the political
forms but a portion.

4. Ideology as Shared

The discussion, to this point, has been focused on
ideology at the personal level. In all societies we may ex-
pect that some elements in a personal ideology will be shared
with others in the same culture. If this were not the case,
if each individual's ideology were totally unique, this study
could tell us nothing about the ideology of elites in new na-
tions and would be reduced to a description of individual
idiosyncrasies. What a group or society shares in its gener-
al beliefs, values, and practices is a part of that society's
or group's culture. And what a group shares in its political
orientation, values, and symbols is a part of that group's
political culture. In fact, it would not be inaccurate to

say that the political culture of a group is simply the dis-
tribution of individual political ideologies for that group's
population.[6]

5. The Basis for Shared Ideology in New Nations

Inasmuch as we focus on the aspects of personal ideol-
ogy which seem to be shared by some or all of the members of
our sample, we are dealing with a segment of political cul-
ture. We are concerned with the political culture of an
elite; not with any individual *exotica* but rather with what
they share in their personal political ideologies. That the
elite we are dealing with will have some elements of politi-
cal ideology in common is virtually certain, but the extent
will depend directly on the degree to which its members share
an existential base which provides for some common experi-
ences, whether they look at the world with similar cultural
premises, and whether they have other corresponding personal
qualities.[7] As our interest is concentrated on what our Ma-
laysian sample can tell us about the ideology of elites in
new nations, it will be natural for us to emphasize those
parts of the existential base and experiences which Malaysia
shares with most new nations rather than those which distin-
guish Malaysia from other new states.

What do new nations share in terms of an existential
base and common experiences? In a preliminary way we may say
that they share:

1. Elements of a still traditional culture, however
   attenuated.
2. Relative poverty.
3. A past of alien rule by Western nations.
4. Rapid social change, at least at the elite level,
   in the recent past.

Throughout our study we shall concentrate largely on these
four bases of common experience and the similarities in per-
sonal political ideology for which they seem to account. The
first two are pre-colonial in their origin and the final two
are direct and indirect products respectively of colonialism.
While all four are fairly clear-cut, one might wonder whether
"elements of a traditional culture" would constitute some-
thing new nations do <u>not</u> have in common rather than something
shared. Without pausing now to discuss the problems involved
here, we would suggest that traditional cultures have enough
in common in a broad sense to speak of "traditionality" as
something shared by new nations.

Furthermore, the nature of our study gives us a unique
advantage in that we may in some respects control for the
differences in traditional societies. Our sample, after all,
includes still culturally distinct Chinese, Malays, and Tam-
ils. Should we find similar elements in their political ide-
ologies, we may conclude that these arise either from shared
cultural premises or from other common experiences such as
education or colonialism. But if these similarities seem to
be of the sort which originate in early childhood, then they
are most probably culturally determined. And if the Chinese,
Malays, and Tamils in our sample share culturally determined

lements in their ideologies, we may then reasonably say that
he traditional cultures of the three societies appear to
ave some common traits. We would not hesitate to simply as-
ume that all "traditional" cultures share certain character-
stics if it were necessary, but the tri-racial nature of our
ample allows us to discover similarities rather than assum-
ng them.

Malaysia is, in one sense, an amalgam of its Chinese,
ndian, and Malay sub-cultures, and this fact affords us many
f the advantages of cross-national comparative research
hich embraces countries of diverse cultural patterns. Com-
son elements discovered in the ideology of members of all
hree groups are more likely to be found in other new nations
than would common elements found in the ideology of a single
cultural group. Our study is, in some measure then, an exam-
ination of three cases rather than of a single case which
would be more affected by unique cultural variables.

In any event, we feel that the four characteristics
which all new nations share will form the broad basis for
whatever similarities in political ideology might be found
among their elites. It is for this reason that we stress
these characteristics when dealing with Malaysian civil ser-
vants and attempt to show what they contribute to the shared
ideology of a Malaysian elite and, by example, what they must
also contribute to ideology among the elites of other new na-
tions.

B. Levels of Ideology in New Nations

1. The Concept of Levels

When discussing personal ideology we must take care to distinguish what "level" of ideology we are treating. Obviously, a belief that the government should extend the fishing season is in a real sense a more peripheral or "shallow" belief than a conviction that all power holders are self-seekers. Some conception of "level" is thus a prerequisite for separating the relatively trivial from the more significant or "deep." Milton Rokeach has developed a terminology for characterizing these levels of ideology which we shall use here. [8] He organizes beliefs along a "central--intermediate-- peripheral dimension." In the central region we find those 'primitive beliefs about the nature of the physical world, the self, and generalized others.' Two examples of central beliefs which we shall discuss later are whether human nature is basically good or bad and whether the environment is supportive or hostile.

Some central beliefs are strictly cognitive--for example, the belief that the sky is blue. As such, they are confirmed only by the observations and agreement of others. A fear of heights, on the other hand, is a belief which cannot be confirmed or denied by outside authority since it refers to an inner state. Validation is a more complex problem for beliefs which fall between the two just mentioned. Is a belief that people are generally trustworthy as testable as the

blueness of the sky, or is it more like acrophobia? Actually, it is not entirely analogous to either because of the problem of false validation. Although trustworthiness in others refers to patterns of behavior which are observable, the quality being measured is so ambiguous that the data can often be distorted for a long period to serve personal needs. Those who have studied the psychology of racial prejudice are well acquainted with this problem of false validation when a conviction of the inferiority of another people is involved. Thus, some central beliefs are amenable to validation by observation and external authority, while some others are quite intractable regardless of the evidence. But many more central beliefs, the ones with which we shall be chiefly concerned in this study, are recalcitrant, but not totally impervious to the accumulation of evidence which would contradict them.

The other two levels of a belief system are, according to Rokeach, the "intermediate" and the "peripheral." By intermediate beliefs he means all beliefs about the 'nature of positive and negative authorities, personal or impersonal, to be relied upon for information and opinions which we cannot or will not gather and develop ourselves.'[9] Reliance on such authority may be total or partial, but knowledge of these positive and negative authorities--the intermediate region of beliefs--will tell us much of the content of the peripheral region. What is left over after the central and intermediate

beliefs are accounted for is the peripheral region which includes, of course, non-primitive beliefs arising from positive and negative authorities.

The material we work from to analyze the latent ideology of Malaysian civil servants is composed largely of peripheral beliefs. Beliefs in the central and intermediate region of an ideology are seldom explicitly stated but rather must be inferred from the interview material. The feelings on the part of a civil servant that his father was overly strict, that his boss is "out to get him," and that political and religious leaders are rapacious or menacing, are all peripheral beliefs. But taken together they may well indicate a central belief that 'authority figures are threatening and exploitive.' Inductive procedures of this sort are the tools we must employ to reconstruct a person's central and intermediate beliefs.

2. Discontinuity of Ideology among Post-Colonial Elites

When we work back inductively from peripheral beliefs to central and intermediate beliefs we are also working our way back through the history of an individual. The evidence is persuasive that the central strata of beliefs are laid down at an earlier age than the intermediate, and the intermediate strata earlier than much of the peripheral. Many important central beliefs are learned during childhood, in the primary socialization process within the family. Among these central beliefs are many which may well have a marked influ-

ınce on specifically political beliefs: notions about how
ıuthority figures behave, whether nature can be controlled,
ïhether others can generally be trusted in time of need, and
ıo forth are examples cf such central beliefs.

Because central beliefs and values are learned early,
ïhey tend to persist and to be resistant to change. Students
ɔf cultural change are widely agreed, for example, that a so-
ʒiety's early-socialized values and beliefs are apt to endure
long after less central notions have been transformed by con-
ʈact with another culture. After reviewing many studies
which bear on this point, one anthropologist goes so far as
to suggest the universality of this "early learning hypothe-
sis" to account for the tenacity of central beliefs in every
cultural context.[10] Leonard Doob, a psychologist interested
in cultural change, also recognizes the relative persistence
of central beliefs that are learned early. Using a different
formulation, he argues that those aspects of a traditional
culture which "serve continuing needs" are likely to be most
resistant to change and that

> Traditional beliefs and values that have been learned at
> an early age, other things being equal, are more likely
> to appear to serve a continuing need than those learned
> later in life.[11]

The primary socialization of central beliefs is the
key process for maintaining the identity of a culture over
time. What Linton has called the "core culture" is transmit-

;ed from parents to their children as an integral part of growing up.[12] Successful socialization of this core-culture permits the central beliefs and values of a society to persist more or less intact from generation to generation. In a relatively stable, isolated society the intermediate and peripheral beliefs added on layer by layer tend to be congruent with, and to amplify, the basic orientations transmitted by this early socialization. To be sure, not even the most stable and isolated societies are without their own particular strains and inconsistencies, but they nevertheless maintain a high order of continuity.

The continuity we have described was true of most underdeveloped areas before colonialism. With the advent of Western rule, however, this continuity was broken as colonized societies found themselves in an era of cultural change imposed from outside. The fact that the change originated from without provided the source of discontinuity, while the forceful, imposed nature of colonialism allowed for little of the selective adaptation which often characterizes trade contacts between cultures. These societies had been selecting beliefs and values from outside sources before colonialism, but the choice was usually their own; they could retain or discard what they pleased. Colonial rule, on the other hand, introduced certain practices which it insisted be followed and exacted penalties for noncompliance. The imperial rulers tried in a systematic way to transmit their own beliefs and

values to sections of the indigenous population through edu-
cation and also through the administrative machinery. Much
the same could be said of any regime originating in alien
conquest. But the Western colonizers were more thorough and
systematic in their attempts to change people, where other
conquerors were willing to settle for outward deference and
tribute.

Colonial rule created great discontinuities in ideolo-
gy, especially among the local elite which was educated and
trained under it. Secondary socialization in the schools
taught British, French, Dutch beliefs and values inconsistent
with many of the central beliefs of the local culture. The
Western insistence on contract relationships and private own-
ership of land, for example, conflicted in turn with more ar-
chaic networks of obligation and with traditional land tenure
patterns. Labor became a commodity in a money market rather
than the subject of traditional kin and community obliga-
tions. Court justice according to common law replaced what
seemed to Westerners to be more diffuse and unjust methods of
settling disputes.[13] In short, a whole host of new beliefs
and values which did not flow from, and often contradicted,
the central beliefs of the colonized people were propagated
and enforced by alien rulers.

This gap between central and peripheral beliefs, be-
tween primary and secondary socialization, has created a
great discontinuity in ideology, the effects of which are

everywhere apparent in new nations. The dilemma a civil servant confronts in deciding whether to let his daughter make her own match or to select a suitable mate for her is a microcosm of this conflict. So too is the choice between spending the money he has saved on a feast for his friends and relatives or on his son's education. So is the choice of whether to wear Western or traditional dress at home. The choices to be made are between alternatives of behavior but each alternative implies a different set of values and, taken together, they imply a way of life. Making a decision is not simple, it is a real dilemma simply because the civil servant simultaneously holds different values which would predispose him to each alternative. He can seldom appease both values at once and therefore each choice he makes leaves the other set of preferences unsatisfied.[14]

There is a discontinuity in specifically political ideology as well, and it is this discontinuity which is more relevant to our purpose. Early socialized central beliefs, for example, imply a quite different political system than the existing national system which has been adapted from Western forms. While early training stresses obedience to authority and traditional bases of legitimacy, later school training is likely to emphasize active participation in politics and the doctrine of popular rule. Local political structures are, like the family, autocratic—or oligarchic at best—while the national political system may be democratic

and open. One style may be taught for participation as a citizen in the local community and another, different style for participation in the national political arena. The Westernized school system may emphasize the possibility of government contributing to social change and economic development, but, at the same time, a central belief in the powerlessness of man before nature, in fatalism, may seriously undermine this orientation.

These are only a few examples of the discontinuity in political ideology which we feel is a general phenomenon among elites in new nations. Discontinuity in political ideology can be viewed as merely a single facet of the cultural dualism to be found in all new states as a result of the coexistence of Western values at the peripheral level together with more traditional notions in the central region. This dualism is generally more a feature of the broad elite rather than of the masses, as it is particularly the elite which has had prolonged contact with Westernized values and institutions. The basis of the discontinuity the elite experiences resides in the conflict between the norms of dependence, nonparticipation and compliance with traditional authority which are internalized early and the norms of independence, participation, and critical evaluation to which they are exposed in school and in the modern sector. Often the clash is between an ideological style emphasizing "subject" values and another representing more of a "citizen" orientation.[15]

3. Two Consequences of Discontinuity in Political Ideology

Two consequences of this discontinuity in political
ideology are of special interest for our study. Each will be
examined in some detail in this study.

a. The first consequence is that there is often a
discontinuity between the content of a person's beliefs and
the underlying style of his beliefs. We may find, for exam-
ple, someone simultaneously holding the view that a govern-
ment must initiate change together with a firm conviction
that social and economic conditions are essentially beyond
the control of man. We may find someone who believes in the
formation of groups for political ends but whose strong pes-
simism about the cooperativeness of human nature largely pre-
cludes acting upon that belief. Or, we may discover that
someone who is able to evaluate political parties dispassion-
ately feels nevertheless that his obligations to kin and com-
munity constrain him to support one party irrespective of its
program. In each case we find that a belief or value learned
presumably during secondary socialization is being undercut,
being sabotaged, so to speak, by a more central belief inter-
nalized earlier. The discontinuity in political ideology
permits central orientations which are often a part of the
cultural tradition to seep through and affect the style and
content of beliefs which are, on the surface, more Western.[16]
In the next two chapters we shall examine the influence of
central orientations across a whole range of peripheral beliefs.

b. A second result of this discontinuity in political ideology relates closely to the point above but requires that we make a distinction between the "range" of beliefs and their "weight." When peripheral beliefs are consonant with intermediate and central beliefs, they are apt to have considerable weight. But when there is discontinuity in political ideology of the kind we have described, peripheral beliefs, while they may have the same range, are likely to have less "weight." Erich Fromm illustrates exactly what we mean in this passage:

> Ideas often are consciously accepted by certain groups, which, on account of the peculiarities of their social character, are not really touched by them; such ideas remain a stock of conscious convictions, but people fail to act according to them in a critical hour. An example of this is shown in the German labor movement at the time of the victory of Nazism. The vast majority of German workers before Hitler's coming into power voted for the Socialist or Communist Parties and believed in the ideas of those parties; that is, the range of these ideas among the working class was extremely wide. The weight of these ideas, however, was in no proportion to their range.[17]

Similarly, we may expect to find, due to the discontinuities in political ideology among the elites of new nations, that many peripheral political beliefs have great range but little weight. Taking the broad ideas associated with Western liberal democracy we may discover that these ideas have great currency but rest on shaky foundations; that

there is a facade of democratic beliefs which are often
strongly held at the conscious level but are, at the same
time, undermined in style and content by quite contrary cen-
tral beliefs that are often "pre-political" in origin. Find-
ing out how "deep" a belief goes is a hazardous enterprise
but we shall nonetheless attempt to say something not only
about the depth of Western political beliefs among the sample
we have examined, but also about other beliefs which tend to
strengthen or weaken these Western notions.

C. Accounting for an Ideology

Explaining the origins and maintenance of beliefs
which are widespread in a culture is not an easy task and
should perhaps be left to the anthropologists who are better
equipped for the endeavor than we. Ultimately, however, an
explanation of the origin of a personal ideology must be re-
lated to personal experience within a cultural context. Un-
less an effort is made to trace the genesis of an ideology
along these lines, one is left with a largely descriptive
analysis which lacks any dynamic character. Some conception
of how important beliefs are generated and maintained is a
prerequisite to an understanding of the process of change in
ideologies.

As the study of ideology in developing areas is in its
infancy, there are few systematic attempts to account for
what has been found and described. Two such attempts which

are among the most prominent deserve our attention. One is
that of Lucian Pye in Politics, Personality, and Nation
Building: Burma's Search for Identity[18] and the second is Ed-
ward Banfield's The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.[19] We
have chosen these two not only because they are more or less
systematic but also because they are quite divergent in per-
spective and in the process of change which they imply.
While they are not mutually exclusive, each approach has its
unique advantages and disadvantages, and a close examination
of each should help us see the problem in sharper focus. A
comparison between the two approaches is all the more en-
lightening because both attempt to explain the same phenome-
non; namely, why people are unable to join together effec-
tively for common ends.

1. Pye's Approach: Discontinuity, Identity Diffusion,
   and Social Mobility

Pye sees "the problem of political development and
modernization as essentially the creation of adaptive and
purposeful organization."[26] According to him, Burma has
largely failed to create such organizations and he sets out
to discover why.

For the most part, Pye seeks his explanation in the
theory of discontinuity which we have sketched in broad terms
above. Politicians and administrators in Burma, he shows,
have been socialized at an early age to traditional beliefs
and norms and then later exposed to Western beliefs and

standards. The result of this discontinuity in socialization is that no clear sense of identity develops among these elites and that "there will be related uncertainty in the political culture of the people."[21] A sense of ambiguity about the colonizers, about traditional culture, and about the West characterize Pye's subjects as does the feeling that they may have failed when measured against the Western standards they have partially incorporated. Their political ideology, according to Pye, is a product of their identity crisis and is therefore meant to solve problems of personal identity rather than to provide a path toward objective goals. It is no wonder to Pye that the personally insecure Burmese elites lack the self-confidence necessary to cooperate effectively with others without fear, suspicion, and general anxiety. The general tone of Pye's analysis is pessimistic because personal insecurity will inevitably lead to more failures and those failures will provoke more anxiety as well as increasingly stavistic programs which in turn will bring failure and so on in a seemingly endless, vicious circle.[22] Inasmuch as the core dilemma of insecurity about identity is rooted firmly in colonialism--in contact with the West--there seems to be no way out except perhaps after a long series of disasters with false prophets.[23] If Pye is able to find some slender basis for hope, other analysts such as David Apter who agree with Pye's diagnosis see no remedy but rather predict an increase in irrational, messianic flights of fancy.[24]

Pye's analysis is pursued as if the situation he describes were something unique to new nations, but it belongs, we feel, in the category of research into the consequences of social mobility. The upwardly mobile individual in the West moves from the sub-culture of one class into the sub-culture of another, higher class, while mobility in colonial society represents a more traumatic movement from one culture into an entirely new one. The differences in the degree of change are important but should not obscure the similarity in the kind of movement. At the personal level, mobility in both industrial and transitional societies has strikingly similar effects. The resemblance between the following summary of the personal consequences of "marginality" arising from social mobility and Pye's analysis of Burmese elite behavior is impressive.

> They [those who change social status] are shedding major aspects of their personality and adopting new ones. They suffer from a variety of feelings: guilt, because they are to a degree renouncing the people (especially their parents) in the status group which nurtured them and set many of the rules for their behavior; solitude, because they have severed old ties and not yet established new ones; conformism, because they feel they must sedulously adopt the customs of the better status group if they are ever to be accepted by it; and a radical ambivalence of the self, as they see themselves from time to time failing the past that nurtured them, failing in their efforts to enter a new status, and failing to measure up to a self-image of virtue in either the Greek or puritanical sense. They feel neither noble nor free of sin.[25]

The personal feelings Pye attributes to transitional elites in Burma bear a strong likeness to the characteristics found among those who are socially mobile. That we should find this similarity is not at all surprising since social mobility is the central process involved in both situations. Many students of new nations have commented on the conformity, often of a ritualistic nature, and the ambivalence about the old and new ways which characterize their elites.[26] These characteristics can be seen as the result of the special form of social mobility which the elites in new nations have experienced. We do not doubt for a moment that the behavioral consequences of such feelings may be quite different in new nations than in the West, but we enhance our understanding of the process if we see it as a special case of social mobility.

The use of "social mobility theory" to explain the personality disorders Pye finds among Burmese elites is more plausible in the light of research results comparing socially mobile persons to those whose class status is stable over time. In their inventory of behavioral propositions for which there is supporting data, Berelson and Steiner summarize the findings in this way:

> Those moving up in class are more subject to mild or moderate emotional and mental disorder (neuroticism) than those who are stationary, partly because of the clash of class values to which they are subject and partly because of their own make-up at the outset.[27]

The "emotional and mental disorder" to which members of a mo-
bile transitional elite are prone is really the focus of
Pye's study and he too assigns a central role to the clash of
values involved. The degree of neuroticism, however, may
well be even greater for the upwardly mobile in a new nation
simply because mobility in transitional society entails such
a vast leap from indigenous traditional values to alien,
Western norms.

Mobility in transitional nations is a very "special
case" of general social mobility since in these new nations
it is also accompanied by rapid, general social change. The
upwardly mobile person in the industrial nations is moving
through a relatively more stable system, while the upwardly
mobile person in a transitional society is less certain of
the class or status into which he is moving. He is uncertain
what the relative ranking of that class will be after five
years, and what behavior he should conform to in order to be
accepted, since status rankings and role behavior for each
class or sub-class are still relatively unsettled. The exam-
ple of local administrators who joined the colonial bureauc-
racy is especially poignant in this respect. For many of
them, no sooner had they attained their new status than inde-
pendence was declared and they were revealed by the new po-
litical elite to be part and parcel of the exploitative, co-
lonial regime--worthy objects of contempt. Changing status
in any society carries its uncertainties but in a transitional

society these uncertainties are compounded by change of a more general nature.

Pye's way of accounting for the beliefs and values which prevent the erection of effective organizations in Burma focuses on the discontinuity in socialization and the conflict in beliefs and values which this discontinuity implies. The "broken" pattern of socialization that he describes is common both to those who move up in status and to those who are most affected by cultural contact such as colonialism. Therefore, the conflicts highlighted in Pye's study are common to both processes although, as we have explained, there is an important difference in degree since colonialism occasions more striking conflicts in values. If our analysis is correct, we may characterize the approach of Pye and many of those who share his orientation as one which emphasizes the impact of rapid social change, the ideological conflict it produces in individuals, and the observed behavior which results.

Having examined one important way of accounting for ideology, let us turn to another, very different attempt to grapple with the same problem in another context.

2. Banfield's Approach: Amoral Familism and the Empirical Base

The setting of Banfield's study is a small town in southern Italy, an underdeveloped area but certainly not a new nation. In this new setting Banfield faces the same

problem Pye faced in Burma: how to explain why people in this town seem unable to organize effective groups for either economic or political ends. Like Pye he feels this ability is the crucial skill involved in moving toward modernity. His explanation of why the skill to create effective organizations is lacking must be different from Pye's for the simple reason that the factors Pye relied upon are absent in the Italian context. Colonialism and rapid social change are not a part of the Italian peasant's experience as they are a part of the living memory of Pye's Burmese subjects.

Banfield observed that the interpersonal behavior of the townsmen of Montegrano precluded forming lasting, vigorous interest groups. He looked for a unifying principle which would render most of their interpersonal behavior comprehensible and would predict behavior not yet observed. Montegranesi, he concluded, acted as if they were following this rule:

Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise.[28]

This principle Banfield calls "amoral familism" to emphasize that when dealing with people outside the family, the interests of one's nuclear family take precedence over other considerations of right and wrong. Once this simplifying principle has been accepted it appears to explain why residents refuse to join together for community interests, why they are suspicious of the motives of others, why office

holders pursue personal and not organizational goals, why the
law is ineffective when there is no fear of punishment, why
the weak prefer strong government, why power-holders are seen
as corrupt and self-seeking, and finally why community gains
are favorably evaluated by a family only when it will share
substantially in those gains.[29] Many of these patterns which
Banfield finds among the citizens of Montegrano are striking-
ly similar to those Pye observed among Burmese elites. The
interpersonal suspicion, the low estimate of power-holders,
the pursuit of personal goals within organizations, and the
preference for strong government, all find echoes in Pye's
study. But Banfield sees these characteristics as part of a
pattern of "amoral familism" without reference to discontinu-
ities in socialization or fragile personal identity.

If Banfield makes no use of discontinuities in social-
ization to account for the ethos of Montegrano, how does he
explain its existence? The principle of "amoral familism"
might be called a basic part of the latent ideology of the
Montegranesi but it does not account for the origin of this
ideology. It is merely a simplifying principle which brings
order to a number of specific beliefs and values associated
with political activity.

To explain the origins of the ethos of "amoral fami-
lism" Banfield turns primarily to the poverty-- la miseria --
of the region, to the absence of a supportive extended fami-
ly, and to the nature of childhood training. But both the

size of the family and the nature of primary socialization
are, according to Banfield, heavily influenced by the poverty
of the land and the fears of injury or death prevalent amidst
such privation.[30] Thus, although he does not say so expli-
citly, Banfield attributes the "amoral familism" of the Mon-
tegranesi to the existential base of poverty; the severe lim-
its imposed on the ideological superstructure by the
strictures of the material culture. Banfield's reliance on
the existential base, on a variety of economic determinism,
contrasts sharply with Pye's dependence upon the personal
consequences of discontinuities in socialization while both
are endeavoring to explain substantially the same phenomenon.

3. Contrasts of Two Explanations

a. <u>Origins of an ideology</u>. The quite separate ways
in which Pye and Banfield account for the origins of the com-
parable personal ideologies they found among subjects in Bur-
ma and Italy highlight some important analytical contrasts.

First, Pye discovers the origins of beliefs which im-
pede cooperation in the dualistic nature of the culture--par-
ticularly, the ideological uncertainty produced by colonial-
ism--and in rapid social change. Banfield, to whom these two
explanations are not available in the Italian context, finds
that much the same beliefs are created by the cultural hand-
cuffs of a poverty stricken economy. For Pye, then, the fo-
cus is on <u>social and cultural change</u> and its personal conse-

quences while, for Banfield, attention is concentrated on the static nature of a culture of poverty.

Our second point is related to the first and is best illustrated if we recall the four characteristics which new nations share in their existential base and common experience. These are: (1) elements of a traditional culture, (2) relative poverty, (3) a past of alien rule by Western nations, and (4) rapid social change. The initial two are characteristic of almost any underdeveloped nation whether it is a new nation or not. And these are the two characteristics which Banfield employs when he analyzes the effects of poverty on the beliefs and values of the southern Italian peasant. Pye, by contrast, accounts for the unsettled beliefs and values of his Burmese subjects by concentrating on colonial rule and rapid change, the last two factors, which are more specifically attributes of new nations than of the broader category of underdeveloped countries. In this sense, then, we may say that Banfield's explanation is a broader one as it could conceivably apply to any culture existing at the subsistence level while Pye's explanation, relying as it does on the colonial experience, is restricted to nations which have recently won independence from Western rule.

Thirdly, we may distinguish between the levels of socialization which each writer employs to explain the personal ideology he has found. Banfield relies almost exclusively on primary socialization within the family, particularly those

aspects of primary socialization most affected by the perva-
sive poverty of the environment. Early socialization plays
an important role in Pye's analysis too, but only to the ex-
tent that it conflicts with secondary socialization. Pye's
reliance on the discontinuity in socialization means that he
must concentrate on both levels while the continuity of so-
cialization in Montegrano allows Banfield to focus on the de-
velopment of central beliefs during early training which are
then confirmed, not contradicted, by later experience.

   b. Changes in ideology. Banfield emphasizes stasis,
primary socialization, the traditional culture, and poverty
while Pye tends to focus on transition, the discontinuity of
secondary socialization, colonialism, and social change. Not
only do they rely on quite different independent variables to
explain an ideology, but each approach implies a distinct
process of ideological change. Both writers are pessimistic
about the possibilities of ideological change in the near fu-
ture but it seems to us that the logic of Pye's analysis
leaves less cause for optimism. The discontinuities in so-
cialization which, he feels, create insecurity about identity
and values and predispose elites to failures in modernization
are here to stay and there is no reason to believe that they
will disappear now that the imperial masters have departed.
The cultural dualism Pye describes seems irreversible in the
foreseeable future. His subjects suffer from what might be
called personality disorders which involve an inability to

deal with the real world and real dilemmas.

Banfield's subjects are, on the other hand, in some measure dealing with the real world, a world of poverty in which "amoral familism" makes sense, given the environment. If their behavior is predicated upon a society where scarcity is the rule, it is quite conceivable that conditions of more abundance would change beliefs and values in the long run. Some evidence that this is the case is suggested by the absence of "amoral familistic" responses to Thematic Appperception Tests administered in the more advanced northern area of Italy.[31] It seems unlikely, of course, that given their ideology, the Montegranesi could get together and pull themselves up by their bootstraps. But opportunities introduced from outside might well begin the process of ideological change. Thus Banfield's analysis has very different implications for ideological change than Pye's. A change in the environment is going to make more of a difference to the southern Italians who are coping with the real world than to the Burmese who have turned their backs on reality. Pye's subjects confront a psychic cul de sac while Banfield's face largely environmental obstacles.

c. The functions of an ideology. We can gain further insight into the question of how shared personal ideology originates and changes by focusing on the functions an ideology serves for an individual. Three functions can be distinguished: (1) A personal ideology serves purely personal

extra-rational needs. A man has to express his unique intra-psychic problems and needs and he does this by externaliza-tion, including projection and displacement, reaction forma-tion, rationalization, fantasy fulfillment and so forth. These might be called the "calming" functions of an ideolo-gy.[32]   (2) The second function a personal ideology serves is to place a man among his fellows, defining his location in his family, neighborhood, community, in the society as a whole. He identifies with some individuals and groups and dis-identifies with others. Thus, ideology helps a man cre-ate a social identity and maintain his self-esteem in inter-personal relations. (3) A third function could be called the "reality" function.[33] In order to live and work toward his goals a man must know what things and people are like, how they respond to his behavior, and so on. The "reality" func-tion sets some limits on a personal ideology since a man's beliefs must be approximately correct in telling him what is happening around him and to him if he is to operate at all effectively as a member of his society.

Most writers concerned with the ideology of elites in new nations have, like Pye, largely dwelt on the personal, extra-rational functions fulfilled by personal beliefs and values and, to a lesser extent, on their inter-personal func-tions. For Pye and many others, the obvious discontinuity in socialization in new nations which creates conflicts in val-ues immediately focuses attention on ways of assuaging the

intra-psychic needs and tensions which accompany these con-
flicts. Once having adopted this mode of analysis, Pye sees
no way out of the basic dilemma except perhaps through an
eventual abandonment of reality-cheating mechanisms after
failure upon failure has somehow forced an agonizing reap-
praisal of defense mechanisms. Apter, who shares much of
Pye's analytical orientation, appears to see no exit whatso-
ever but forecasts the triumph of "political religion" as a
measure of desperation amidst the failure to successfully
modernize.[34]

d. The importance of the reality function. It should
be clear by now that we feel the "reality function" of ideol-
ogy has been woefully neglected in explaining the pattern of
personal ideology among elites in new nations. It is impor-
tant that political scientists ask themselves whether a set
of beliefs and values seems to "make sense" in the environ-
ment--both material and non-material--which they are examin-
ing. We readily concede that an ideology need not precisely
fit a man's experience; but it cannot be too wide of the mark
or it will not survive. Lane has expressed what we intend to
convey in this way:

And even the most facile devices for squaring particular
experiences with incompatible interpretations . . . must
eventually fail to protect men from the abrasions of re-
ality. Know-Nothingism, Social Darwinism, the anarchism
of the Western Wobblies are eroded, each in turn, by ex-
perience with Catholics, with government regulation, with

the welfare departments of cities. Incongruence between ideology and experience extinguishes a social movement.[35]

A variety of factors may account for the emphasis placed on the "calming" function of personal ideology in new nations to the virtual exclusion of the "reality" function. First, a good many of the beliefs and values present in developing areas may seem, to Western eyes at least, irrational. Once they are perceived as irrational it is natural to turn to explanations which center on pathology rather than to examine the environment in which these beliefs exist and seek clues to their genesis there.

A second and more serious reason is simply the failure to recognize the effect of a society's existential base in restricting the range of available beliefs and values to those which are roughly congruent with experience in that society. The limits placed on the non-material culture by the material culture have been studied repeatedly by anthropologists, and while the latitude of beliefs permitted by a given material culture is the subject of dispute, there is no doubt that some limits are imposed. For example, Shapera has shown that the vast differences in the material cultures of the Bushmen, who are gatherers and hunters moving across the landscape in very small bands, and the Bantu, who are agriculturalists and husbandmen living in larger, settled communities, result in quite dissimilar beliefs about how the community should ideally be managed.[36] A good test of the

influence of the existential base on ideology is to observe
what happens when forces beyond the control of a culture al-
ter its existential base. This is precisely what happened to
the people of Tanala who had depleted all the available land
for dry rice cultivation. Kandiner describes what occurred:

> This psychological balance could, however, be maintained
> only while the economic basis for subsistence was based
> on communal land ownership. No sooner did the subsist-
> ence economy and the social organization for it change
> than the whole psychological structure collapsed. . . .
> Social changes therefore do not take place in isolated
> and detached items. The human mind is integrative, and
> hence systems of ideas and attitudes become involved, not
> separate items.[37]

In spite of all the evidence for the relationship be-
tween the ideology and the existential base of a culture,
there is another important reason why it has been neglected
as a partial explanation for the genesis and maintenance of
beliefs and values. This arises from the fact that a consid-
erable lag often occurs between a change in the existential
base and the consequent change in ideology. That is, the
ideology and existential base may not be congruent at each
point in time. The farmer who moves to the city or the immi-
grant who arrives in a new country does not immediately
change the whole complex of beliefs and values associated
with his past way of life. It may actually require more than
one generation to restore congruence between the empirical
base and his ideology. On a larger scale, we have already

noted Doob's comments on the tenacity of central, early so-
cialized beliefs even after much else has changed. Central
beliefs will only change after repeated batterings from expe-
rience. The process of slow adjustment may even require an
entire epoch as it did in Tanala.

> Some societies, like Tanala, are able to achieve such
> stability under conditions like an unchanging subsistence
> economy. Once the latter is destroyed, as was actually
> the case, the personality, which was geared for coopera-
> tion under the old conditions, is completely unsuited for
> the new conditions. The society is therefore thrown into
> a disequilibrium which may last for centuries.[38]

This "disequilibrium" stage, as Kandiner describes it,
is not an inappropriate characterization of new nations. If
we focus on the "reality" functions of ideology we may well
find that there is a congruence between central beliefs now
current and the empirical base which was destroyed by coloni-
alism.

In fact, the possibility that much of the central be-
lief system or latent ideology of elites in new nations is
congruent with a past existential base is a central proposi-
tion in this study. We hope to show that the approach of
Banfield in The Moral Basis of a Backward Society can shed
more light on the origin and dynamics of ideology than can an
exclusive reliance on the purely personal, intra-psychic
functions of a belief system. If we stress the "reality"
functions of an ideology we do not mean to ignore the contri-

bution of Pye and Apter. The two approaches are not at all
mutually exclusive but are complementary. Focusing on the
congruence between central beliefs and a pre-existing exis-
tential base a la Banfield we may help account for the ori-
gins of these central beliefs and show how change could oc-
cur, while an understanding of the ideological effects of
colonialism à la Pye is essential for an appreciation of the
conflict between central and peripheral beliefs. Banfield's
reliance on poverty and the traditional culture (factors com-
mon to underdeveloped areas) to explain ideology in southern
Italy alerts us to their importance in accounting for ideolo-
gy in Malaysia. Pye's reliance on colonialism and rapid
change (factors common to new nations) to explain ideology in
Burma bears witness to the fact that these two additional
factors complicate the picture in new nations and must be
worked into the analysis where appropriate.

Having already briefly introduced Malaysia and ex-
plained the nature and method of this study in the preceding
chapters, we have tried in this chapter to forge some analyt-
ical tools and to discuss approaches heretofore used to ana-
lyze ideology in underdeveloped areas. We first defined what
we meant by "personal ideology" and "personal political ide-
ology" and then noted the ways in which ideology is patterned
and shared, making a study of a group's ideology both possi-
ble and useful. Four qualities common to the existential

base and shared experience of new nations—elements of a traditional culture, relative poverty, a past of alien rule by Western nations, and rapid social change—were suggested as the basis of a shared ideology in new nations which might allow us to generalize about them as a group.

We then introduced the concept of "levels" of a personal ideology borrowing Rokeach's definitions of central, intermediate, and peripheral beliefs. These distinctions were used in turn to illustrate the discontinuity between central and peripheral beliefs, between primary and secondary socialization, both of which are facets of the cultural dualism produced by the colonial experience. Two results of this discontinuity are that pre-political beliefs tend to penetrate the later learned Western beliefs and that Western beliefs are apt to have great range but little weight.

Finally we compared the different methods utilized to account for the existence and maintenance of a shared ideology in underdeveloped areas. Pye's approach is characterized by reliance upon colonialism and discontinuity in socialization, the relieving of intra-psychic tensions, and the rapid change in transitional society as crucial factors. This approach approximates a special case of the theory of social mobility. Banfield's analysis depends more upon factors like poverty and traditional ways and emphasizes the "reality" functions of belief systems. The method of Pye underlines change while that of Banfield stresses stasis. After explor-

ing the implications for ideological change of each approach, we explained that the "reality" function of an ideology was seldom used to explain belief patterns in new nations and suggested that it could perhaps lead to more fruitful results than exclusive reliance upon Pye's mode of analysis.

The next task is to discover the central beliefs of our sample of high civil servants and ask how these beliefs developed. In Chapter 4 we explore our sample's estimate of human nature and, in Chapter 5, their conception of man's relation with nature. In each case we ask specifically: What are the consequences for political ideology of these orientations? Chapter 6 attempts some generalizations about ideology in transitional society. The sources of support for democratic norms are analyzed in Chapter 7 and in Chapter 8 we probe the nature of democratic support in the sample. Chapter 9 is devoted to a discussion of the sources of support for an administrative or non-democratic polity. The final chapter is an attempt to put the diverse threads of our study in some order and to reach some modest conclusions about ideology in new states.

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. . . . **FOOTNOTES**

1. T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper Brothers, 1950), p. 2.

2. Lane, op. cit.

3. Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

4. For a discussion of the theory of cognitive dissonance and the mechanisms for reducing dissonance see L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957), and Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance (New York: Wiley, 1962).

5. Alma Don Sorensen, "Toward a Theory of Ideology in Political Life" (unpublished PhD dissertation, Univ. of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, 1965), p. 55.

6. "Political culture" is a still broader term than "shared political ideology" since the former would include material artifacts relevant to politics as well as practices and behavior per se. The concept of shared political ideology does not contain artifacts and practices per se but does include them as objects of cognition and affect in the minds of members of the society.

7. These terms are borrowed from Robert E. Lane's "paradigm of ideological change" in Political Ideology, op. cit., pp. 415-416.

8. Rokeach, op. cit., pp. 39-51. Rokeach's typology is sim-

ilar to the distinction between "dominant" and "variant" value orientations made by Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck in their Variations in Value Orientations (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1961), pp. 3-4.

9. Rokeach, ibid., pp. 42-44. The levels of belief that Rokeach outlines are largely axiomatic and, hence, untestable.

10. Edward M. Bruner, "Cultural Transmission and Cultural Change," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 12 (1956), pp. 191-199, reprinted in Neil J. and William T. Smelser, eds., Personality and Social Systems (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1963), pp. 481-487.

11. Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Exploration (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 150-156.

12. The term comes from Ralph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936), p. 360.

13. Even when such a process of change occurs indigenously and over an extended time its consequences are dramatic and often tragic. For a striking account of the process in England see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (London: Farrar and Rhinehard, 1944).

14. We have dramatized the dilemma by dichotomizing the choices while in real life many such choices are between many alternatives distributed along a continuum.

15. Almond and Verba stress correctly that the subject and

citizen orientations (their terms) are not mutually ex-
clusive; that Western democracies have not substituted
the citizen orientation for the subject orientation but
have added a citizen component to already developed sub-
ject orientation. The Civic Culture (Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1965), pp. 20-26.

16. Almond and Verba might want to quarrel with me on this
point as they feel that secondary socialization, partic-
ularly education, is closer to politics and has much
more influence on one's political beliefs than central,
early learned beliefs. This is true for much of the
manifest content of political beliefs which is what
Almond and Verba's study deals with. But if we are to
speak of the latent content of beliefs and broad differ-
ences in style, the compartmentalization Almond and
Verba note is more difficult to maintain. In fact, one
can with some justice claim that the many efforts to de-
fine democracy in new ways in Africa and in Asia is an
effort to bring peripheral values more closely into line
with central orientations which are a part of the tradi-
tional culture--this, regardless of whether the new in-
terpretations serve the special interests of reigning
elites.

17. Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Rinehart,
1941), p. 280, quoted in Lane, op. cit., p. 427.

18. Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Build-

ing: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1962).

19. Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society
(Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).

20. Pye, op. cit., p. 39.

21. Ibid., p. 53.

22. I do not wish to create the impression in this brief
summary that Pye neglects the influence of the tradi-
tional culture. He does discuss traditional norms deal-
ing with the scope of politics, the use of power, etc.
But the main thrust of his analysis with respect to per-
sonal political ideology is clearly focused on the prob-
lem of personal insecurity arising from discontinuities
in socialization.

23. Pye, op. cit., pp. 287, 301.

24. See David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New
States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New
States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New
York: Free Press, 1963).

25. James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics
of Political Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1963), p. 265.

26. See, for example, Edward Shils, "The Intellectual in the
Political Development of the New States," in John H.
Kautsky, ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Coun-
tries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: Wiley,
1962), pp. 195-234.

27. Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1964), p. 489.

28. Banfield, op. cit., p. 85.

29. By way of announcement we should note here that many of the same phenomena are found among bureaucrats in Malaysia.

30. Banfield, op. cit., pp. 147-161.

31. Ibid., pp. 191-199.

32. M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, Opinions and Personality (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1956), pp. 39-47.

33. Ibid., p. 41.

34. Apter, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

35. Lane, op. cit., p. 426.

36. See I. Shapera, Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (London: Watts, 1956).

37. Abram Kandiner, The Psychological Frontiers of Society (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1947), pp. 420-421. Italics mine.

38. Ibid., pp. 417-418.

II. BASIC VALUE ORIENTATIONS

CHAPTER 4

HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICS

A. Basic Value Orientations

We devoted a good deal of space in the last chapter to
a discussion of the gap in new nations between central be-
liefs and primary socialization on the one hand and peripher-
al beliefs and late socialization on the other. Central be-
liefs constitute the core of a person's latent ideology.
They are apt to be patterned, shared, and, most important,
tenacious over time. Compared with the relative variability
of peripheral beliefs they are a more stable element in an
ideology as well as being more pervasive by virtue of their
centrality. The logical place to begin examining the ideolo-
gy of elites in a new nation is with these central beliefs.

The task of structuring a discussion of central be-
liefs is simplified by the rigorous treatment of "basic value
orientations" undertaken by Florence Kluckhohn and Fred

Strodtbeck.[1] They feel that the basic values of a culture are relatively stable over time and, taken together, constitute the 'personality' of that society. Assuming that "there are a limited number of common human problems for which all peoples at all times must find a solution,"[2] they single out five basic problems which they consider most important. In question form, these five are:

1. What is the character of innate human nature?
2. What is the relation of man to nature (and super-nature)?
3. What is the temporal focus of human life?
4. What is the modality of human activity? [being, becoming]
5. What is the modality of man's relationship to other men?

Every culture solves each of these problems in its own characteristic way and the sum of its solutions comprises much of its core culture. Similarly, an individual adopts unspoken answers to these same questions and the sum total of his answers constitutes much of the core of his personal ideology. The extent to which his orientations are shared by others of his group determines the extent to which we can speak of common cultural--or sub-cultural--orientations. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck examine five distinct societies all living in the same region of Texas and, using an ingenious method, are able to trace the distinct patterning of solutions which characterizes each of the five cultures.

The problems we shall chiefly concern ourselves with are 1, 2, and 5: human nature, man-nature, and man-others respectively. This chapter is devoted to the orientation of

our sample toward human nature and toward others since the two are closely related while the next chapter focuses on the relationship between man and nature. Important as they are, the time and activity orientations will be less thoroughly and systematically treated.

How does one discover what, for example, the temporal focus of a cultural group is? How can one decide whether the group tends to be oriented toward the present, the past, or the future? Since people seldom express their dominant temporal orientation explicitly, it must rather be inferred from what they say and do. Behavior such as saving, planning, and talk of times to come might indicate a future orientation while sleeping in the noonday shade implicitly places high value on present satisfactions. Any individual exhibits all three orientations toward time: future, present, and past, but one of the three is usually dominant. In The Cherry Orchard, Chekhov never has his characters say they are oriented to the past but the weight of nostalgia is nevertheless painfully evident. Which orientation is dominant in an individual or group must be inferred from a wide sample of verbal or non-verbal behavior. The process involved is much like asking one's self, 'From what unspoken assumption about time does this behavior seem to flow?' For our Malaysian civil servants we will be asking the same question and it will be understood that when we say they have such-and-such an orientation, we mean that they are acting as if it were their orientation.

B. The Nature of Human Nature

1. The Selfishness of Man

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of a man's estimate of human nature in influencing the construction of his political ideology. Seeing human nature as good, bad, or varied has an effect on how one views the motives of others, whether people are given the benefit of the doubt or whether scepticism prevails, and whether cooperation with others for common ends is considered possible. For example, many of the assumptions behind liberal democracy take for granted a certain minimum level of reasonableness and concern for others in human nature. Assumptions like this make possible a system in which each man, within reasonable limits, may freely pursue his own ends. Democracy is not impossible where low estimates of human nature are the rule, but it is surely more difficult to maintain amidst the partisanship, distrust, and suspicion which generally accompany a lack of faith in people.

With almost no exceptions the civil servants we interviewed had a low estimate of human nature. Their scepticism surges to the surface throughout the interviews and, as we shall see later, permeates more specifically political beliefs. Let us first turn to the bureaucrats themselves and examine more closely what they have to say about human nature.

Pessimism about human nature was most apparent when the civil servants were asked how important friends are in a

person's life. The question in no way suggested comments on
the shortcomings of human nature and yet Jeganathan, an offi-
cial in the Telecommunications Service, takes the occasion to
unburden himself of this statement:

> If there is to be a friend, he must be a true friend---
> through thick and thin like marital vows, you see---it's
> not like---that sort of friend is---if you are sitting in
> this room and when you leave there is no friendship---he
> is just a friend because he wanted to get something out
> of you. That's the kind of friends you have mostly in
> this world---because I have seen that happen to me---I
> have been at the bottom and at the top.

For Jeganathan, one's friends are apt to be false friends,
ingratiating themselves to gain some personal end. If this
were an isolated instance of one angry man, and Jeganathan is
angry at losing a recent promotion, it would be of little
note. But it is merely a more explicit statement of an out-
look that is shared widely by others in the sample. Inche'
Nordin, an elderly Malay, distinguishes between

> . . . friends who may be good for everything and others
> just for money. Sahabat dalam kedai kopi [friends in the
> coffee shop]. We have a lot of that here in Malaya.
> They are just friends in coffee shops---if you take them
> to the house they may be dangerous.

Mr. Lim, whom we met earlier, echoes Inche' Nordin's senti-
ments:

> . . . nowadays it's very difficult to get a true friend
> in the sense of the word---The majority of people give

you lip service. I may not have been fortunate enough to have met with a sincere friend but it is very difficult.

Again and again when we discuss friends the men take the opportunity to emphasize the dangers of insincere, exploiting, and even potentially threatening friends. It is not that sincere, true friends do not exist at all, but rather that they are hard to locate among the multitude of false friends. For us, the accuracy of these opinions is of less importance than the fact that they are strongly held. The older civil servants are somewhat more emphatic on this point and are more apt to characterize the bad faith of friends as a falling away from grace of the "good old days," but the feeling is common among both old and young. What is emphasized is the self-seeking nature of most people. Something seems to be missing though; there is little of the indignation or moral condemnation of this state of affairs that one might expect. That potential friends are too often self-seeking is regrettable and sad, but nothing which occasions any moral outrage.

If these civil servants see friends valuing them only for what profit might be gained from the friendship, it becomes relevant to ask what they hope to achieve by friendship. With few exceptions, they themselves see friends in terms of what assistance they can offer when the need arises. Inche' Mustapha in the Health Service says of friendship:

As I said, it's a part of one's life---you don't use him

for some benefit, but he is always there to help you.

And Inche' Zaharuddin, a bright young Malay in the Ministry
of Labor, feels much the same way.

> The degree to which they [friends] are important you
> can't say---but I think it's important because you can't
> be alone---there are plenty of occasions when you need
> help and you need somebody to turn to for help.

Sundram, an elderly Tamil customs official, inordinately giv-
en to cliches, contents himself with saying, "A friend in
need is a friend indeed," and then, scarcely a second later,
vents his bitterness over what has happened to friendship in
the modern world.

> These days they only look to the chair you hold. Once
> you are out of it, you are no longer of any service to
> them.

In the same breath used to criticize the exploitation
of friendship by others, these administrators make it clear
that they look to the social support and assistance which
friends provide. Not all mention money, but financial as-
sistance is cited often enough to indicate that it is an im-
portant function of friendship for these men. As we shall
show later, they consider the future with some fear, so that
friendship perhaps serves to cushion unexpected blows of fate
and provides some measure of social protection. The divi-
dends of comradeship, warmth, and social intercourse are not
absent from their concern, but only four of the men give this

dimension much prominence--it comes second, after the more
important advantages of friendship are assured. Without mak-
ing any value judgments, it is apparent that the uses of
friendship which they condemn in others are uses to which
they themselves attach some importance. What they call ex-
ploitation by others becomes a natural request for friendly
assistance when viewed from their side of the street.

2. Self-Seeking in Organizations

The blemishes which afflict humans singly are, in the
eyes of these civil servants, also at work within organiza-
tions. People are seen exploiting organizations in much the
same manner as they exploit friends. Kamalam, an affable but
firm democrat, belongs to no voluntary organizations and when
asked why, replies:

> I do not believe in these organizations because---
> everyone in these voluntary organizations are becoming
> members or officers for personal reasons.----They want to
> rub shoulders with VIP's---and most of them have not the
> interest of the organization at heart. They say,---'I'm
> the President,' 'I'm the Secretary.'

Inevitably, the problem of self-seeking in organizations is
seen as closely linked to the desire for money. Not only do
those who join organizations seek recognition and position;
they are apt to seek wealth too. An outspoken Tamil in the
Ministry of Information, Mahalingam, puts the matter less
subtlely than most:

Well, what happens here---there are two kinds of organi-
zations. One is---whatever you do you can't fill your
pockets---that's like the. . . . Then you take associa-
tions for the blind and crippled. They have a lot of
money changing hands---and you find in these associa-
tions, you have vested interests taking over, and once
they take over, they never like to part with the control
---and their membership is supposed to be open, but if
you try to join, you find you are very diplomatically
discouraged.

Chances are that the situation Mahalingam describes is large-
ly a creature of his own imagination but nevertheless it ex-
presses an orientation he shares with other civil servants.
Another notable facet of Mahalingam's belief is that this
sort of self-seeking is likely to be found even in the bosom
of groups espousing the highest purposes. In fact, it is es-
pecially those who parade their noble, unselfish motives who
come under the most suspicion, for they are believed to have
constructed a righteous facade behind which more prosaic mo-
tives are at play. Among Malay peasants the same pattern ap-
pears to exist and Swift has noted that there is usually some
suspicion of the pious layman and the religious teacher for
this very reason.[4]

Self-seeking and insincerity are thus seen as quali-
ties of human nature which make friendship precarious and
difficult. Similarly, when groups are formed they are thought
to be run for the sole benefit of their leaders rather than
for their expressed purposes. The most disastrous consequence

of self-seeking is of course war. Inche Abdul Karim, a young
and generally optimistic officer in the Social Welfare De-
partment, speaks for most of the others in the sample when he
connects human nature and war. Asked if there will always be
war he answers matter of factly, "So long as man stands on
this world there's bound to be war." If we were to inquire
whether these bureaucrats feel human nature as they see it is
mutable or immutable we could not ask for a more definitive
negative than Inche Abdul Karim's statement. Perhaps it is
because human nature is viewed as immutable that that moral
indignation over what is wrong with it would be to no purpose.

3. Comparative Levels of Misanthropy

Some scepticism and even cynicism about human nature
is probably not absent from any culture on this side of Uto-
pia and one might well ask whether our sample is not really
expressing an attitude that is universal. A measure of scep-
ticism is no doubt common in every society, but its degree,
we feel, will vary from culture to culture, just as Kluckhohn
and Strodtbeck have shown.[5] And the degree of scepticism is
crucial as it determines what is the predominant orientation
toward human nature.

We do, in fact, have some indication that the level of
pessimism about human nature we have found in our sample is
relatively high since we can compare it in a rough way with
findings in other nations. At the conclusion of the last in-
terview, each respondent completed a number of attitudinal

measures among which was Morris Rosenberg's "Faith-in-People
Scale."[6] Almond and Verba, in their study of political cul-
ture in five nations, administered the same scale and below
we have added the results for our sample to their results for
comparative purposes. Since the Malaysian sample contains but
17 respondents while Almond and Verba's figures are for an "N"
of roughly 1,000, the comparisons can only be suggestive.

TABLE 1

SOCIAL TRUST AND DISTRUST BY NATION[7]

Percentage Who Agree That	U.S.	U.K.	Ger-many	Italy	Mex-ico	Malay-sia
Statements of Distrust:						
1. "No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it."	38	45	72	61	78	76
2. "If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you."	68	75	81	73	94	100
Statements of Trust:						
3. "Most people can be trusted."	55	49	19	7	30	18
4. "Most people are more inclined to help others than to think of them-selves first."	31	28	15	5	15	12
5. "Human nature is fundamentally cooperative."	80	84	58	55	82	88
N	970	963	955	995	1,007	17

With the exception of the last question, the Malaysian responses are, in each case, toward the pessimistic end of the continuum. The pattern of responses by Malaysian civil servants is, moreover, as interesting as the combined totals. Questions "1" and "4" ask whether one can count on support from others and a negative reply implies that one must fend for himself. On these two questions the Malaysian civil servants are only exceeded in their pessimism by Mexicans in one case and Italians in another, and the spread is not more than three percentage points in either instance. But when the question asks not if people will fail to help you but whether they will actually "take advantage of you," the Malaysians are unanimous in their agreement that they will, while the Mexicans, who are the next most distrustful of their social environment, muster only 94 per cent. The Malaysian civil servants we interviewed do not only see the human environment as non-supportive, but agree to a man that that environment is apt to be actually threatening. Their concept of human nature does not allow them to count on others for help; in fact, they feel they can count on others to "take advantage of" them "if they don't watch themselves."

On the basis of the results for the first four questions, the tabulations for Question "5" are seemingly paradoxical. Mexicans and Malaysian bureaucrats who chose the most distrustful alternative on the preceding four questions are two of the three groups who agree most often that "human

nature is fundamentally cooperative." The clue to the para-
dox clearly lies in the nature of Question "5" as distin-
guished from the form of the other questions. Each of the
other four refer to "you" and focus on what personal expecta-
tions might be, while simply asking whether "human nature is
fundamentally cooperative," as Question "5" does, allows one
to be optimistic without worrying about the personal conse-
quences. This helps explain the incongruity of responses
among Mexicans and Malaysian bureaucrats and also provides an
interesting illustration of a type of formalism. In contrast
to the British sample which maintains a fairly high level of
social trust on each question, the Malaysians and Mexicans
exhibit high trust on a general statement while displaying
substantial distrust in replies to more specific, focused
statements in which their personal involvement is implied.
Later in this study we shall see a similar formalism when we
discuss support for the freedoms of liberal democracy, a for-
malism arising from the gap between central and peripheral
beliefs.

The pessimism about human nature revealed in these
questions is strong, but there is even some possibility that
its strength may have been understated. Our sample is, after
all, an elite sample of those who have had substantial educa-
tion, are financially well off, and occupy posts near the top
of the status ladder. The sample contains none of those
whose disadvantaged situation might lead us to expect a cer-

tain alienation or _anomie_; yet the pessimism in the sample is general. Perhaps if our sample had been broadened to include less successful, lower status respondents, the level of distrust and pessimism would have been even more striking.

4. Misanthropy in Transitional Nations

One might anticipate on the basis of what we have described that Malaysian civil servants might easily develop a high moralistic tone in condemnation of the present human condition which could, in turn, lend a rigid, righteous, ideological cast to political opinions. But, as we have said before, the moralizing tendency is absent. Like the Americans whom Lane describes in Political Ideology, "a belief in human frailty" replaces "a belief in human weakness."[8] The frailty is, however, seen by Malaysians as more severe and irremediable than it is in Lane's Eastport. Most of the civil servants with whom we spoke find it difficult to imagine anyone with great power not exploiting that power for purely personal ends. People are thought to be governed entirely by their own weakly restrained wills in the desire for advantage over others. The difference in views of human nature between Eastport and Kuala Lumpur is one of degree, but large enough to constitute a qualitative difference. Malaysia may share this difference with other new nations. Myron Weiner's description of the motives ascribed to others, especially leaders of groups, in India fits without alteration into the portrait we have sketched.[9] A more striking example comes from

O. Mannoni's brilliant analysis of the psychological results of colonialism in Madagascar. Describing Malagasy official-dom, Mannoni says:

But the Malagasy does not think it reveals a low estimate of humanity to say that all human actions are prompted by egoism; he has not made social prohibitions part of his own conscience and, unlike the majority of us, including Gonzalo, he hardly ever dreams of a society composed of men of goodwill among whom regulations are unnecessary.[10]

Mannoni's statement not only ascribes to the Malagasy the same estimate of human nature which we attributed to Malay-sians, but also emphasizes the absence of a moralistic tone. He also suggests that the absence of a super-ego may explain the Malagasy orientation toward human nature. We shall re-turn to this possibility later in the chapter, but it is suf-ficient to suggest here that the Malaysian view of human na-ture may be equally present in other new nations.

In any case, the results from Rosenberg's "Faith-in-People Scale" substantiate the impression we had gained on the basis of our extensive discussions with Malaysian civil servants. A pessimistic view of human nature and human mo-tives is pervasive and creates a social atmosphere overcast with leaden clouds of distrust and scepticism. It remains for us to explore the consequences for political ideology of such an estimate of human nature and the suspicion of others which it breeds.

C. The Political Consequences of an Orientation
Toward Human Nature

We might well expect that a pessimistic view of human
nature would spill over into beliefs which relate more spe-
cifically to political life. Adorno and his colleagues have
shown that an "inability to identify with humanity takes the
political form of nationalism and cynicism about world gov-
ernment and permanent peace."[11] The relationship between
pre-political and political beliefs is difficult to establish
with any precision, but a contextual analysis of both may re-
veal strong enough similarities in tone and phrasing to sug-
gest that a consistent pattern is involved. This is exactly
what we hope to do, to show that the qualities attributed to
politicians and leaders bear an unmistakable relation to the
conception of human nature described above.

Other consequences for political beliefs have been at-
tributed to a pessimistic view of human nature. Morris
Rosenberg has shown that those who score low in "Faith-in-
People" are more likely to suspect the motives of public fig-
ures, more often find elected officials unresponsive to the
needs and desires of the citizenry, and are more inclined to
suppress certain political freedoms.[12] If these same beliefs
are associated with misanthropy in our Malaysian sample as
well as among Americans, we will have gone some way toward
showing that misanthropy has an impact on political ideology
regardless of the cultural milieu.

Profiting from the insights of Adorno and Rosenberg, we shall now examine the attitudes toward both elective and non-elective officials as well as opinions about political freedoms in the light of the generally pessimistic orientation to human nature which characterizes our sample.

1. Images of Politicians: The Power, the Glory, and the Money

Just as the men we interviewed saw others as insincere and potentially exploitive, their view of politicians is couched in almost identical terms. When they are asked why politicians stand for office only one, Inche Abdul Karim, probably the strongest democrat in the group, emphasizes the desire to serve the people and to right wrongs. The others stress selfish motives in general or focus on the political appetite for power, for publicity and social status, and, above all, for money.

Given the wealth of transcript material which illustrates a cynicism about the motives of politicians, we could devote much space to illustrating this point. Instead, we shall merely offer a few examples to provide some appreciation of the tones in which this cynicism is expressed. Sundram, an elderly Tamil in the Ministry of Customs, seldom beats around the bush and when I ask him whether or not we are getting closer to an ideal society in Malaysia, he replies in staccato fashion:

Further away from it---because--it's more due to aggran-

dizement and the lust for power. When a man has this
lust for power and wants to amass everything for himself
it is difficult to see the other man's sufferings.

Inche' Mohd. Amin, a middle-aged Malay in the Postal Service,
is more phlegmatic than Sundram but shares both his animation
and outlook when asked why people change their minds in a po-
litical discussion. "Most politicians," he says, "are just
opportunists, they just want to gain some power; they join
any party which could help them up." In contrast, Inche'
Ismail, a "young Turk" in the Federal Establishment Office,
sees social standing as the primary motive and is willing to
grant that politicians may start out initially with good mo-
tives. Asked why someone might stand for public office, he
answers:

Social standing. Others are urged or goaded into poli-
tics because of the shortcomings of society. They can
improve things when they get standing and authority---
these are the genuine politicians. Even this general in-
tention at the beginning will be polluted when the social
standing they desire falls into their hands---and they
have ideas about the pursuit of their own interests and
the interests of those dear to them.

Regardless of what particular motive is seen as upper-
most in the minds of politicians, virtually all would agree
that politicians are interested above all in "Number One."
Again, this is not because politicians are the worst in a
world filled with bad men, although this feeling is not en-
tirely absent. Rather, politicians are considered to be no

weaker or more corruptible than other men but are faced, at
the same time, with temptations far beyond that of common
mortals. Who could really expect them not to succumb in that
promised land at the top of society. Inche' Ismail's comment
above expresses this indirectly but Jeganathan, whom we have
already met, is even more explicit. He does not think we are
getting closer to an ideal society. On the contrary:

> I'm afraid we are drifting further away. [Why?] I mean
> so long as there is advantage to be gained, no one wor-
> ries about the means used to gain the advantage.---Oppor-
> tunity makes a thief. . . . I have seen absolutely honest
> people who have been put to temptation where they have
> succumbed.

It is "opportunity" which corrupts people. The level of hu-
man selfishness seems, for these civil servants, to be fixed,
and the amount of actual self-seeking which takes place is
therefore a function of the level of opportunity. Since, as
we have seen, the level of selfishness is seen to be fixed at
a fairly high level, it does not take much opportunity before
the average mortal will succumb. In short, politicians are
like everyone else and it is only because they are constantly
tempted by such golden opportunities that they are unable to
resist. The word "opportunist" expresses essentially this
same notion and it is used again and again by these men to
describe the behavior of politicians. Viewed in these terms,
much of the general attitude toward politicians among Malay-
sian civil servants must be seen as part and parcel of their

orientation toward human nature.

It is important that the connection between evalua-
tions of politicians and evaluations of human nature be made.
Observing similar attitudes toward politicians among Burmese
civil servants, Pye concludes that this unanimity is a result
of a feeling of inferiority which arose when these adminis-
trators were abandoned by the British in favor of politicians
whom they consider incompetent and only semi-literate.[13]
There is no doubt that many of these feelings are real and
that they contribute to the prevailing view of politicians.
We shall deal at length with this aspect of political ideolo-
gy in Chapter 9. But Pye's explanation focuses attention on
the colonial period and the reversal of relationships which
independence occasioned. We have tried to show that the same
attitude can be convincingly attributed to a basic value ori-
entation, namely, the one concerning human nature. The ori-
gin of this orientation lies, we feel, historically deeper
than colonialism and independence. If, in fact, the drastic
status changes of politicians and administrators were at the
root of this evaluation of politicians by civil servants, we
would expect that this attitude would be uniquely directed at
politicians. But it is not. We have shown that it fits
clearly into a broader orientation toward human nature. In
addition, in Malaysia this attitude is not only directed at
politicians by civil servants but it is also directed at civ-
il servants by civil servants. Inche' Abdul Karim talks

about self-seeking among the administrative class in precise-
ly the same terms others have reserved for politicians.

> . . . there are tremendous opportunities and one may suc-
> cumb. Even if they're well paid and still if there are
> so many opportunities---probably the sky is the limit.

Most others echo these sentiments. To attribute the
attitudes of administrators toward politicians solely to the
bitterness and insecurity which characterizes a recently
déclassé ruling elite seems too narrow an explanation, espe-
cially when administrators view leaders of voluntary organi-
zations, and bureaucrats as well, in precisely the same
light. It appears that attitudes toward politicians should
therefore be seen in the context of a general orientation to-
ward human nature, an orientation whose roots must extend
back beyond the recent struggle for independence.

2. The Need for Control of Human Nature

a. God and government as controlling agents. Given
their orientation toward human nature and the behavior they
anticipate of those in positions of power and authority, it
is difficult to see how Malaysian civil servants can conceive
of a society which successfully regulates its affairs or
maintains an acceptable level of cohesion. If everyone acts
as if he were motivated exclusively by thought of personal
gain regardless of the cost to others, how could society be
prevented from degenerating into anarchic self-seeking? How

can selfishness be confined to tolerable levels in the inter-
est of preserving the social fabric?

As these men see it, the only limitation to the full
play of selfish motives in society is the fear of punishment
by some external authority. The agents of this fear of pun-
ishment are both sacred and temporal. God (or Allah) keeps
man from pursuing his self-interest to the detriment of oth-
ers by the threat of retribution in the hereafter, while sec-
ular authority--strong government--deters him by the threat
of swift punishment here and now. It makes sense for these
men to talk of their God and their government in the same
breath since each fulfills a similar function for society;
each serves to limit the freedom of individuals in the inter-
ests of all men. But for their tenuous check on the rapa-
ciousness of man, human affairs would be quite out of control.

The similarity of religious and governmental control,
and the implications of both for political ideology, are im-
portant enough to merit some elaboration. First, let us turn
to Mr. Lim as an illustration of how the basic orientation
toward human nature and the views of religion and government
fit together. His view of human nature conforms to the pat-
tern we have described. Asked if wars are inevitable, he
stammers:

> You must have---there must be---[Why?] Well---it's a
> case of---shall we say egoistic ideas---wanting to exert
> the forces [sic]---and also this is one of the laws of
> nature.

When Mr. Lim is asked why religion is important to him, his
answer is short and direct and represents the substance of
all his comments about religion. "For me, it is always some
restraining influence against bad actions." We talk about
freedom later in the same interview and the parallels seem
striking. Trying to decide whether there is generally too
much freedom or too little freedom, he replies:

Well---if you give too much freedom---then people are apt
to abuse---because they will take too much license on
[sic] it---you give him too much and he goes out of hand
---it tends to be out of hand. There should be some re-
straining power. [How out of hand?] Too free with
words, actions, all these things.

Both religion and limitations on freedom are "restraining"
influences against the 'natural law' of "egoistic ideas."
The idea that the restraint of religion and government are
necessary in a world where self-seeking would otherwise pre-
dominate is so strong among these men that they cannot give
rein to fantasy and imagine a perfect society where such re-
straint could be lifted. Speaking of whether government
would be needed in an "ideal society," Mr. Tay, a young, edu-
cated Chinese in the Ministry of Education, says:

Certainly,---there must be someone responsible for plan-
ning. Even in a perfect society there must be disci-
pline. If there is not, if you let everyone run loose,
then there will be chaos.

Discipline is achieved only with a substantial compo-

nent of fear. Both God and government use fear to curb human
beings from the anti-social acts they are inclined to by
'natural law.' The importance of fear can be seen in the
comments of Inche' Ismail and Jeganathan: first about fear
in religion, and then about fear in politics.

Ismail on religion: [Does religion help a man stay on
the right track?] "Yes it does, through restraint and
also through a certain feeling of fear of the wrath of
Allah.---It defines a certain etiquette; gives a re-
straint on one's feelings."

Ismail on politics: [Will there always be wars?] "As
long as people are not willing to settle things in a
round-table there will be wars. What prevents war is the
fear of what each other will do. Basically people cannot
change in this sort of thing---the interests of the indi-
vidual and the nation stay the same---it is this fear
which persuades people to talk."

Jeganathan on religion: [Does religion help a man stay
on the right track?] "Yes, if---you see the king's pun-
ishment is then and there but God's punishment is slow .
but sure. And once you have gotten God's punishment
there is no chance of redeeming yourself. So if a person
considers this---you conduct yourself properly."

Jeganathan on politics: [How do party members in Malay-
sia measure up to the ideal?] "They are ideal to the ex-
tent that they---by fear of party discipline they conform
to party wishes. It is not out of love for any principle
or anything---but fear of being chucked out of the party.
That goes for the whole world."

There is little indication, then, that any of these

men consider self-restraint or social consciousness effective
materials with which to construct a viable society without
resort to the threat of temporal or sacral punishment. Only
the sort of fear described by Jeganathan and Ismail seems to
offer a way out of untrammelled egoism. As Inche' Hussain, a
serious, sincere young official in the Immigration Service,
sees it, religion is "an upper hand which watches over you
and if you sin you'll be punished in the other world." Simi-
larly, for these top administrators, government seems to be
'an upper hand which watches over you and if you sin you'll
be punished in this world.'

It seems impossible that we have simply tapped a par-
ticular religious tradition for we have just cited the re-
marks of a Hindu, a Buddhist, and a Muslim. Nor does this
configuration represent some unique cultural heritage since
Malays, Chinese, and Tamils all share the same beliefs on
this subject. If we are to seek the causes of this orienta-
tion we must find them either in the common qualities of the
traditional cultures from which they came, or in the existen-
tial base or experiences which they share. Before we specu-
late about the origin of these beliefs, however, we shall
first explore in more detail the consequences for political
ideology which they imply.

b. The need for strong government. If the govern-
ment's principle role is to keep human passions within ac-
ceptable limits then it must be a strong, firm government.

Indeed, with only two exceptions, the civil servants inter-
viewed expressed a preference for strong leadership--strong
enough to keep people in line. They are, for the most part,
committed to a democratic form of government, but this con-
viction is vitiated by a feeling that an entirely democratic
regime is apt to be a weak structure which could not prevent
men from pursuing their natural inclination to exploit oth-
ers. What they seem to settle on is a combination of strength
and fatherly concern, perhaps analogous to what they remember
in their family or, more likely, the qualities they would at-
tribute to the 'ideal father.' Sundram seems to have this
image in mind when he describes the ideal government as "some
form of control and guidance" as does Mohd. Amin when he de-
scribes the perfect government: "Government means there must
be a leader." "This leader would be firm and just." Seldom
is strength mentioned alone without coupling it to words like
"just" or "guidance." The image seems to be one of a strong
but benevolent figure--strict but not tyrannical.

The component of strength is central and there is some
feeling that a weak leader will not only fail to inspire re-
spect but will be exploited at every opportunity. Mr. Khoo
Swee Fah, an intelligent young Chinese in the Audit Depart-
ment, makes the connection between strength and respect in
this way:

Before the War, civil servants were highly respected but
not now. We don't rule by the sword. When you treat

them as human beings they have no respect for you. But
if you rule with an iron hand you're very well respected.

In and of itself, Mr. Khoo's comment might indicate a straight-
forward preference for dictatorial rule as the only means to
maintain respect for rulers. When we talk in a later inter-
view, however, he appears to advocate the mixed sort of lead-
ership we have outlined. Describing what a Prime Minister
should do, he says:

A good Prime Minister should be a person who will pour
oil on troubled waters. The Deputy Prime Minister should
be ruling with an iron rod. If both the Prime Minister
and the Deputy Prime Minister rule with an iron rod, then
you have a revolution.

"Iron" qualities are essential to rule but unalloyed
"iron" would be as productive of chaos as weakness. With one
hand, the ruler conforts his subjects while his other hand
holds the "iron rod" in readiness lest things get out of con-
trol.

The attractive qualities of firm rule have been noted
by H.B.M. Murphy in his study of the mental health of stu-
dents in Malaysia. He claims that most students looked with
favor on the strong rule established in Malaya by the Japa-
nese during World War II. After the initial violence was
past, the harsh treatment dealt to lawbreakers by the Japa-
nese authorities was much admired despite the absence of most
peacetime freedoms.[14] This desire for the tough leader, for
firmness and discipline, is the logical conclusion of a view

of human nature in which asocial self-seeking is thought to predominate. And the need for government to restrain self-ishness with the threat of swift and sure punishment is a most significant source of anti-democratic strains in the political ideology of this administrative elite.

    c. The limits of freedom. A good indication of the anti-democratic tendency we have described is the degree to which these men are willing to limit freedoms in what they believe to be the interests of society as a whole. When we discuss what freedom means to them, a majority place special emphasis on the limits of freedom. Only one respondent fails to explicitly mention the dangers of freedom. For Inche' Nordin, an elderly Malay who is more traditionally minded than most, the danger of freedom is the overindulgence of appetites. As he graphically puts it:

> It's a great---[danger]. First and foremost is health. [Why?] Well, we have more freedom, money, and we take more food and you actually drown yourself. If you have a car---accidents. Too much freedom is dangerous sometimes. Everybody must have freedom but that freedom must be limited.

Inche' Nordin sees too much freedom as a threat both to one's self and to others while Sundram, less explicitly, says that when people have too much freedom "they start deteriorating." What Sundram and Nordin suspect might happen in an environment of broad freedom persuades them and their colleagues that leaders must be resolutely firm and that freedom must be

limited to save people from themselves.

One further aspect of political ideology remains to be examined in this context of controlling human nature. This is the attitude toward law and its relation to freedom. Inasmuch as strong government curbs human avarice by passing laws, these men are stout defenders of the law and see it as a central tool for the control a society requires. When they speak of law they most frequently mean criminal law since the criminal inclinations of man are viewed as the most dangerous centrifugal forces threatening society. Their attachment to law is over and above that attachment one might expect of a bureaucratic elite which much prefers to run things without politics as it did during the colonial days. This feeling for law is as much a product of their inability to imagine a society without it, as it is a consequence of their positive attachment to it. When Inche' Zukifli is asked whether government would be needed in a perfect society, he answers cryptically, "I don't think so---as long as they conform to government orders." Inche' Zukifli never specifies, of course, who is to issue "government orders" in the absence of a government. Much the same view is implied by Mr. Tay when he speaks of the dangers of freedom:

. . . there is not too much danger provided you have a proper system of government---laws and everything---provided people obey and respect the law of the country.

To Mr. Tay and others, freedom seems to be what is "left

over" after you get through obeying all the laws and govern-
ment directives. Put another way, freedom is what remains
after the legal structure is strong enough to prevent chaos.
Like strong government, the important quality of law, for
them, is that of a guide to behavior backed up by the threat
of punishment if the guidelines are breached. Their attach-
ment to law often overwhelms their attachment to freedom,
since a weakness in law or government might mean nothing less
than anarchy, while the loss of some freedom is regrettable
but less dangerous.

    d. The government as policeman. The need for strong
leadership and limits to freedom is based on assumptions
about the fragility of human society which follow in turn
from the assumptions about human nature which we have de-
scribed. These presuppositions are not entirely the products
of lively imaginations. Malaysians have experienced in their
own lifetime periods of disorder and violence which have made
a deep impression and have reinforced these assumptions. The
interval between the defeat of the British and the establish-
ment of an Occupation administration and again the period be-
tween the Japanese surrender and the return of the British
were times of great insecurity and widespread lawlessness.
In particular, at the end of World War II, the anti-Japanese
guerilla forces, mostly Chinese, settled many real or imag-
ined scores in villages and towns across the nation before
order was restored. Coupled with these 'times of trouble,'

the postwar emergency sabotaged law and order in many areas
and exacerbated the communal tensions which are never far be-
low the surface in Malaya. The long shadow of violence has
thus contributed to the fear that the stability which now ex-
ists is a tenuous achievement--that security and order could
easily collapse. Having seen what happened in these times,
and given their basic assumptions about human nature, it is
not surprising that most of these men express a marked pref-
erence for strong rulers, for limits on individual freedom,
and for obedience to law. Supported by central beliefs and
personal experience, these preferences seem durable.

Lane has said that in America the common man sees gov-
ernment as existing to satisfy people and fulfill their wants
--"working for the people, not merely restraining them."[15]
Government and religion, for the Malaysian administrative
elite, exist much less to meet people's needs than to prevent
them from meeting the anti-social needs they are presumed to
have. The Puritans, perhaps, might have had more in common
with these bureaucrats than with their own descendants. Like
the ideal traditional leader, the civil servants we inter-
viewed see government and God restraining them, preventing
them from getting out of hand--a firm master but benign and
paternalistic at the same time, one who instructs when he can
and threatens when he must. The police component of govern-
ment is much more salient to these men than its service com-
ponent; government is valued less for what it actually does

or permits than for what it prevents.

We have tried to show in this section the implications for political ideology of a central belief about human nature. Politicians and others with power and authority are seen as acting in their narrow self-interest regardless of the damage to third parties. They do so because they are cast in the same mold of human nature as others and are in positions where the opportunities for personal aggrandizement are so readily available. It is not that they are any more selfish than other men, but simply that their opportunities are much more numerous and profitable. Thus, the image of politicians held by these civil servants is cut from the same fabric as their basic orientation toward human nature. And it is this conviction of the potential rapaciousness of man which is their rationale for preferring strong leaders, a strict framework of law, and limitations on individual freedom. All these consequences for political ideology follow naturally from a view of human nature which assumes that the freedom and liberty of men must be controlled for their own good--that left to themselves, men will probably serve themselves and harm the community.

Having examined how a basic value orientation casts its long shadow over intermediate and peripheral beliefs and affects the construction of a political ideology, we shall now turn to some speculations about the origin of this basic orientation.

D. The Development of a Basic Value Orientation

We have dwelt at some length on the fact that the administrative elite in our sample feel that "all human actions are prompted by egoism"[16] and can be controlled only by threats emanating from external authorities, whether governmental or supernatural. Suggesting the origin of these central beliefs is a hazardous and speculative enterprise at best, but one which promises to give us more than just a static picture of basic orientations. Although we will attempt a broader view of the dynamic qualities of central beliefs and their impact on political ideology in Chapter 6, in this section we shall suggest how this particular view of human nature and its control might have developed, as well as exploring another of its consequences for political beliefs.

Because central beliefs are likely to persist over time, even when substantial changes in intermediate and peripheral beliefs have already occurred, the place to seek the origin of basic orientations is in the nature of traditional society.

1. Conformity and Dependence Relations in Traditional Society

Without overemphasizing the homogeneity or rigidity of traditional societies there can be little doubt that, compared to modern or even transitional societies, they tend to achieve and maintain a relatively greater degree of uniformity of behavior and beliefs. Whether the higher degree of

uniformity is a function of material conditions such as the restrictions of the physical environment or the isolation of the society or of non-material factors like the kinship system is still the subject of much dispute. Doob describes a number of elements in the environment of traditional society which contribute to this uniformity of beliefs and behavior.[17] Among other things, he emphasizes the slowness of change, the degree to which conduct is traditionally prescribed, the penalties for non-conformity, and the relative absence of "surprises" in interpersonal relationships. Further, the absence of a large economic surplus which would make experimentation less risky, and the absence of challenges to custom from outside sources, help explain the relative lack of internal critiques that question the correctness of a traditional society's beliefs and values. The conditions in which traditional societies exist, then, produce a "social structure" which, as Redfield says,

. . . is a set of limiting conditions within which the conduct of the individual takes place. It is a system of ethical directives, a set of signposts to the good and virtuous life.[18]

Keeping in mind the relative uniformity of beliefs and values in a traditional society, and their subjective 'correctness' for the members of that society, there is another, more important quality shared by traditional societies. This is the phenomenon of dependence relationships. In societies

with unilineal (patrilineal or matrilineal) kinship groups, dependence takes on a more corporate nature since kin groups are mutually exclusive and durable over time, while in societies characterized by bilateral kinship, alliances are more flexible and patron-client groups thrive or wither depending on their success in satisfying the goals of their members. Whether permanent or not, the strength of dependence relationships is a pervasive characteristic of traditional societies.

Godfrey and Monica Wilson suggest that 'in any society, the total degree of dependence on others is the same while the strength of the dependence and the number of persons on whom one is dependent vary, but their product does not vary.'[19] What they propose is that in traditional societies one is very dependent on a few people while in a more modern society one has less intense dependencies, but is dependent on a far larger number of people. The idea is not novel but it highlights an essential distinction between the pattern of life in modern and traditional societies.

2. Dependency and External Control Agencies

For most situations in a traditional society, custom will do very well, but for the unexpected, one can rely on the patron or the corporate group for shelter. Similarly, the uniformity of beliefs and values which characterizes traditional society is enforced by the social network of dependencies by which the crucial test of the "rightness" of a be-

lief or behavior depends on its being sanctioned by authority
--provided it doesn't flaunt tradition, which is, after all,
a kind of dependence on the authority of ancestors. Thus, it
is not inaccurate to say that the effect of the strong sex-,
age-, and status-based dependencies in traditional society is
that much of one's conscience is invested in an authority
figure or a "patron." A patron of some men will usually be a
client of a more powerful patron who protects him as he pro-
tects his clients and so on to the apex of the social struc-
ture.

What we are suggesting here is that the observed homo-
geneity in beliefs and behavior in traditional societies is
achieved by a system of strong dependencies whereby the deci-
sion of the superior ordinarily carries with it the weight of
moral 'correctness' by virtue simply of the superior's posi-
tion. In short, the super-ego is externalized; it is vested in
outside authority rather than in the individual. The demands
and restrictions of the conscience or super-ego are not inte-
grated into the ego structure, but, instead, outside agencies
must be relied upon for moral decisions and limits.[20] Mannoni
phrases the matter without reference to the "super-ego" but
appears to have the same phenomenon in mind.

> All this would seem to suggest that the ego is wanting in
> strength, and that is borne out by the fact that hallu-
> cinatory disturbances and panic appear the moment the
> feeling of security is threatened. The individual is
> held together by his collective shell, his social mask,

much more than by his 'moral skeleton.' And this, with
but slight modifications, must be true of many other
'primitive' societies.[21]

It should be apparent by now that the orientation of
our sample toward human nature--an orientation which sees men
inclined to such a high degree of self-seeking that only the
threats and guidance of God and strong leadership can re-
strain it--bears an unmistakable resemblance to the reliance
on outside moral agencies for control which characterizes
traditional man. Unable to imagine purely self-restraint and
internal controls limiting man's selfishness, traditional man
is thrown back to a reliance on the threat of punishment or
ridicule by external authority as the only viable means of
maintaining social harmony. The very nature of control in
traditional society, as shown above, implies a view of man
pursuing his own advantage exclusively unless linked to a de-
pendency system--that is, unless controlled by an external
authority which sets limits to his behavior in the interest
of the group and has sanctions to enforce those limits.
There is a marked similarity between the control system for
society which the civil servants in our sample see as proper
and the control system which actually operated in traditional
society. We have only to recall the comments of those we in-
terviewed about religion and political leadership to note the
congruence between these attitudes and the pattern which
characterizes an externalized super-ego. This congruence is

so striking that it seems not unreasonable to suggest that
the present attitudes may have originated in these tradition-
al circumstances and have been maintained since.

3. The Externalized Super-ego and Amoral Familism

The distinction between an internalized and an exter-
nalized super-ego corresponds closely to the distinctions
drawn by anthropologists between "guilt cultures" and "shame
cultures."[22] In shame cultures behavior which is socially
disapproved will be consciously suppressed out of fear that
others will ridicule or condemn it. The control is external
since shame depends upon witnesses and generally, if the wit-
nesses are absent, the control of behavior is significantly
reduced. A shame culture exhibits

> a particularistic or situational ethic as opposed to the
> more universalistic ethic built around moral absolutes
> found in Western Christian thought.[23]

By contrast, in a guilt culture, the automatic reaction of
the internalized super-ego represses the individual's desire
to engage in disapproved behavior, usually before it is even
perceived, and, if not, he feels that sense of sin which is
perhaps the hallmark of Western society. The ethic here is
internalized and individual rather than externalized and sit-
uational as in the shame culture.

There are two points we wish to make about shame cul-
tures. First, since in this kind of culture "much of con-
scious life is concerned with a system of social sanctions,"[24]

and since an externalized super-ego is likely to be the rule, the source of control is located outside the individual, in the authority of patrons and superiors, and in the ridicule and condemnation of peers. If, as Mannoni has suggested above, most traditional societies are largely shame cultures, we can expect that the prevalent view of human nature and the system for individual and social control in these societies will match the attitudes we have found in our elite sample. Putting it the other way around, transitional elites are likely to hold beliefs about human nature and social control which are congruent with the situational-ethic cultures from which they come. A belief in the self-control of man and a preference for a service-oriented leadership would not be congruent with this tradition, but the presumption of man's weakness and a desire for strong, restraining rule which we have found are indeed congruent.

The second point about shame cultures where the super-ego is externalized relates to the problem of guilt and sin. De Vos notes that Western missionaries were "perplexed . . . by what they considered a <u>lack of moral feelings in regard to non-familial relationships</u>"[25] among the Japanese. Guilt is not entirely absent, according to De Vos, for

> Whereas the applicability of the more universalistic Western ethic in many aspects tend to transcend the family, the Japanese traditional ethic is actually an expression of rules of conduct for members of a family, and filial piety has in itself certain moral absolutes that

are not completely situationally determined even though they tend to be conceptualized in particularistic terms. This difference between family-oriented morality and a more universalistic system is, nevertheless, a source of difficulty in thinking about guilt in the Japanese.[26]

The "family-oriented morality" and the "absence of moral feelings in non-familial relationships" may very well be typical of shame cultures and, more important, it seems almost identical to the "amoral familism" which Banfield uses to account for the political beliefs and behavior of the southern Italian peasant. While this is frankly speculative, we suspect that Banfield's "amoral familism" has essentially the same content as the "family-oriented morality" which De Vos attributes to the Japanese. The welfare and advantage of the family, whether it be nuclear or extended, is the criteria against which the "correctness" of behavior and values are judged. As a result, the orientation toward those outside the family appears to be "amoral."

There is a distinct possibility that "amoral familism" is quite typical in developing nations. It may be a characteristic of cultures with a situational ethic as well as a product of both the strength of primordial attachments and the poverty of the material culture.[27] If "family-oriented morality" is typical of shame cultures, as De Vos' comments might indicate, then the predominance of shame cultures and situational-ethics outside the West indicates that "amoral familism" and its social and political consequences may char-

acterize many developing nations. Surely, the family-oriented morality observable in many non-Western and some Western nations goes a long way toward explaining the relative absence of civic-consciousness or dedication to abstract principles of justice in these areas.[28] A situational ethic is contextual and is therefore quite incompatible with principles of justice or morality clothed in their universalistic Western garb.

E. A Note on Other-Directedness

1. Evidence of Other-Directedness in the Interviews

The concept of an externalized super-ego implies the operation of some external agency to serve the function of discouraging socially disapproved behavior and beliefs. Aside from supernatural authority, these sanctions operate through people who evaluate and then either sanction or condemn. As appropriate roles for different situations are learned, however, a kind of pre-censorship takes place so that sanctioned behavior is normally produced. A person's social antennae sense what others expect and thus avoid ridicule and condemnation. This is the "radar" to which David Reisman refers in explaining the concept of "other-directedness." Cultures in which the super-ego is modally externalized are "other-directed" cultures since "others" perform the function of the super-ego.

It is useful to be more specific about the "other" in "other-directed." Presumably, one may be "directed" toward peers, superiors, or inferiors in terms of their status rankings. Given the importance of hierarchy and the network of dependencies in traditional society, the relevant others are superiors and peers, but not inferiors since, if anything, inferiors rely on the social judgment of their superiors rather than vice versa.

If traditional societies are characterized by the externalization of the super-ego and a concern about the favorable evaluation of others, so are the elite administrators in the transition nation we are examining. Already we have seen in their attitudes about human nature, God, and leadership indications of an externalized super-ego. And the evidence of their other-directedness is equally convincing.

All the administrators were asked, at one point or another, whether they would prefer to be respected for their independent opinions or for their ability to get along with others. The question seems to be a clear-cut choice between other-directedness and inner-directedness. Only four of the seventeen preferred to be respected for their independent stance, while all the rest emphasized the necessity of getting along with others and not appearing antagonistic. Inche' Abu Bakar, a young and somewhat diffident Malay in the Telecoms Service, speaks for most when he explains why he prefers to get along with others: "I mean---independent

opinion may not be very attractive to the majority of people." Inche' Ja'afar of the Ministry of Information, whom we met earlier, is more self-conscious in answering this question but his decision is the same.

> One is an ideal---the ideal, I know, would be to be independent. But in my present status I feel the other one is more important. Independent opinions---because, after all James---what is your opinion---it may not be the right one.

Ja'afar may take the humble way out but, in the process, he makes it clear that too much independence might jeopardize his position.

Early in the interviews each respondent was asked what he would do if he were an economist who was asked to prepare a justification for a policy which went contrary to all he was taught as an economist. The choice between inner-directedness and other-directedness is somewhat muddied here by the problem of bureaucratic discipline but, in any case, almost all the administrators said they would prepare the report as requested without questioning its correctness. The most frequent rationalization was that 'economists are as fallible as anyone else.'[29]

Although these men are well acquainted through their schooling with the entire gallery of British heroes who are honored for their singleness of purpose and independent views, they would themselves prefer to be known for their ability to get along with others, and they say so quite openly

while, at the same time, making appropriate verbal bows to
the ideal. They are, for the most part, clearly other-
directed.

The other-directedness of "those who are changing" is
attested to be Leonard Doob on the basis of results from pro-
jective tests administered cross-culturally.

> In comparison with those who remain unchanged or those
> who have changed, people changing from old to new ways
> are likely to be generally sensitive to other people.[30]

Doob feels that this "sensitivity" is heightened especially
during acculturation since one is continually testing to see
whether his behavior is appropriate to the new group he is
entering.

. Role-Adaptability Versus Cultural Change

Other-directedness, however, when looked at in a
slightly different analytical light might be called "role-
adaptability." The other-directed man is able to adjust to
new situations so that his behavior and beliefs "fit-in" with
the new social environment. Many have commented on the ap-
parent role-adaptability of the Indian peasant who somehow
sheds many of the caste rules when he comes to the city and
miraculously reassumes the same rules with evident ease when
he returns to the village environment.[31] The same applies
equally well to the adaptability of the Malay peasant in the
city or, for that matter, the adaptability of the Malaysian
civil servant while abroad.

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At first glance, other-directedness and role-adapta-
bility seem to be similar to the quality of "empathy" which
Daniel Lerner feels is the crucial variable in becoming mod-
ern.[32] The ability to adapt to new roles surely entails an
ability to place one's self in other people's shoes, to an-
ticipate their reactions and behave accordingly. But we must
distinguish between conformity and the internalization of new
norms. The former depends on the pressures of the social
milieu, while the latter, presumably, is a more permanent
phenomenon which depends less on social support. Conformity
which flows from other-directedness tends to evaporate when
social support for it disappears; unlike internalized norms,
it is unstable. Although conformity may be the initial step
along the road toward new value patterns--because behavior
has its own influence on beliefs--the two are quite distinct
in regard to the stability of beliefs and behavior which they
imply.

3. Other-Directedness, Hierarchy, and Political Beliefs

When the conformity of other-directedness is linked to
a strongly hierarchical social structure--when other-direct-
edness is also "upper"-directedness, as it is in most transi-
tional societies--it becomes difficult to distinguish infor-
mation from the source of that information. A communication
is evaluated and accepted or rejected by virtue of the posi-
tion of the communicator without much reference to the merit
of its content by some other impersonal standard. The indi-

vidual in a hierarchical, other-directed society is so at-
tuned to pressures from the social environment--especially
those from above--that it is virtually impossible for infor-
mation from a disesteemed source to alter his belief system.
Exhortations from an esteemed source, on the other hand, can
usually secure outward conformity in behavior and even
changes in peripheral beliefs. The source of the external
pressure for change thus determines what influence that
source can exert on one's beliefs and behavior. To this ex-
tent we may say that an individual's mind is "closed," since
what is not fixed by tradition is more responsive to external
pressures than to the more rational processes of evaluation.[33]

The influence of other-directedness and hierarchy on
the political belief system of Malaysian civil servants can-
not be overestimated. First, it means that their peripheral
beliefs are often more linked to each other by the authority
sources from which they are derived than by any internal
logic. It is common, therefore, to find a host of logically
incompatible beliefs effectively compartmentalized in an in-
dividual's mind; each belief being strongly held by virtue of
its origin. For example, a traditional belief that one
should not openly criticize leaders co-exists quite comfort-
ably with the belief that parliamentary democracy requires an
openly critical opposition since both beliefs come from es-
teemed sources (i.e., traditional wisdom and Western learn-
ing). The welter of conflicting beliefs found among transi-

tional elites becomes less confusing once one realizes that
their admission to a belief system depends more on the au-
thority from which they emanate rather than the logic of
their inclusion.[34]

Secondly, hierarchy and other-directedness mean that
political beliefs, particularly at the peripheral level, are
apt to be quite variable and unstable. Most specific politi-
cal beliefs are tailored to conform to the social environment
and when, for one reason or other, that environment changes
substantially, changes will occur accordingly in peripheral
political beliefs. And given the instability of transitional
societies themselves, the sources of external social pressure
to conform are subject to rapid and occasionally drastic
change. Understanding this variability of political beliefs
among transitional elites helps us account for much ideologi-
cal change by reference to the rise of a new elite. More im-
portant, though, the instability of these beliefs makes the
purely descriptive account of political beliefs in these
countries an enterprise of limited usefulness.

The third point about other-directedness and hierarchy
as they relate to political beliefs is concerned with how the
study of political beliefs among transitional elites should
be approached. If peripheral political beliefs are likely to
be variable, it becomes more profitable to concentrate on
either the broad stylistic characteristics of beliefs and the
more stable central values or perhaps on the selective process

by which the beliefs transmitted by sources of authority are accommodated.

In this chapter we have discussed the basic value orientation of Malaysian civil servants toward human nature and toward others, while suggesting some of the ways in which those orientations affect political beliefs. In particular, a view of man as destructively self-seeking unless controlled seems to produce the feeling that politicians are "out for what they can get." Their view of human nature further predisposes these men to look to leaders whose strength and firmness can restrain man from acting against community interests. Thus they are inclined to demand tough laws and strict limits to freedom in order to curb the natural human impulse to take advantage of others.

We attempted to locate the origin of these basic orientations in the traditional society. We suggested that the externalized super-ego, reinforced by the network of dependencies, in traditional society is likely to produce both the orientation toward human nature and the political remedies for it which we found among the administrative elite in Malaysia. The situational-ethic which prevails in traditional society was linked to the phenomenon of "amoral familism" by which Banfield explained political beliefs and practices in southern Italy. Finally, we tried to show that the Malaysian administrative elite is other-directed, as is traditional

man, and that this other-directedness, when linked to hierar-
chy, produces a marked instability in peripheral political
beliefs over time--an instability with important consequences
for the study of ideology in transitional nations.

In the next chapter we will tackle the man-nature ori-
entation of this elite group and suggest its sources as well.
As it is closely linked with the orientations already dis-
cussed, we will suggest how all three basic values fit to-
gether and affect political beliefs.

FOOTNOTES

1. Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1961). Although this is not the first study to concern itself with the problem of basic value orientations, it is the first to develop concepts to a point where they could be operationalized and used in cross-cultural research.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

4. M. G. Swift, *Malay Peasant Society in Jelebu*, No. 29, London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology (London: The Athlone Press, 1965), p. 163.

5. *Variations in Value Orientations, op. cit.*, Ch. 1.

6. Cf. footnote 15, Chapter 2.

7. Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

8. Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

9. Weiner notes the common distrust of political leaders and feels that the attentive, political public believes "that peasants, workers, refugees, and linguistic, religious, caste and tribal committees are organized by politicians, not in the interest of the organized, but rather to satisfy the power desires of the organizers." Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 10.

10. O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 153.

11. Adorno, et al., op. cit., p. 148.

12. Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), pp. 690-695.

13. Pye, op. cit., Chapters 15 and 16.

14. H.B.M. Murphy, "Cultural Factors in the Mental Health of Malayan Students," pp. 164-221, in The Student and Mental Health: Conference Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Student Mental Health (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956), pp. 169-170.

15. Lane, op. cit., p. 145.

16. Mannoni, op. cit., p. 153.

17. Doob, op. cit., Chapter 2, pp. 20-38.

18. Robert Redfield, The Little Community / Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 46.

19. Godfrey and Monica Wilson, The Analysis of Social Change: Based on Observations in Central Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1945), pp. 28, 40, cited in Doob, op. cit., p. 30.

20. The absence of an internalized super-ego is likely to mean that behavior will be "motivated by narrowly" defined personal goals unless curbed by external authority. In this connection, Pye has noted that almost all those who joined the Malayan Communist Party armed

forces during the Emergency joined to realize personal values and had a strong sense of careerism rather than having necessarily any commitment to the principles of the organization. Political groups, Pye says, were evaluated largely on the basis of their effectiveness in promoting the private interests of its supporters, and, when it failed, it was abandoned. Lucian W. Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956), pp. 172-173. Similarly, when asked what they liked about the civil service, two-thirds of the sample we interviewed mentioned personal goals like security, pay, promotions, while only four mentioned anything having to do with the purposes of the organization itself. Moreover, there is no trace of embarrassment when they assert the primacy of their personal goals; it seems natural.

21. Mannoni, op. cit., p. 41.

22. As in most distinctions of this nature, "shame" and "guilt" cultures do not constitute a dichotomy but rather a continuum. Thus, Western culture, generally described as a "guilt culture," exhibits shame as well, while in Japanese culture, which is generally termed a "shame culture," guilt is not entirely absent. The terms merely refer to the modally preferred means for avoiding disapproved behavior.

23. George De Vos, "The Relation of Guilt Toward Parents to

Achievement and Arranged Marriage among the Japanese,"
pp. 150-167, in Neil J. and William T. Smelser, eds.,
Personality and Social Systems (New York: Wiley and
Sons, 1963), p. 165.

24. Ibid., p. 166.

25. Ibid., p. 165.

26. Ibid.

27. Aside from the individual himself, the family consti-
tutes the narrowest unit of loyalty. The process of
change away from a family-oriented morality most proba-
bly entails a broadening of the concept itself so that
one feels a degree of kinship with a wider group. Loy-
alty to the kin group persists but other loyalties are
added. The existence of fictive kin and god-father re-
lationships which are common in the Philippines and
elsewhere is an effort to draw outsiders into an alli-
ance with a kin group by an artificial kinship arrange-
ment. This creates a broader loyalty group for purposes
of cooperation and mutual protection.

28. One suspects that much of the present "Great Cultural
Revolution" in China is aimed precisely at eliminating
this family-oriented morality and replacing it with loy-
alty to the teachings of Chairman Mao.

29. Many students of bureaucracy in new nations have noted
what seems to be the absence of professional standards
and a tendency to 'go along' with whatever is required

by others. The problem is not so much the absence of professional standards _per se_ but rather the fact that the rewards offered by a quasi-traditional status system are "social relational" rather than "external." That is, the hallmark of a society still largely traditional is that personal rather than impersonal indications of success are most valued. Unlike the modern entrepreneur who relies on profits, sales, production--all impersonal indicators of success--the transitional administrator relies on the reassurance of his superiors or the praise of "respect elites" for indications that he is doing a good job. And if the superior does not use impersonal indicators to judge his subordinates, the personalistic criteria are re-inforced. The high value placed on personal rather than impersonal indicators of success is responsible, I feel, for a large part of the bureaucratic anomalies observed in developing nations. Cf. Melvin M. Tumin, "Competing Status Systems," pp. 222-233, and David C. McClelland, "The Achievement Motive in Economic Growth," pp. 179-189, in David E. Novack and Robert Lekachman, eds., _Development_ and _Society: The Dynamics of Economic Change_ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964).

30. Doob, _op. cit._, p. 135. Doob's formulation would appear to be at variance with mine since he ascribes _more_ sensitivity to those who are changing than to those who are unchanged. He himself, however, cites studies which

show that the unchanged American Indian is more sensitive to others than the typical Midwestern, white American. More important, Doob recognizes that traditional people are sensitive to others but that the relevant others do not include "outsiders," a caveat which precedes his hypothesis. "A man who remains unchanged may be sensitive only to cues from traditional people and may fail to acquire knowledge of the behavior of outsiders." *Ibid.*, p. 135.

31. See Robert O. Tilman, "The Influence of Caste on Indian Economic Development," pp. 202-223, in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler, eds., *Administration and Economic Development in India* (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1963), p. 216.

32. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), *passim*.

33. Cf. Chapter 3, Rokeach, *op. cit.*

34. In addition, we should not overlook the fact that non-Western societies generally place less emphasis on the logic and consistency of individual beliefs than Western societies. The quotation of proverbs often passes for argument in traditional society and it is only our unique Western heritage which predisposes us to find such disputation lacking in rigor.

CHAPTER 5

MAN AND NATURE: THE STRUGGLE FOR SLICES
OF A CONSTANT PIE

A. The Man-Nature Orientation

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck suggest three possible cultural orientations toward nature: "Subjugation-to-Nature," "Harmony-with-Nature," and "Mastery-over-Nature."[1] Unlike the orientation toward human nature, the view of natural forces which prevails in a society would seem to depend heavily on the technical and scientific skills of the culture. It is possible for the industrialized West to achieve "mastery-over-nature" in many respects, whereas simple herding people are in a real sense at the mercy of natural forces. Thus the choice of orientations is, for herders, somewhat circumscribed by the level of their material culture.

Societies whose actual control over their environment is minimal are likely to make some ritual attempts to appease

natural forces as well as taking precautionary measures such as storing water, etc. And even within communities that are subject to nature, certain charismatic figures are thought to possess special powers, however tenuous, to bend natural forces to the will of man. Malinowski, for example, has written that the role of magic begins when "mastery over nature" ends. That is, the part of nature that seems beyond the rational control of a society becomes the province of the magical or religious arts which attempt to appease and/or manipulate potentially destructive natural forces.

In contrast to this priestly or sacral manipulation of the environment, the engineering approach typifies societies whose great technical virtuosity allows them to shape nature to their ends or, failing that, to construct havens which are immune to its vageries. These varied approaches to nature, as categorized by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, reflect primarily the degree to which a society feels it is in control of its present and future environment. And we should emphasize here that the orientation of a society toward nature depends on how it sees its relationship to nature, regardless of the degree of control over the environment which a dispassionate observer judges it to possess. Thus, if a society is objectively prey to nature, but nevertheless feels subjectively that it can control the environment, its subjective mastery is the important cultural orientation. Objective and subjective control are probably strongly associated but analytically

they are distinct.

Whether fatalism or manipulation prevails will, in turn, have a great influence on what is expected of the leaders of a society; whether they are expected to change and improve the environment, or whether their role is simply to preserve the status quo by means of ritual appeasement of natural forces. That is, a culture's orientation toward nature creates distinctive political expectations and demands by which leadership is evaluated. The connection between political ideology and the orientation toward nature is an important one which we shall explore at length in this and the next chapter.

Before examining the orientation toward nature which characterizes our sample of Malaysian civil servants, two additional points should be made about attitudes toward nature in general. First, although Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's list of variations seems clear-cut and is logically exhaustive, it is a far from simple matter to decide how a culture should be classified according to this schema. Taking Japan as an example, the authors state that both historically and at present, Japanese culture emphasizes "harmony-with-nature." Koestler, on the other hand, while not employing the same categories, finds a dominant orientation in Japan which would be more appropriately called "mastery-over-nature."[2] He associates the hostile, volcanic geography of Japan with the attempts in art forms to master nature and reduce it to man-

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ageable proportions. The miniaturization of mountain land-
scapes with stones and sand in trays (bon-seki), and the
dwarfing and shaping of trees by constant root cutting and an
elaborate system of weights and wires are, he states, only
two examples of many symbolic attempts to gain mastery over
nature. Koestler finds that in Japanese culture:

> Nature is too hostile and threatening to be approached
> 'in the raw.' To be aesthetically acceptable, it must be
> stylized, formalized, miniaturized. Uncouth reality must
> be transformed into civilized artifact.[3]

One might even interpret Koestler in another fashion
and conclude that the Japanese orientation to nature is one
of subjugation. The Japanese art forms he describes might be
considered a kind of ritual compensation for a lack of con-
trol over natural forces: a symbolic manipulation of nature
in art that cannot be achieved in reality.

Which of the three possible categories most appropri-
ately describes the Japanese case concerns us less here than
the fact that, as it stands, the typology does not lend it-
self to unambiguous classification. All societies attempt
"mastery" over the environment by technology and/or magic,
and one culture may feel as confident of its shamans as an-
other culture of its engineers. In addition, each society
generally regards some manifestations of nature as manageable
by human effort and other natural forces as essentially un-
controllable. Mastery in one sphere may be balanced by sub-
jugation in another. The Japanese example thus alerts us to

the fact that characterizing a culture's view of man's relation to nature is a hazardous enterprise at best.

For these reasons, it is useful for our purposes to be more specific about the word "nature." We shall focus, in our discussion, largely on the problem of abundance vs. scarcity—on nature's provision of the material goods necessary for subsistence.

A second point about orientations toward nature is also suggested by the example of traditional Japan. Presumably, the hostility or benevolence; the scarcity or abundance of the physical environment in which a society lives will have some effect on that society's orientation toward nature. The influence of the environment's hostility on felt mastery over nature operates in the same manner as the technical level of the society. The higher the society's technical level and the greater the benevolence of the environment, the less likely a society will feel subjugated to nature. Simple societies by definition, however, have a low level of technical skills and live in environments generally characterized by scarcity and by occasional natural disasters such as disease, flood, and fires over which they exercise little control. In such circumstances, one would expect that a preponderance of simple societies would feel "subject" in large degree to the restrictions and periodic depredations of the physical environment.

As we indicated in the previous chapter, the existen-

tial base does influence cultural values, particularly in the long run. A society which in fact exists at the subsistence level and is periodically devastated by drought, plague, or locusts is unlikely to sustain forever the belief that it can manipulate natural forces at will. The real gap between its manipulative power and that of a highly industrialized society is so great that it is apt to feel relatively more "subject" to nature. Within limits, of course, subsistence societies may vary in the degree to which they feel subject to their environment, but the fact that their techniques are so frail and their margin so slim cannot fail to affect their orientation to nature. The common experiences which the existential base provides to a community will be reflected over the long run in that society's basic value orientations.

B. Competition for a Constant Pie: The Politics of Scarcity[4]

Focusing, as we have indicated, on the question of abundance-vs.-scarcity, we hope to show that the orientation of Malaysian civil servants toward nature conforms closely with what one would expect of a society with limited technology, living in conditions of relative scarcity. They have what we have chosen to call a "constant-pie" orientation, an orientation which assumes a fixed scarcity of desired material goods. The "pie" cannot be enlarged that all might have larger "slices" but rather is constant, so that much of political and economic life is seen as constituting a struggle

of one individual, family, group, or nation to expand its
slice at the expense of other individuals, families, groups,
or nations. Through the words of the civil servants them-
selves, we shall attempt to delineate their orientation to-
ward nature while, at the same time, noting the consequences
of such an orientation for political ideology. Later in the
chapter we shall try to find the origins of this basic orien-
tation in the nature of traditional society and relate it
more closely to the orientations we have already discussed in
Chapter 4. First, however, let us turn to the observations
of the bureaucrats themselves.

1. Not Enough to Go Around

Each of the civil servants was asked, at some point,
what he thought was the basic cause of wars, both interna-
tional and domestic. The question is a significant one as it
reveals what the respondents feel are the causes of large
scale violence between groups--what people fight about and
what is worth fighting over. With few exceptions, all re-
spondents mentioned overpopulation as a prominent cause for
war. Implicit, and occasionally explicit, in their replies
was the feeling that resources are limited and therefore an
increase in population means smaller shares all around, un-
less resources are captured from other groups or nations.
This view of resources as a "constant pie" is clearly evident
in what affable Kamalam in the Ministry of Education has to
say. Asked if wars can be eliminated, he settles back in his

chair and begins:

> Here I have to introduce my philosophy. We Hindus con-
> sider the earth the "mother" and the mother can only bear
> a certain burden---and as population increases---so she
> can't bear the burden any longer.---So you have fate,
> like earthquakes and tidal waves, but now that war has
> come you don't even need these since war kills lots of
> people in the same way.

And later:

> Let's put it this way,---If a particular country is un-
> able to support its entire population and you've got a
> neighboring state with plenty, he says, 'Why should my
> people be suffering---what shall we do?', that sows the
> seed.

For Kamalam, the bounty of nature is limited, it will
support so many and not one more. When the limit is exceeded
you get "earthquakes and tidal waves" or their more modern
variant, war. Inche' Hussain, the young ingenuous Malay from
the Immigration Service, says much the same thing when he is
asked whether the causes of war can be eliminated.

> I don't think it is possible. Because as the world gets
> older there will arise more complicated problems, people
> will become more ambitious and people will multiply and
> there will not be enough to eat.

Although Inche' Hussain couples rising ambition with scarci-
ty, he makes it clear that population soon presses on limited
resources (and we should bear in mind that the nation in
which he lives is not plagued by overpopulation according to

most standard measures).

Mr. Khoo, a militant Christian in the Audit Department, echoes the sentiments of his Moslem and Hindu colleagues when he says, "There will always be wars---it is predicted in the Bible." "It is nature's way of reducing the population." If Mr. Khoo's view of a "constant pie" of resources is less explicit than the men we quoted earlier, he nevertheless implies that population must be reduced periodically if it is to stay in line with resources. The view that was is 'nature's way of reducing the population' is, of course, not unknown in the West. But among these men it is more than simply a cliché to be passed off with a smile; it is something quite real. They are in earnest when they state that war occurs when population expands to the point where there is no longer enough to go around.

The inclination of these administrators to view resources as a "constant pie" was so prominent as to prompt the construction of a number of questions designed to tap this attitude among other civil servants outside our small sample. In all, 107 civil servants were asked whether they 'strongly agreed,' 'agreed,' 'disagreed,' or 'strongly disagreed' with the statement, "Even in a rich country, if population grows rapidly, there is great danger that there will soon not be enough wealth to go around."[5] Although the situation was set in a "rich country" to discourage easy agreement, 60 per cent of the respondents agreed that there might "soon not be enough

wealth to go around." The "constant-pie" orientation of those interviewed is thus supported by the responses from this larger group.

The function of war for most of those interviewed is to reduce the number of competitors for scarce values. When the number of competitors dividing a constant pie exceeds a certain limit, a war occurs which eliminates enough contestants to make the struggle over the distribution of these scarce values a more manageable and less violent affair. Neo-Malthusians all, they see population growth threatening peace since men will fight rather than surrender any of their modest share of the non-expanding pie.

Other civil servants put their argument somewhat differently. Whereas the administrators we have already cited see war as the inevitable consequence of man's natural desire to preserve his share of the pie, others cast more blame and seem to imply that if men were less intent upon keeping or enlarging their share of the pie, war might be avoided. Inche' Zukifli, an elderly, vaguely disgruntled Malay in the Postal Service, illustrates this thematic variation when he speaks of the recent Konfrontasi launched against Malaysia by Indonesia.

Well, because---for instance this Indonesia---he is something like---not to say greedy---if I express it this way ---Indonesia have [sic] been independent since 1948 or about and so far they have no improvement. Jealousy---I think that is the main reason.

Jeganathan, who always boils things down to human motives,
articulates the causes of war in a similar fashion:

> Basically it is---you see---you want a share in the other
> man's prosperity. That is what I think it is. A man has
> a bank balance and you want some of it. So if I want it
> and you don't give it, then I will rob you. It's because
> I'm poor that I want it---that I want your money. If I'm
> equally rich I don't care how rich you are. Take Japan;
> it was so poverty-stricken, that's why it started the
> war.

For these two men, the fact that there is only so much to go
around must be placed in the context of human jealousy and
greed in order to explain why wars occur. While Inche'
Zukifli seems to introduce the possibility of "improvement,"
he later makes it clear that he merely means reaching the
pre-World War II standard of living. Thus, both men appear
to acknowledge the problem of fixed resources but, instead of
emphasizing this limitation per se as the cause of war, they
point to the reaction of human nature to this limitation as
the proximate cause. Here, the human nature and man-nature
orientations are joined in an explanatory framework. War,
for them, resembles robbery with the "have-nots" taking from
the "haves."

2. The Survival of the Fittest

The struggle over slices of a "constant-pie" is, for
these administrators, what sets men at one another's throats.
Given this basic orientation, political life resembles a

Hobbesian world where all compete against all to preserve or
enlarge their share of a fixed pie. An environment in which
one man's gain is another man's loss places a premium on
strength, for the weak will be lucky just to hold their own.
None of these men have ever heard of Charles Darwin, but
their views of political and economic life closely resemble
the tenets of Social Darwinism in the late 19th century.
Shot through their political beliefs is the assumption of un-
ending struggle over the distribution of a "constant pie"--an
assumption which makes the stakes high and allows for no gen-
erosity toward other competitors.

Mr. Lim characterizes the Hobbesian world of politics
this way when he is asked whether we are getting closer to an
ideal society in Malaysia:

> I don't think we are. [Why?] Well, that is power poli-
> tics---the big fish eat the small fish and the small fish
> eat worms.

We might have anticipated such a response from Mr. Lim, since
he scores second highest on the "Anomie Scale," but the same
tone is characteristic of the most optimistic, low-scorers on
the "Anomie Scale" as well. When Inche' Nordin, an elderly
Malay notable for his bright spirits and confidence in the
future, is asked about the usefulness of protective associa-
tions for civil servants, he replies:

> I don't know how it is in other countries, but I know Ma-
> laya from experience. Each profession is trying to kill

the other. One doctor makes more money and everyone goes
to him for one reason and the others don't have so many
people coming to them. It's better to have your own as-
sociation to preserve the profession. Even with trade
unions, each one is trying to kill the other. They say,
'You got, why not I got?'

Inche' Nordin's imagery is vivid and he seems to see a fixed
supply of both patients and money over which doctors and
trade unions respectively are "trying to kill the other."
The concept of a "constant pie" is quite explicit here and
the kind of behavior it elicits is equally clear.

Inche' Abdul Karim, another optimist and perhaps the
strongest democrat in the entire group, in talking about how
people would behave in an ideal society, describes what he
does not like in the present society.

They should think of one another as fellow human beings
---and not to exploit the weaklings. What I mean is the
clever ones will not take advantage of the stupid ones.

The Hobbesian nature of the present society is what Inche'
Abdul Karim would like to change. Only in the ideal society,
he feels, could men behave in a way which would allow the
least fit, in Social Darwinistic terms--the weak and dull-
witted--to survive along with the strong and clever. If the
weak are apt to lose out in the struggle for the domestic
pie, the soft-hearted and irresolute among nation states are
no more likely to survive in the international arena. Sun-
dram's description of international politics thus bears an

unmistakable resemblance to Inche' Abdul Karim's picture of
internal exploitation of the weak by the strong. Asked about
the inevitability of war, he answers:

> Yes, war is inevitable. Now you have two camps and neu-
> tral nations will be eliminated. They must take a stand
> either in the democratic or communist camp. This will be
> more or less hitched to ideology---and preservation---the
> weak must rely on the strong to protect you [sic].

The only way for weak nations to survive, according to
Sundram, is by joining, or becoming a client of, a strong na-
tion which will act as a patron of its weak ally. This is
the formula for survival in a Hobbesian world.

The Hobbesian character of political and economic life
is created, as these men see it, by the fact that the size of
the pie to be distributed is unchanging. Under such circum-
stances, it is difficult to establish any ground rules for
the competition and the scope for cooperation is greatly re-
duced. The weakness of any contestant will be quickly ex-
ploited and, unless he can find a strong patron, his only
refuge is strength and/or wile. Most of these administrators
apply the same reasoning to the international arena as well,
where a nation which allows its citizens great freedom may
find this a severe handicap in a world where other nations do
not allow themselves such luxuries. Inche' Ja'afar expresses
the potential danger of freedom in this manner:

> As a nation, we are out to compete with another nation.
> If we have too much freedom, then it might lessen our

ability to compete. But if there is freedom all over---
Too much freedom may affect the national effort---if the
U.S. wants to compete with the Soviet Union, it may have
to lose some freedom in order to compete.

Although he is a strong democrat, Inche' Ja'afar feels democ-
racy may be a disadvantage if other countries do not observe
the ground rules. The problem is to establish such rules
and, if they cannot be set up, a nation is willy-nilly forced
to adopt the same methods as the most ruthless of its compet-
itors in order to hold its own.

As we noted above, most civil servants are persuaded
that the central, domestic function of government is to es-
tablish strict rules for the competition so as to prevent the
struggle from leading to anarchy. Internationally, however,
there is no agency to perform this role. Thus, it is not
surprising that these administrators see great danger in na-
tional freedom unless all other competing states are willing
to abide by the same rules. Both domestically and interna-
tionally, then, the scarcity of desired values and the fact
that their supply remains fixed seems to explain the 'dog-
eat-dog' quality of the competition as it is viewed by Malay-
sian bureaucrats. When someone can gain only at the expense
of another--when economic and political life is a zero-sum
game--it is only natural that the struggle should be intense.

To confirm our impression from the interviews we asked
over 100 civil servants whether or not they agreed with the
statement, "Any government that wants to help the poor people

will have to take something away from the rich in order to do
it." The statement makes the political implications of a
constant-pie orientation quite explicit. Roughly two-thirds
(65.9 per cent) agreed with the statement and over half of
those assenting said they "strongly agreed."[6] These results
lend strong support to our more impressionistic analysis of
the interview transcripts which indicated that political com-
petition is viewed as a struggle over the division of a
constant-pie. The evidence clearly suggests, moreover, that
the conflict engendered by this fixed supply of material
goods is of central importance in accounting for the concep-
tion of both internal and external politics which character-
izes our sample.

The belief patterns noted thus far in this chapter
have not gone completely unnoticed by other political scien-
tists. Lucian Pye, in his Guerilla Communism in Malaya,
wrote that surrendered communist insurgents believed politics
consisted of hostility, aggressiveness, and conflict quite
apart from communist teachings.[7] Although he did not elabo-
rate, Pye actually foreshadowed our own analysis when remark-
ing that the insurgents he interviewed felt that 'from every
political development, some groups profited and some suf-
fered.'[8] Pye makes this observation of a very unique sample,
but it seems equally applicable to Malaysian civil servants
and, as we shall argue later, may well apply to elites in
other underdeveloped nations.

C. The Relation of the Constant-Pie Orientation to Other Attitudinal Variables

The prominence of the constant-pie or zero-sum orientation in the interviews, and its importance for political beliefs, prompted the construction of questionnaire items designed to tap the same attitude in a different manner. A more objective measure of this orientation offers the possibility of replicating our subjective findings and relating them to other attitudinal variables. The four items constructed for this purpose were as follows:

1. Even in a rich country, if population grows rapidly, there is great danger that there will soon not be enough wealth to go around.
2. Those who get ahead usually get ahead at the expense of others.
3. When an individual or group gains, it usually means that another individual or group loses.
4. Any government that wants to help the poor people will have to take something away from the rich in order to do it.

Eighty five civil servants (cf. Appendix B) were asked whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with each of these statements and their responses were scored 5, 4, 2, 1 respectively.[9] The total score for an individual was simply the sum of scores for each item. As these questions were devised specifically for this research and have not been validated or administered in other cultural contexts, the results at this point can only be suggestive.

All items were administered as well to 24 "management trainees" from the private sector attending a course at the National Productivity Centre. A comparison between the aver-

age scores for the private and public sector respondents al-
lows us to determine whether the constant-pie orientation is
a specifically "bureaucratic" phenomenon or if it is shared
in equal measure by non-civil servants in the business world.
The rigid organization of bureaucratic posts and salaries
might lead one to imagine more of a zero-sum orientation
among civil servants. On the other hand, firms in the pri-
vate sector often fall to the pressure of the competitive en-
vironment and their profits vacillate according to the vaga-
ries of the market. Using the latter line of reasoning one
might expect to find more of a zero-sum orientation among
managers in the private sector. Different kinds of "common
sense" thus lead us in quite opposite directions. In any
case, the average score on all the constant-pie items for the
private sector respondents was 12.5 and for the public sec-
tor, 12.4. The distribution of scores within each group,
moreover, was comparable. A difference of .1 is of no sig-
nificance whatever and there is thus no reason to suppose
that anything peculiar to the experience of civil servants
might predispose them to think more in constant-pie terms
than other groups. We shall have to seek elsewhere for the
roots of this orientation.

In the context of the interviews it seemed that the
constant-pie orientation was related to both a Hobbesian view
of the world and a relative absence of social trust. The
evidence from the transcripts, persuasive as it seems, is

nevertheless somewhat impressionistic. Use of the measure we have constructed, however, permits us to explore the connection between the constant-pie orientation and other attitudinal variables in a more systematic fashion. These connections serve to put some conceptual "flesh" on the orientation and place it in its proper context among other beliefs and opinions.

The summed scores on the constant-pie items were divided at the median into high and low scorers and correlated with the scores on other attitudinal variables tapped in the same questionnaire.[10] Surprisingly, of the eight other variables tested, the results for five were correlated with constant-pie scores at a statistically significant level (.05 level or better using chi square). Four of these correlations are important enough for our analysis to merit discussion below.

1. Authoritarianism.

Taking the "P" Scale used by Joseph Elder in India,[11] those who were high scorers in constant-pie thinking were generally high scorers on the authoritarianism scale as well.[12] The association between the two is hardly astonishing since both orientations share a kind of "over-realism," a belief that conflict rather than cooperation characterizes social relations. Items in the "P" Scale stating that "there will always be wars and conflict," that the division between "the strong and the weak" is the most relevant one in society,

and that "evil people" abound, clearly approximate the vision
of the world one would expect of someone competing for his
share of a fixed pie. That people are pitted constantly
against one another is an assumption as common to the man who
thinks in constant-pie terms as to the authoritarian man.

Simply because of the widespread misunderstanding of
what "authoritarianism" means, we should like to make quite
clear what we are saying. One may distinguish between those
who, when discussing the dynamics of authoritarianism, con-
centrate on ego-defensive mechanisms and pathology, and those
who focus on cognitive processes. As Greenstein points out:

> The cognitive theory holds that the patterns of expres-
> sion and behavior that have been characterized as author-
> itarian are based upon simple learning of the conceptions
> of reality prevalent in one's culture or sub-culture, and
> that these patterns also may to some extent be accurate
> reflections of the actual conditions of adult life faced
> by some individuals, rather than having the labyrinthine
> roots in reaction formation suggested by the ego-defensive
> theory.[13]

The cognitive approach is particularly useful in in-
terpreting authoritarianism in the non-Western context. Ma-
laysian civil servants, in particular, manifest some authori-
tarian traits while lacking others. They do exhibit a
suspicion and distrust of human nature, an externalized
super-ego, and conventionalism, but they are not exclusively
power-oriented, nor do they desire unrestrained leaders (for
they do not trust human nature). We have suggested that an

externalized super-ego and a lack of faith in people are probably cultural norms rather than pathological traits. Moreover, as we shall argue later, their constant-pie orientation may well be an accurate reflection of actual conditions. The cognitive theory of authoritarianism surely makes more sense than the ego-defensive theory in a cultural _milieu_ where elements of authoritarian character predominate and where much of the environment may in fact resemble what the supposedly pathological person might imagine.

In an environment of the sort we have described, it is difficult to distinguish ego-defensive strategies from conformity--pathology from acquiescence. There is thus no reason to resort to pathology à la Pye to explain the authoritarian attitudes of Malaysian civil servants. It is more than likely that the mere assimilation of cultural norms and adaptation to the environment produces whatever authoritarianism we have discovered. The strong affect and reaction formation which characterize the pathological authoritarian are largely absent, for these men, like Banfield's southern Italian peasants, are reflecting the cultural norms and existential restraints which are a part of their experience.

2. Superiors as Vindictive or Threatening

Using three items to ascertain whether respondents felt their superiors were vindictive or threatening, we found that those who thought more in constant-pie terms tended to view their superiors in this manner.[14] The correlation con-

firms what might have been predicted. If the social product
is viewed as fixed it is likely that superiors would be ex-
pected to seize every advantage and exploit their subordi-
nates when the opportunity arose. As anticipated as this re-
sult is, the effect of the constant-pie orientation on
interpersonal relationships within the bureaucracy is an im-
portant one to have established.

3. Faith-in-People

Rosenberg's Faith-in-People Scale was administered to
54 civil servants but, due to the method of scoring, a large
number of middle scores had to be discarded in dichotomizing
the results into high and low categories.[15] Of the 35 re-
maining individuals, those with a high constant-pie orienta-
tion had less "faith in people," while those who thought less
in constant-pie terms more often evinced a greater faith in
people. As we commented earlier in this chapter, everyone in
a constant-pie world is a potential competitor and is expect-
ed to act in a narrowly selfish manner. Surely, no one would
expect much brotherly love where the social product is fixed
at low levels, and the correlation bears this out.

The link between the constant-pie orientation and a
lack of social trust, both in the interviews and in more ob-
jective measures, is of some theoretical importance. It con-
nects the view of human nature which we explored in the pre-
vious chapter and the belief in a fixed social product. An
evaluation of human nature in which a lack of social trust

predominates may be the common pattern in any community where
the supply of most desired values is seen as severely limited.

For peasant society this connection has been made re-
peatedly. Foster notes the poor quality of interpersonal re-
lations in peasant society and ascribes it to the fact that

> each minimal social unit . . . sees itself in perpetual,
> unrelenting struggle with its fellows for possession of
> or control over what it consideres to be its share of
> scarce values.[16]

In addition to the anthropological evidence for widespread
social distrust in peasant societies, including Indian and
Chinese peasant communities,[17] Swift has commented on pre-
cisely the same pattern among Malay peasants. After de-
scribing the lack of social trust within a Malay village,
Swift relates it to a "constant pie" in this passage:

> . . . and when competition moves into the field of power
> (which I see as a zero-sum concept) it may be said that
> one man's success can only be achieved at the direct ex-
> pense of his competitors. Many village leaders are such
> because they have striven hard to achieve the position,
> and in the course of their striving have made bitter ene-
> mies.[18]

One would be at a loss to describe the great variety
of conditions and historical experiences which might provide
fertile ground for the growth of social distrust. An event
like the French Revolution created cleavages and social dis-
trust which endure to this day, but we suspect that the form

of social distrust which it promoted is quite different from
what we have found among Malaysian civil servants. The fa-
miliar animosities between anti-clerical and pro-clerical
groups in France are highly structured--i.e., social distrust
has a relatively clear target. An environment where desired
values are seen in zero-sum terms, on the other hand, is more
likely to encourage the highly generalized social distrust
which we found among these 17 administrators. What we are
suggesting is merely that the constant-pie orientation may be
a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for widespread in-
terpersonal distrust. The fact that one person's gains must
come at the expense of others--or simply the belief that this
is true--makes everyone a potential or actual competitor for
scarce values since the progress of one necessarily means the
plunder of another. In this sort of atmosphere, it would re-
quire a great act of faith to trust others in the absence of
firm sanctions to enforce cooperation. Generalized social
distrust, in this context, is likely to be the modal orienta-
tion and social trust, a deviant one.

A. Control Over the Future

The degree to which people feel they can successfully
plan for the future is an important basic attitude. Two
items were included in the questionnaire to tap this feeling
and the correlation between these scores and the constant-pie
items was striking. Those who thought in constant-pie terms
most often felt they lacked any control over the future while

those who scored low in constant-pie thinking scored high in
"future control" items ($N = 57$, $\underline{chi}^2$ 24.10, $p < .001$).[19]

We remarked earlier that in a constant-pie environment
one must struggle to preserve his share against the depreda-
tions of others while, where the pie is expanding, the prob-
lem is rather to preserve a rate of advance. In the latter
situation, the future is likely to be promising, cooperation
and generosity are more possible and more rewarding, and even
the weak can participate in gains. An environment of scarci-
ty projected into the future, however, promises danger and
uncertainty and makes planning a hazardous enterprise at
best. Feelings of fear and helplessness before the future
may well characterize those who see the system within which
they operate as closed and relatively poor.[20] Fear of the
future is, in this context, quite common among more tradi-
tional peoples who actually live in systems of this nature.

The theoretical importance of this strong association
between time orientations and constant-pie thinking is such
that we shall have more to say on this subject in the follow-
ing chapter.

The construction of a more objective measure of the
constant-pie orientation was intended for a quite limited
purpose. It has served simply to amplify and substantiate
the meaning of the orientation and its relationship to a num-
ber of other attitudes. The Hobbesian qualities cast on the

environment by the assumption of fixed social product were
indirectly confirmed through the association between "author-
itarianism" and the felt vindictiveness of superiors on the
one hand and the constant-pie orientation on the other. More
important, the link between the social distrust described in
Chapter 4 and the zero-sum outlook was replicated in the cor-
relation of scores on the "Faith-in-People" Scale and the
Constant-Pie Scale. Finally, it seems that the presence or
absence of the constant-pie orientation implies fundamentally
different visions of what the future holds. The strength of
the constant-pie orientation was strongly associated with a
feeling that the future is both uncertain and uncontrollable.
Now we shall turn to a brief discussion of how others have
described and explained much the same orientation to nature
and consider further its implications.

D. Clarifying the Constant-Pie Orientation

1. An Economic View

After discovering what we have chosen to call a "con-
stant-pie" orientation among Malaysian civil servants, we
found that at least two social scientists have discussed much
the same phenomenon in quite different contexts. The first,
Albert O. Hirschman, an economist, discusses this orientation
in his book, The Strategy of Economic Development; a work
which challenges many of the orthodox theories of economic
growth.[21]

Hirschman distinguishes between tightly-knit societies which are likely to have a "group focused image of change" and more loosely-structured societies which are apt to manifest an "ego-focused image of change." Tightly-knit societies, according to this characterization, expect economic development to raise everyone at the same rate so that relative status rankings are preserved while loosely-structured societies see progress in individual rather than group terms.[22] Hirschman suggests that societies of the latter type tend to stress the "competitive and creative role of entrepreneurs," at the expense of the cooperative abilities needed to ensure the success of any large-scale enterprise. We have noted that, for our sample too, the competitive pattern in politics is apt to be emphasized and the possibility of cooperative strategies largely discounted. Hirschman feels that this selective emphasis may result from something like the constant-pie orientation which we have found among Malaysians. As he puts it:

When the total social product is believed to be rigidly fixed, the idea that both parties can profit from an agreement is not likely to arise; on the contrary, the more closely one approaches agreement, the more suspicious one becomes about the other fellow's having 'put something over.'[23]

The belief in a "rigidly fixed social product" is not really different from the "constant-pie" orientation which we have described. Hirschman limits himself to a description of

the economic consequences of such a belief while we have
shown that the consequences for political ideology are simi-
lar. The Hobbesian world our respondents see, the ruthless
competition, the many opportunities for exploitation of the
weak by the strong, are all analogous to the economic pattern
Hirschman finds, and both patterns seem to flow from the same
constant-pie orientation.

Hirschman also notes that the "group-focused image of
change" can be seen as a "defensive ego-focused strategy."
That is, those who fear that they will be bested in the com-
petition may find it to their advantage to emphasize group-
focused change which would enable them to preserve their rel-
ative position.[24] Now, group-focused change requires strong
government which can restrain individuals and groups from
acting against the interests of the community at large. As
we explained in the previous chapter, this is exactly the
sort of government preferred by Malaysian civil servants and
perhaps for the same reason Hirschman outlines. Given the
loss of status suffered by bureaucrats vis-a-vis politicians
after independence and the high level of unrestrained self-
seeking they see in society, the preference for strong gov-
ernment may well represent a desire to protect themselves and
others whom they feel are less fitted for survival in an ego-
focused society. Thus a central belief in a "rigidly fixed
social product"--a constant-pie orientation--accounts not
only for certain types of economic behavior as Hirschman has

shown, but also helps explain analogous political patterns
such as a belief in strong central rule and a competitive
rather than cooperative view of political life.

2. An Anthropological View

The second social scientist who has discussed some-
thing akin to the constant-pie orientation is George M. Fos-
ter, an anthropologist. Foster contends that "the image of
limited good" is a belief which is characteristic of Latin
American peasant societies, if not peasant societies every-
where.[25] His understanding of the term is virtually identi-
cal with our concept of a "constant pie" although, as this
quote shows, he finds it applicable to a much broader range
of phenomena.

> By "Image of Limited Good" I mean that broad areas of
> peasant behavior are patterned in such fashion as to sug-
> gest that peasants view their social, economic, and natu-
> ral universes--their total environment--as one in which
> all of the desired things in life such as land, wealth,
> health, friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect
> and status, power and influence, security and safety,
> exist in finite quantity and are always in short supply,
> as far as the peasant is concerned. Not only do these
> and all other "good things" exist in finite and limited
> quantities, but in addition, there is no way directly
> within peasant power to increase the available quanti-
> ties.[26]

Whether or not the image of limited good applies as
well to values like health, love, honor, etc., does not con-

cern us directly here,[27] but Foster does delineate the three essential qualities of a constant-pie orientation. The size of the pie must be seen as fixed, it must be seen as small relative to demand, and it must be thought to remain relatively constant over time. When all three qualities are present in the minds of community members, they will see themselves living as part of a "closed system"[28] in which no appreciable expansion of the social product can occur.

The hallmark of this kind of environment is that no individual, family, or group can gain unless other individuals, families, or groups lose. Social life becomes a zero-sum game in which one can only get ahead at the expense of others. The <u>political</u> beliefs of civil servants, which we recounted earlier in the chapter, may all be viewed as logical in the light of this basic value orientation. Politics is, for them, imbued with the Hobbesian qualities which characterize a constant-pie orientation. They would like government to impose sanctions against this chaos of individualistic self-seeking and restore order, but in the meantime, until ground rules and order are created, the endless struggle for material values continues.

There is good reason to suppose that the constant-pie orientation is not restricted to peasant societies in Latin America or to Malaysian administrators. Foster himself cites evidence from no less than thirteen areas,[29] in addition to Mexico where his own first-hand observations were made, to

support his contention that the orientation is characteristic
of most, if not all, peasant societies. And since most peas-
ant societies are, in fact, societies in which the material
pie is constant and in which it is often true that one man's
gain is another man's loss, the widespread evidence of this
orientation is scarcely surprising. Later, we shall explain
why we feel that the constant-pie orientation is characteris-
tic not only of peasant society but of post-colonial elites
as well.

E. Constant-Pie Orientation and Distributive Justice

Evidence for the constant-pie orientation among Malay-
sian bureaucrats can be found in what they fail to say as
well as in what they do say. American working men in Lane's
Eastport, when they spoke to Lane of their future, saw an ex-
panding economic pie in which they fully expected to share.
Commenting on this, Lane writes:

> Many of the men who see themselves as "better off" in
> five years think of this in terms of an advancing econo-
> my, not individual promotion.[30]

Oddly, not one of the Malaysian civil servants interviewed
mentioned "an advancing economy" or a growing civil service
as his way to a better life. Those who saw a better future
saw it not in terms of a general, societal advance but rather
as a result of their own promotion through a static system.
They not only fail to see total wealth as an expanding quan-

tity; they fail as well to see any future change in the status pyramid. All of them choose to ignore the large expansion of civil service posts in recent years and focus instead on promotion as their superiors retire or die. What seems to be missing is an appreciation of the fact that the total number of positions at each rank are increasing and that there is both an absolute and relative expansion of the middle- and upper-class which makes room each year for more and more people. The hours civil servants spend assiduously examining the Federal Establishment List, making notes of retirements, transfers, and promotions, are a reflection of the constant-pie occupational world in which they imagine themselves to be operating. Quite naturally, competition for promotion, suspicion of what others may be doing to get ahead, and disaffection with the distribution of posts are all intensified in this environment. Internal bureaucratic politics are thus but a smaller version of what is assumed to occur in national politics.

When the pie is seen as constant both inside and outside the bureaucracy, concern is focused on whether an individual is getting his "share" or not. He cannot afford to be generous since others advance potentially at his expense. An individual or group in this context judges the system largely in terms of its distributive justice and it is this almost exclusive concern with how justly the "slices" are parcelled out which characterizes the constant-pie orientation. It is

therefore difficult for a group to look with equanimity on the advances of another sector since that sector's advance leaves a smaller balance to be distributed to the remaining groups. Whether a civil servant groups himself with his racial community, with other civil servants, or simply with his close kin—-and all identifications are present in the sample —-all of them judge the political system according to how equitable they judge their share and that of their group to be. Mere intimation of an advantage about to be conferred on others excites in them a lively sense of personal or group loss and, often, bitterness.[31]

The stuff of politics at present is, for most of these civil servants, not the effort to realize common goals but rather the attempt to mediate and settle disputes over the distribution of scarce values. Ethnic cleavages, coinciding with linguistic, occupational, religious, and urban-rural divisions, exacerbate the disputes and provide a focal point for conflict but do not per se produce it. The ideal politician is thus one who, by appeals, threats, fatherly firmness and justice, persuades or intimidates individuals and groups to accept less than they would otherwise insist upon. He keeps peace among his children who are continually "at war" over the distribution of scarce values.

The desire for a strong government which would promote a "group-focused" policy can be seen as an effort to eliminate the problem of distribution by freezing the existing

distributive pattern. Under this policy, government would in
effect guarantee the relative financial statuses of all;
gains or losses would be evenly distributed throughout the
social pyramid with relative statuses remaining intact. As
Hirschman has noted, this is a strategy adopted by those who
feel they are potential losers in a period of change. What
is required of strong central rule is that it insure its peo-
ple against the inherent dangers of a constant-pie society.
The same process is involved in the efforts of trade unions
to abolish "piece work" which would 'profit some more than
others and divide the group.'[32] It is a conservative strate-
gy which values group solidarity over atomized competition.

F. Conclusion

Before concluding this section we should emphasize
again that the constant-pie orientation is an ordering prin-
ciple which unites a variety of beliefs. None of these civil
servants ever directly suggested that he viewed the environ-
ment in this fashion and there is therefore no basis for as-
suming that this central belief is a part of his conscious,
cognitive orientation. Rather, what we have done is to show
that many of the respondents' political beliefs make sense
only if they are interpreted in the light of this ordering
principle. The constant-pie orientation does not seem to be
contradicted by any of the evidence and its makes comprehen-
sible and predictable a wide range of the political beliefs

we have described.

The quality of politics in a community where the "pie" is assumed to be constant is fundamentally different from politics in an environment where the pie is thought to be expanding. It is the difference between the politics of scarcity and the politics of affluence. Where the pie is expanding, cooperation and generosity are possible, while where it is constant, one must be callous since, as Mr. Lim aptly puts it, "The big fish eat the small fish and the small fish eat worms." In the one, people can get rich and no one suffers, while in the other, the poor must plunder the rich if they are to advance. In the one, population increase need not mean poverty, but in the other, population growth means smaller shares all around and promotes violence. In the one, groups are fighting to preserve a rate of advance in an atmosphere of economic growth, while in the other, a group is fighting to preserve its share of a fixed pie against the assaults of opposing groups. In the one, compromise comes easily and alliances can endure, while in the other, the stakes are too high for much compromise and alliances are rife with suspicion and distrust. Where the pie is growing, one can afford to give something away occasionally, while where it is fixed, there is no substitute for strength and ruthlessness. These qualities of a constant-pie world dominate the views of politics held by Malaysian civil servants. It is not that they prefer things this way; on the contrary, they would like

the government to step in and put an end to the pattern of
politics created by a constant pie.

As we have already implied in our discussion of misan-
thropy among Malaysian civil servants, the constant-pie ori-
entation leaves little room for the social trust which pro-
motes democratic political styles. Perhaps it is this absence
of trust which lies at the bottom of many of the political
implications of this basic orientation for, among others,
Almond and Verba have shown that "the role of social trust
and cooperativeness as a component of the civil culture can-
not be overemphasized."[33] As social trust and cooperative-
ness filter into political beliefs they reduce partisanship
and "fragmentation," facilitate the formation of groups, en-
courage the use of persuasive strategies, and make for some
level of confidence in the elite and in the political sys-
tem.[34] The constant-pie orientation, on the other hand, dis-
courages social trust and the political dividend which social
trust pays. In the absence of this trust and cooperation,
the maintenance of a democratic system becomes vastly more
difficult since there is great discontinuity between the po-
litical culture assumed by a democratic type of government
and the actual political culture.

Throughout this chapter we have concentrated on demon-
strating the existence of what we have called a "constant-
pie" orientation and exploring its relationship with other

attitudinal variables. In particular, a view which imparts Hobbesian characteristics to the environment, a lack of faith in people, a fear of the future, and a special form of authoritarianism, were all significantly associated with a belief in a fixed social product. These empirical connections allow us to place the orientation in a broader context and relate our findings for the orientation toward human nature to the findings for the "man-nature" orientation. Profiting from the insights of other social scientists, we have also attempted to trace some of the political implications of the constant-pie thinking: the concern with distributive justice, the fragility of political cooperation, the desire for government to impose a "group-focused" orientation, etc.

In the following chapter we hope to suggest the origin and development of the constant-pie orientation and, in the process, highlight some essential characteristics of ideological change in transitional societies.

FOOTNOTES

1. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

2. Arthur Koestler, The Lotus and the Robot (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 189-197.

3. Ibid., p. 190.

4. The phrase "Politics of Scarcity" is borrowed from Myron Weiner's The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962). My use of the term, however, is quite different from Weiner's.

5. Division I, II, and a few Division III civil servants were included in this sample drawn from training courses held by the various ministries in Kuala Lumpur.

6. This, despite the well-known fact among civil servants that over half of annual governmental revenue comes from import duties rather than from internal taxation.

7. Pye, op. cit., p. 168.

8. Ibid., p. 196.

9. The median score for 85 civil servants was 12.35. Actually, more agreement was recorded for items 1 and 4 which place the situation in a more specific context than for the more general statements represented by items 2 and 3.

10. See Appendix B, Part II, for a complete listing of items and scales used in this questionnaire.

11. See Appendix B, Part II, for this seven item scale.

12. See Appendix C for correlation table and chi^2.

13. Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Sociali-
zation: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic
Character," The Annals (September, 1965), p. 93.

14. See Appendix B, Part II, for items used and Appendix C
for the correlation table and chi^2.

15. See Appendix B, Part II, for scale items and Appendix C
for the correlation table and chi^2.

16. George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Lim-
ited Good," pp. 293-315, American Anthropologist, Vol.
62, No. 2 (April 1965), p. 302. Foster also cites a
number of anthropologists who have commented on the
"mentality of mutual distrust" found in peasant socie-
ties. Among others, he mentions Oscar Lewis, Life in a
Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Restudied (Champagne-Urbana:
Univ. of Illinois Press, 1951); G. Morris Carstairs, The
Twice-Born: A Study of a Community of High-caste Hindus
(Bloomington: Univ. of Indiana Press, 1958); S. L. Dube,
India's Changing Villages: Human Factors in Community
Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd.,
1958); Winifred S. Blackman, The Fellahin of Upper Egypt
(London: George C. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1927); Hsiao-tung
Pei and Chit-I Chang, Earthbound China: A Study of the
Rural Economy in Yunnan (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1945).

17. See footnote No. 27.

18. Swift, op. cit., pp. 156-157. The passage between pa-

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rentheses is his.

19. See Appendix B, Part II, for scale items and Appendix C for the correlation table.

20. One could reverse the argument and say that a fear of the future will result in a constant-pie orientation. The causal link is, in this case, somewhat more difficult to construct but not entirely implausible. For example, when the economic pie is in fact expanding a pervasive fear of the future may prevent a person from projecting that expansion into the future and changing his beliefs accordingly. Experience over time with an expanding pie would, however, probably extinguish his fear of the future in the long run.

21. Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1958).

22. Ibid., pp. 11-14.

23. Ibid., p. 18.

24. Ibid., p. 13.

25. Foster, op. cit., pp. 293-315.

26. Ibid., p. 296.

27. There is some evidence from the transcripts that the constant-pie orientation is applicable to values other than just wealth and power. Many respondents exhibit a good deal of machismo, exaggerated toughness and a touchy sense of personal honor, which Foster thinks flows from this orientation. The men I interviewed also seem to

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consider prestige and status in short supply as this
typical quote from Inche' Ismail illustrates: "But
there can't be an ideal man since there can't be an
ideal society. If a man is the ideal of one sector,
then another sector will not like him and even perhaps
grow to hate him."

28. Foster, op. cit., p. 297.

29. Egypt, Uganda, Columbia, Guatemala, Nigeria, Peru, Paki-
stan, Spain, Greece, Lebanon, China, India, and Indo-
nesia. See text of Foster's article, op. cit.

30. Lane, op. cit., p. 18.

31. National politics in Malaysia follows much the same pat-
tern. With the exception of a handful of leaders, party
members seem largely concerned with retaining or expand-
ing the privileges their group enjoys rather than with
devising policies to enlarge the pie. And the competi-
tion for these privileges is carried on as if the total
pie were both small and constant. Similar orientations
may be observed in the industrialized West as well; the
distinction is one of relative emphasis rather than an
absolute dichotomy.

32. Hirschman, op. cit., p. 13.

33. Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 356-357.

34. Ibid., pp. 357-360.

CHAPTER 6

THE DYNAMICS OF THE CONSTANT-PIE ORIENTATION
AND THE NATURE OF TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY

A. The Peasant's World as a Constant-Pie World

1. The Parameters of Traditional Society

When a peasant assumes that the fund of desired values
in his community is both small and constant, he does little
violence to the facts. His view is a more or less accurate
assessment of his condition and that of his neighbors. Fos-
ter is quite explicit on this point.

Peasant economies, as pointed out by many authors, are
not productive. In the average village there is only a
finite amount of wealth produced, and no amount of extra
hard work will significantly change the figure.[1]

The social product is fixed in peasant society and it
is in this situation that the constant-pie orientation must
develop. Not only is the total wealth of a peasant village

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constant, but the level of technical skills and scientific
knowledge is also fixed, making the prospect of greater af-
fluence in the years to come completely unrealistic. A peas-
ant society is likely to have only a fixed number of leader-
ship posts as well, and since these posts are less divisible
than rice or gold, the potential for inequalities in the dis-
tribution of power is particularly great.

In most peasant villages wealth is virtually synony-
mous with the amount of productive land an individual pos-
sesses. While the pattern of "slash-and-burn" agriculture,
where there is little population pressure, offers some chance
to leave the community and strike out on one's own,[2] the sed-
entary wet-rice pattern which prevails in most of Southeast
Asia more closely resembles a closed system. The labor costs
of bringing new land into production--assuming more land is
available nearby--are so great as to render the total arable
land area more or less constant in the foreseeable future.
Under the wet-rice pattern, land becomes gradually more
scarce as population grows and, as the cultivators become ac-
customed to this productive technique, it becomes progres-
sively more difficult for an individual to break away and re-
turn to slash-and-burn agriculture.

Power, knowledge, skills, land, and wealth are thus
all more or less fixed at certain levels in the peasant econ-
omy. The progress of one group or individual often does oc-
cur only at the expense of a competing group or individual

and the peasant's belief that this is so is no figment of his imagination. The economic system is a closed one, and where it has some contact with a central government, the question is seldom how much it will receive from the government but whether it can minimize the tax plunder which will surely occur. If anything, the net effect of an affiliation with a central government in traditional society is to reduce the quantity of scarce goods to be distributed within the village. That the government will take a share as tax is virtually certain and only the size of that share is in question as village authorities plead abject poverty and government officials search for something to squeeze. Thus, the central government itself contributes to the economic scarcity of peasant life.

The constant-pie orientation then reflects the inherent limitations of traditional peasant society. More specifically, it reflects the severely limited availability of power, prestige, wealth, land, and productive techniques. As a peasant orientation, it is in tune with the realities.

2. Constant Pie, the Future, and Social Distrust

A belief that the society could to some extent collectively plan its own future might theoretically offer a way out, but the attribution of natural events to supernatural forces and the uncertainty and fear which permeates the peasant view of the future only serve to reinforce the orientation. Nothing in the peasant's attitude toward the future

mitigates his belief in the inevitability of scarcity or the permanence of conflict over the distribution of shares.

As we have indicated, the relationship between the constant-pie orientation and the orientation to time is a crucial one. It is particularly relevant to strategies of cooperation since even in a zero-sum environment, a long run view might allow one faction to cooperate closely over an extended period to increase its share of scarce values. That is, a zero-sum "game" does not per se exclude long run cooperative strategies, although it may make cooperation somewhat more tenuous since the potential rewards for switching alliances are comparatively great. But the constant-pie orientation when coupled with a short-run view of the future, as it is in peasant society,[3] drastically reduces the scope for long-term cooperation. When most members join a group to achieve a variety of short-run personal advantages, it becomes impossible for the group as a whole to pursue long-run objectives and still retain its membership. Under these circumstances groups tend to be short-lived and fragile, and to seek only immediate, limited objectives.

Our description of the limited nature of cooperation among peasants is at variance with the semi-romanticized image of peasants which contends that peasant societies are the very model of collective endeavor. Among such model peasantries, none have been as highly vaunted as the Javanese. The well-known Indonesian term gotong royong has come to signify

the friendly mutual assistance which is supposed to charac-
terize their behavior. Clifford Geertz, however, alerts us
to the danger of misconstruing the nature of Javanese cooper-
ation:

> What has developed . . . is not so much a general spirit
> of cooperativeness--Javanese peasants tend, like many
> peasants, to be rather suspicious of groups larger than
> the immediate family--but a set of explicit and concrete
> practices. . . . This sense for the need to support spe-
> cific, carefully delineated social mechanisms which can
> mobilize labor, capital, and consumption resources . . .
> and concentrate them effectively at one point in space
> and time, is the central characteristic of the much-
> remarked, but poorly understood, 'cooperativeness' of the
> Javanese peasant. Cooperation is founded on a very live-
> ly sense of the mutual value to the participants of such
> cooperation, not on a general ethic of the unity of all
> men or an organic view of society which takes the group
> as primary and the individual as secondary.[4]

Innate peasant suspicion of those outside the family, then,
pervades the character of Javanese cooperation and makes it
"specific," "carefully delineated," short run, and keys it to
the personal goals of participants. We would expect that in
a society with a fixed social product, cooperation with per-
sons outside the family circle will generally be circum-
scribed in the manner Geertz describes.

The distrust of those outside the kinship network
which Geertz observed among the Javanese and attributes to
peasants as a class is, of course, precisely what Banfield

has in mind for southern Italian peasants when he character-
izes their inability to form durable groups for common pur-
poses as "amoral familism." As a pattern of behavior,
"amoral familism" could not be considered either irrational
or pathological in an environment where the struggle for
shares of a constant pie is normal, and where a short-run
time orientation predominates. All three patterns--"amoral
familism," constant-pie orientation, and limited time horizon
--are typical of peasant society and originate in the materi-
al limitations of peasant life everywhere, whether in south-
ern Italy, Latin America, or Southeast Asia.

Extended cooperation with non-family members requires
a certain level of generalized social trust which is usually
absent in peasant society[5] and, as we showed in the previous
chapter, is negatively associated with a constant-pie orien-
tation. In an atmosphere of scarcity compounded by an un-
known and recalcitrant future, there is little room for easy,
confident social relations. Friends are valued largely for
what they can offer you--in terms of support and protection--
rather than for their amiable personality. And since those
who make you their friend have the same object in mind, it is
well to be wary of exploitation.[6] If the material conditions
were less constricting, friends might serve sociable rather
than survival functions and there might be greater scope for
the easy-going "civic" qualities on which a democracy is sup-
posed by many to depend. But these are luxuries which the

competitors for scarce values can hardly afford.[7]

Judging both from our analysis and the observations of other social scientists, it is apparent that a belief in a fixed social product, a comparatively high level of social distrust ("amoral familism"), and a short-run time orientation are all interrelated characteristics of peasant societies. The inherent parameters of wealth and knowledge which typify such communities are responsible for the genesis and maintenance of all three of these qualities.

3. Scarcity: The Human Condition

The conditions which promote and maintain these orientations have in fact been the common lot of man until the recent past. The arrival of the notion of progress is relatively recent and, even now, is limited to a small proportion of mankind, while the constant-pie orientation--together with its social and political consequences--continues to be a more or less accurate expression of the traditional condition.

Analyzing the writings of Kautlya, minister to the founder of the large Mauryan Empire in India at the end of the 14th century, a commentator concludes that 'he conceived of the politico-economic world as a Hobbesian one.'

> Above all, he had no vision of a gradually rising level of living; for many if not most, his economy would always be a "pain economy."[8]

To this day the economy of India remains a "pain economy" as do the economies of virtually all the new nations.

And if a "pain economy" is typical of new nations, it is reasonable to suggest that new states also share the orientations which, as we have shown, characterize a "pain economy." Nor is a fixed social product exclusively the property of the non-Western world. Large areas of Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal which constitute peasant "enclaves" in the West (as well as most of Latin America) share a similar material environment and there is some evidence that they share much the same set of beliefs as well.[9]

Recognizing that peasants live in a constant-pie environment, it remains to explain the mechanisms by which the pie is distributed in traditional society.

B. Managing the Constant-Pie in Traditional Society

The manner in which the constant-pie of desired values is managed in traditional society is distinctive and fundamentally different from the pattern in transitional society. As these differences greatly affect the nature of ideology, we shall examine each pattern in turn.

In traditional society, more specifically peasant, village society, a relatively stable system develops whereby limitations are placed on the level of competition for shares of the pie. Certain restrictions also govern the means by which one may try to enlarge his own share or that of his kin group. A variety of social norms, customs, superstitions, dependencies, and other social control mechanisms become

established which serve to restrain the fissiparous tendencies inherent in an economy of scarcity. In the relatively static atmosphere of traditional peasant society these social mechanisms help achieve some community solidarity and a measure of predictability in the distribution of shares within the community. The success of these mechanisms varies, of course, from society to society, but they appear to work tolerably well in maintaining tenuous control over the centrifugal forces generated by a "pain economy."

The necessity for social control mechanisms are perfectly obvious in a situation where the acquisition of a larger share by one family or group poses a direct threat to the equilibrium of the community as a whole. By setting behavioral norms for the competition, the war of all against all is tempered and the stability of the community is maintained.

Foster notes that those who fall below a certain level are as much a threat to community solidarity as those who rise too quickly at the expense of their fellows.[10] The very poor threaten village unity by virtue of the resentment, envy, and jealousy they direct at those who may have gained at their expense. Even in Malay villages Swift has commented on the important leveling function of envy and jealousy.

> The peasant knows that if he is poor he is regarded with contempt and must be ashamed. But he also knows that to strive for success will arouse envy and resentment. For the ordinary man, sensitive to the feelings of his kin

and neighbors, there are strong motives to keep him up to
the normal income level, but also important pressures to
prevent his making great efforts to rise beyond this
point. . . . . Thus egalitarian values are not radical, de-
manding a change in the whole organization of [extra-
village] society, but rather conservative, concerned with
maintaining existing distinctions and limiting individual
mobility.[11]

The importance of jealousy and envy, then, is that it
prevents an ambitious person from expressing that ambition by
outdistancing his compatriots in the acquisition of material
wealth. For this reason, it is common for members of a peas-
ant community to be sedulously secretive about any relative
improvement in wealth and to steadfastly deny that their ma-
terial status is out of line with community norms. A similar
explanation may lie behind the oft-noted reluctance of peas-
ants to seek leadership roles within the community. In the
southern Italian town of Montegrano, Banfield says that only
state officials are concerned with public affairs--because
they are paid to do so--but that "for a private citizen to
take a serious interest in a public problem will be regarded
as abnormal or even improper."[12] To seek leadership in a
peasant society where the social product is fixed is to open
oneself both to the charge that one is attempting to improve
his position at the expense of others and to the jealousy and
resentment which will follow. This is especially true when,
as in most peasant communities, the assumption prevails that
people are motivated largely by thought of private gain.

Should an imbalance occur in the distribution of fixed resources within a peasant society, there are a number of sanctioned mechanisms available to redress that imbalance. Loans made by the relatively wealthy of the village to the poor are a prominent example; they are not expected to be repaid but are regarded as part of the normal process of redistribution of wealth within the community. Occasionally the more affluent villagers are expected to sponsor a "blow-out" at which time a large amount of wealth goes up in the smoke of firecrackers, is consumed at community feasts (makan besar in Malaya), or is otherwise distributed in goods and services. Encouraged by the villagers to sponsor such events, the wealthy villager signifies to all that he has no intention of hoarding his wealth or using it in a way which might threaten communal solidarity. In effect, the sponsor trades his wealth for prestige which presumably is felt to be less of a danger to village cohesion. Finally, the wealthy are expected, as patrons to take on an ever larger number of dependents and make larger ritual contributions to the mosque, temple, or church, both of which function to redistribute his wealth while adding to his status. The cost for the wealthy family of not availing itself of these sanctioned, redistributive mechanisms is, on the other hand, a loss of status and prestige as the flood of antagonism, resentment, and envy makes life uncomfortable and operates to eliminate any threat to the community posed by an inordinate concentration of wealth.[13]

Over time, then, traditional society has evolved a variety of social control mechanisms which limit inequalities, set norms for the struggle over scarce resources, and constitute something of a "containment policy" against the centrifugal potential of a constant-pie environment. Mechanisms which permit both a modest "leveling-up" and a "leveling-down" are the defenses of a society in which the gains of one family are the losses of another. The plunder of those outside the community is permitted, even encouraged, because outsiders are not a part of the system and whatever booty is brought in from outside is, in the long run, an addition to communal assets, to the pie itself. By the very nature of peasant society, however, such opportunities are so few and far between that they have no appreciable effect on the community ethos.

In addition to the mechanisms we have described, the small inequalities that fall within accepted limits are generally legitimized by existing beliefs which anticipate that important families and perhaps teachers or religious leaders will have somewhat higher standards of living. These inequalities will continue to be sanctioned so long as they are of modest proportions and so long as those who profit from them behave in conformity with community norms governing their conduct.

Thus, within the narrow confines of the peasant village the Hobbesian struggle for shares of a fixed pie is held

to tolerable levels by the practices and beliefs we have mentioned. Both a zero-sum material environment and the constant-pie orientation which accompanies it are still present. But the social control mechanisms available to traditional society place a limit on gains and losses anyone may suffer, and thus prevent mutual antagonisms from reaching a level which would destroy the community.

We have seen that the peasant's world is, in fact, a constant-pie environment and have tried to describe how peasant society manages the disruptive potential of its zero-sum situation. Next, we shall suggest how the constant-pie orientation may have endured to the present day in new nations and, after that, turn to an examination of the special problems posed by the constant-pie orientation in transitional society.

C. The Survival of the Constant-Pie Orientation

The persistance of a basic value orientation in the long run depends upon the continuance of an existential base which provides experiences compatible with that orientation. It is necessary to use the term "long run" since a central belief which is no longer in line with common experiences is not extinguished or replaced immediately. On the contrary, it may persist long after the circumstances which produced it have disappeared. Even after the orientation itself has changed it may be still longer before the practices and

peripheral beliefs which were stimulated by that orientation
finally change. In a work cited earlier, Abram Kardiner sug-
gested that beliefs and attitudes suitable to an "unchanging
subsistence economy" remained intact long after changes in
the nature of the economy made them wholly unsuitable to the
new situation.[14]

Inasmuch as the constant-pie orientation--and the po-
litical beliefs and practices which we suggested were associ-
ated with it--originate in, and are maintained by, continuous
experience with a "pain economy," they will persist at least
as long as this existential base lasts. Before the industri-
al revolution in the West, a "pain economy" was the normal
state of affairs for mankind and a constant-pie orientation
was undoubtedly a common, shared belief. Even in the West
the slow growth of civic consciousness and political coopera-
tion which depend on a relatively high level of interpersonal
trust indicate that there was a substantial lag between a
change in the existential base and a change in the orienta-
tion itself. One supposes that as people experienced the
growth of the social product, the assumption that one per-
son's gain was another's loss gradually faded from one gener-
ation to the next and eventually lost most of its signifi-
cance. The overriding question of survival haunted politics
less and less and was slowly replaced by the desire to pre-
serve a rate of material improvement. When the issue becomes
the protection of a rate of improvement, room is made for

political trust and cooperation, since the stakes involved are less vital in the literal sense of that word.

In the underdeveloped nations of the world this process has yet to occur. With a few notable exceptions, new nations have experienced little if any growth in real per capita income over the last three or four decades, and some have even witnessed a decline in per capita real income. We use real per capita income as the crucial measure because even an appreciable expansion in G.N.P. at constant prices will not be reflected in common experiences if it has no effect on the per capita figure.[15] Thus, in the underdeveloped world as a whole, there has not been the economic growth which would lead us to expect any weakening of the constant-pie orientation. Existential support for the orientation is the rule rather than the exception.

The example of Malaysia, whose economic progress has surely been the most impressive in Southeast Asia, will illustrate what we mean. Although real per capita income has grown significantly over the past twenty years, one economist estimates that it was only in the late 1950's that the real domestic per capita product of Malaya attained the level it had reached in 1929.[16] Due to the effects of the Great Depression, World War II, and the postwar Emergency, it was thus almost thirty years before an improvement in real per capita income occurred. The growth which took place between 1910 and 1929, and again from 1957-58 to the present, is there-

fore not perceived as a permanent phenomenon, since within
living memory it has been rolled back. It is one thing to
hope for a rising standard of living and another to count up-
on it. The economic growth of even a relatively exceptional
nation like Malaysia is perhaps enough to make men wish for
better times, but surely not of either the magnitude or dura-
tion that would occasion a change in fundamental expecta-
tions.[17]

Aside from the West, there are very few areas where
extended recent experience with an expanding social product
has created and sustained a belief that progress is normal.
The rest of the world, including backward areas of the West,
continue to live by and large in a zero-sum material environ-
ment and tailor their beliefs accordingly.[18]

D. The Constant-Pie and the Nature of Transitional Society

1. The Breakdown of Social Control

While we have suggested that the constant-pie orienta-
tion is characteristic of both traditional and transitional
society, the centrifugal tendencies generated by this orien-
tation are, in traditional society, more or less effectively
managed by a variety of social control mechanisms. In tran-
sitional society, however, these mechanisms which serve to
both prevent the growth of great inequalities and to legiti-
mize some limited differences in incomes have largely broken
down. Within the urban areas of a transitional nation in

particular, there are few if any of the traditional customs which temper the competition for shares of a fixed pie. No longer are there clear rules governing the competition, no longer are individuals as susceptible to the social pressures of traditional society, and no longer are the criteria for the distribution of wealth, power, or prestige as clearly defined as they were before.

Rapid change in transitional society not only impedes the effectiveness of social control mechanisms but also heightens status anxiety. In traditional settings, the stability of social structure and community norms make it possible for an individual to predict what his status and income will be over the short run. The multiple status systems of transitional society, on the other hand, make it difficult to forecast one's own position within a status pyramid that is in constant flux. Thus, while the constant-pie orientation characterizes both traditional and transitional society, the world appears more Hobbesian to transitional man simply because the corrective pressures and stability which provide traditional man with a measure of security are no longer operative.

In this context, many of the comments by civil servants which we cited in the previous chapter implied that change and confusion have replaced stability and that unrestrained competition has replaced cooperation. Inche' Nordin who spoke of unions and professional associations "trying to

kill each other" clearly felt that somehow things were better long ago. The fact that his already grown children are constantly at his door demanding large amounts of cash represent for him a measure of the breakdown of social controls. He often dreams of buying a winning national lottery ticket which would allow him to give a house and a stand of rubber to each and wash his hands of them once and for all. Taken alone, his opinion might be considered the normal prophecy of moral collapse made by the elder generation in times of rapid change. Inche' Nordin's comments about trade unions and professional associations, however, indicate that his distress with his children is bound up with a broader view of what is happening to young and old alike.

Others, younger than Inche' Nordin, see a breakdown in social controls too, even if they express it in diverse ways and find it hard to explain. Inche' Ismail, himself an individualist, sees the growth of individualism destroying community solidarity. When he is asked whether Malaysia is moving closer to the ideal society, he replies:

We are getting further and further away from that. The most responsible for that is the development of character and individuality. The development of character has gone too far---there's too much individuality---and concern for the progress of one's position.

For Inche' Ismail, the development of character is synonymous with the growth of self-seeking. His image of the ideal society is one in which generosity and a concern for the condi-

tion of others prevail over personal goals, but he is pessi-
mistic about the chances of such values being realized under
present conditions because:

> Every person in society is drifting away from this ideal.
> He is drifting away in proportion to the degredation of
> society---disintegration of society itself. Our society
> nowadays is all the while trying to fall apart with the
> coming of new ideas---different sectors in opposition---
> conflicts of interest groups. The only thing that holds
> it together---that is the political factor. . . .

Clearly, the "political factor" is the only available
instrument to replace the breakdown of social control mecha-
nisms which, in Inche' Ismail's eyes, have failed with "the
coming of new ideas." The vision of increasing competitive-
ness and self-seeking is the spectre which occasions the need
for some new form of social control. Strong, firm government
is increasingly necessary in an environment where the more
traditional forms of solidarity and community feeling have
all but disappeared.

Few civil servants express themselves as lucidly as
Inche' Ismail but almost all express some concern over the
speed of change and the lack of control over its direction.
Asked about the usefulness of professional protective associ-
ations, Inche' Mohd. Amin replies:

> In a changing world when anything could happen---everyone
> is striving for better---trade unions have their own or-
> ganization---only by these means can we get our share.

The chances of falling behind "in a changing world" are much greater than under more traditional circumstances and Mohd. Amin is painfully aware of the dangers of being bested in the competition. Others feel they have already been bested and imply that the controls which held some groups closer to the common level are now inoperative. As Mr. Lim notes disapprovingly, "Those who suddenly become rich---they have a big say in things now---everyone tends to give them respect." The emphasis is on "suddenly" becoming rich and Mr. Lim feels that the rate of status change in an ideal society should be more modest and that personal wealth would more frequently be used on behalf of the community.

For virtually all the civil servants there is the more or less vague feeling that important social bonds have been broken and that no comparable controls have replaced them. The kinds of social bonds to which they implicitly refer are those which govern the distribution of material wealth within the community. In the absence of established norms governing the distribution of wealth and status, the competition becomes more anarchic and uncertainty about one's present and future position creates great anxiety. The need for a strong government which will reimpose community solidarity is even more apparent to men who live in an atmosphere where the traditional boundaries of self-seeking have collapsed.

2. Social Control Mechanisms and Modernization

Most theories of modernization compare the content and

style of behavior and beliefs in traditional society with be-
havior and beliefs in modern, industrial society and then
place transitional societies somewhere along the imaginary
continuum between these two states.

Even those who, like Almond, recognize the mixed qual-
ity of modern political systems (he shows, for example, that
the family is still important as a political structure in
modern societies but that, in comparison with traditional
systems, its importance has been diluted by the growth of a
host of secondary associations) still tend to place transi-
tional nations midway between modern and traditional socie-
ties along most dimensions they discuss. Interest articula-
tion thus tends to be manifest in modern states, latent in
traditional states, and a mixture of both in transitional
states. Similarly, recruitment to political roles in modern
society, according to Almond, is likely to stress achievement
or performance criteria, in traditional society ascriptive
criteria are mostly emphasized, while recruitment in transi-
tional systems fluctuates somewhere between these two modes.[19]
Once this basic scheme is accepted, research is likely to
focus upon precisely what mixture of the modern and tradi-
tional most appropriately describes each facet of the politi-
cal system in a transitional nation.

The method of analysis we have described has many
strengths but it contains a basic weakness as well. Its
failing is that it ignores one essential quality which modern

and traditional societies share and which distinguish them
both from transitional societies. This quality is the exist-
ence of effective, non-governmental, social control mecha-
nisms. Both traditional and modern, industrial societies, we
suggest, are characterized by more or less effective social
control mechanisms while in transitional society, these con-
trols are comparatively much weaker.[20]

We may use the "value features" attributed to indus-
trial society by Wilbert More to illustrate what we mean.[21]
The three features Moore delineates are:

a. Minimal cognitive consensus.
b. An acquiescence in, if not positive acceptance of,
    a normative order.
c. A minimal consensus on ultimate values.[22]

All three characteristics, we feel, are applicable ceteris
paribus to traditional society as well as industrial society.
The cognitive consensus in industrial nations is largely sec-
ular and is reinforced by the educational system and by the
mass media, while the consensus of traditional society is
sacral and receives the sanction of religion and custom.
Notwithstanding these differences in the nature of the con-
sensus, both systems achieve a substantial measure of cogni-
tive agreement. Secondly, the "normative orders" in modern
and traditional societies are vastly different but they are
each accepted passively or actively by most members. This is
so despite the fact that the normative order is broader and
more variegated in the modern case. "A minimal consensus,"
the third value quality, is perhaps more characteristic of

traditional structures than of modern, although the politi-
cally stable industrial nations have achieved some degree of
consensus on standards of equality, justice, and the distri-
bution of such values as wealth and power. All three quali-
ties, then, are more or less attributable to both industrial
and traditional systems. Transitional society, on the other
hand, lacks all three to a significant extent; there is less
cognitive consensus, less agreement on a normative order, and
less consensus on ultimate values.

This consensus which is typical of modern and tradi-
tional structures adds to the stability and predictability of
politics as well as of interpersonal relations. Modern and
traditional systems are thus closer to what we might warily
call an "equilibrium" situation, even though the equilibrium
of the modern society is a dynamic one in which even change
is, to a degree, institutionalized. Fred W. Riggs, comparing
what he calls "Agraria" and "Industria," writes:

> The governments of Agraria and Industria both enjoy sub-
> stantial "authority," which is to say, there is wide-
> spread consensus about the political myths, doctrines,
> and formulas which confer formal legitimacy on the acts
> of their governments. In this respect, both are politi-
> cal systems in "equilibrium," as distinguished from
> "transitional" societies in which consensus about myths,
> doctrines, and formulas is often lacking.[23]

It is this "consensus" which Riggs describes that is largely
absent in transitional societies but usually present in both

industrial and agrarian communities.

Thus, when we speak of consensus and social control, transitional society is not midway between the traditional and the modern but toward one end of the continuum. Both modern and traditional states share a relatively high level of consensus (whether internalized or supported largely by external, social sanctions) while transitional society is, virtually by definition, low in consensus. In transitional states the social control mechanisms which sustained consensus in the traditional milieu have broken down and no new value consensus has yet emerged. The following graph is a rough comparison between the three types of societies and the variables we have been comparing.

FIGURE I

A--Extent of modern variants of pattern variables; achievement, manifestness, universalism, specificity.

B--Degree of cognitive consensus, consensus about normative order, and consensus on ultimate values.

The slopes of the lines are merely intended to be suggestive, and were we to separate out the variables which are lumped together, the result would be a multiplicity of lines with varying slopes. Line B is illustrative of the consensual qualities we have discussed. These qualities do not exhibit the roughly unilinear progression from the traditional to the modern as do the Parsonian pattern variables, but rather distinguish transitional societies on the one hand from traditional and modern societies on the other.

Transitional society is thus characterized not only by the breakdown of social control mechanisms but also by a relative loss of cognitive and normative consensus. It has lost the two factors which served to mediate the potential strains of a fixed social product in its traditional setting. Without either of these defenses, transitional nations face what seems to be a zero-sum environment as well. The effects of a constant-pie orientation are more severe under these circumstances since "the rules of the game" have broken down. As a result, anxiety about the future and interpersonal suspicion are likely to increase. Neither new structures of competition, nor new political norms, nor a new consensus have yet begun to reduce the level of uncertainty and reduce the threatening qualities of this situation. And if the social and political environment seems more Hobbesian to people in this setting, this is more a reflection of actual conditions than an indication of personal pathology.

It is in this atmosphere that a desire for strong government grows; a government which would act in the interests of the community as a whole. This government would re-establish control mechanisms which preserve solidarity in the face of the divisive tendencies of a zero-sum material world and recreate, at the political level, the equilibrium which traditional mechanisms maintained.

3. Uncertainty

In transitional society where A's gain is perceived as B's loss and where the traditional means of redistributing wealth and enforcing some limited community-focused behavior are now largely absent, uncertainty about one's future wealth and status in the society is intensified. The rapid changes in status and wealth which are characteristic of transitional societies, particularly at the elite level, only compound the problem of uncertainty. Long-run cooperative strategies, which were tenuous before, become increasingly difficult since one cannot, in fact, plan effectively for the future. The conditions for success--or even the criteria of success-- are uncertain because of competing status systems and the inherent instability of transitional society.

The point we are making here about transitional society is that uncertainty is based on an accurate estimate of reality rather than on personal or collective fantasy. A man functioning in an environment in which the social cues are ambiguous or conflicting is sure to be confused but it is the

confusion of his surroundings which disorient him. His con-
fusion has an existential base.

The other side of conflicting norms, however, is a
certain freedom of choice. Among a host of conflicting norms
and cues, one can choose those to which he will respond and
those which he will ignore. Unlike traditional society where
a single norm or custom generally directs behavior in a spe-
cific situation, transitional society permits a person to
choose those norms he feels will be most to his advantage and
conform to them. A citizen, in his relations with the civil
service for example, will insist on legalism when it is to
his advantage and on favoritism when that serves his inter-
ests.[24] But if the citizen has a choice in this situation,
so do all those with whom he deals, so that no dependable ex-
pectations about how others will react are possible. The
civil servant can switch his behavior too, depending on which
norm is most advantageous to him. The "poly-normativism" of
transitional society thus sabotages plans for the future, ag-
gravates the competition for scarce values, and generally in-
tensifies personal insecurity.[25]

The fact that there is more uncertainty (less consen-
sus) about behavioral norms and community goals in transi-
tional society than in either industrial or folk societies
has another important consequence. Where the means and goals
of politics are more settled, administration occupies an in-
creasingly important place vis-a-vis politics. But where

conflict over the means and goals of politics still prevails, as it does in transitional society, politics achieves primacy. The society which has not yet attained a viable consensus on ultimate goals--which values should be emphasized (equality?, freedom?, progress?) and how they should be achieved--is the politicized society par excellence. Different political ideologies, whether they be formal and rigorous or, more likely, syncretic and vague, offer alternative solutions to the problem of consensus and the champions of each "potential consensus" compete for the allegience of the masses as a means to power. Being somewhere between the informal rigidity of folk society and the formal certainty of modern society,[26] transitional society is more likely to be highly politicized than either. Uncertainty over key values and goals thus provides the basis for the primacy of politics.[27]

4. The Time Orientation and Risk-taking

Again and again observers of administration in new nations have commented on the short-run orientation of government administrators and their seeming inability to take risks for long-run gains. The composite picture they present is one of civil servants who only think, at best, of next week and who will avoid taking chances for any goal beyond that horizon. With few exceptions, this picture accurately describes the administrators who were interviewed in Malaysia as well.

Most Malaysian civil servants are in fact unwilling to take on new ventures which might jeopardize presently adequate arrangements. They prefer, for the most part, to protect their present position and status rather than take even moderate risks which might propel them higher up the status ladder. Jeganathan's thinking provides a typical illustration of this conservative bent. When he is asked to talk about the early days of his administrative career, he replies:

I had an intention of studying medicine and then---while I was halfway in my Senior Cambridge [exam], in July 1928 my father died and I completed my Senior that year. Somehow or other I felt being the eldest---I don't want to put all the gold into one boat and have it sink.

Rather than "shoot the moon" and try to become a doctor, Jeganathan felt that he should enter the lower civil service where a steady income would be assured. Consistently throughout his career, even when family security was not in jeopardy, he has been faced with comparable situations and opted for the safer course.

Mr. Lim's ambition as a teenager was to become a doctor too, but he considers himself fortunate not to have pursued it.

My ambition was to be a doctor but it was a blessing in disguise that I didn't go on to the university since then if my father died all my dreams would have been smashed to the ground.

The fear of failure is prominent and both Mr. Lim and

Jeganathan would prefer to voluntarily abandon their own dreams rather than run the risk of having them "smashed to the ground" by events beyond their control. The desire to "cut losses" is also apparent in the motives Malaysian administrators give for having joined the civil service. By a wide margin they focus on the steady pay, security, leave and pension provisions, and comfortable life rather than on self-advancement or on the exercise of power which the bureaucracy might provide. Quite a few have given some thought to leaving the public service for a higher paying job in the private sector, but the risks have deterred them.

Muneer Ahmad, in a sample survey study of the Pakistani civil service, has arrived at the same conclusion. The most frequent reasons given for joining the bureaucracy were either the prestige and status of office or the security of tenure.[28] In a similar study of the civil bureaucracy in Egypt, Morroe Berger found that most administrators entered government service for its security, high pay, and prestige and were only rarely motivated by the desire to acquire skills or serve the nation. Berger feels that the emphasis on skills and service which characterize Western professionalism is largely absent in the Egyptian civil service, whereas the self-protective aspect of professionalism is quite strong.[29]

As in Malaysia, administrators in Pakistan and Egypt seem to manifest a "sinecure" mentality and are only rarely

performance or achievement oriented. Uppermost in their
minds is the preservation of their status, ample pay, and se-
curity, all of which might be jeopardized if they innovated
and took risks. For most, the possession of an administra-
tive post is more important than exploiting the opportunities
for performance or service which that post offers. In this
context of risk-avoidance, the oft-remarked reliance on rou-
tine, regulations, and pat formulas in developing nations can
be viewed as a means to avoid new, unsettling problems and
preserve the comfortable, secure, bureaucratic nest.

That civil servants in most developing states are
largely inclined to a short-run view and avoid long-term
risks is firmly established as a research finding, but the
explanations for why this is so are in some dispute. Some
claim that, as in the West, bureaucratic self-selection is
involved whereby those who are motivated to seek security are
likely to choose bureaucratic careers. This is unlikely to
be the case in Malaysia or in other new nations where the
civil service represents even today the only significant oc-
cupational alternative for those above a certain educational
level. Unlike the industrial nations of the West, a great
majority of university graduates in these nations can only
look forward to a career of government service and little
psychological self-selection is involved in their occupation-
al choice.

Two other quite different explanations have been of-

fered for the risk-avoidance we have found. One stresses
discontinuities in socialization and the resulting value con-
flict while the other relies more on qualities in the envi-
ronment which affect values and behavior. The former relies
on the personality factors emphasized by Pye and the latter
on those aspects of the existential base employed by Banfield
in his study of a southern Italian village.

Hahn-Been Lee is a proponent of the first mode of ex-
planation.[30] According to his analysis, most civil servants
in developing nations exhibit a "presentist" or "exploita-
tionist" orientation toward time. This orientation leads to
hedonism, the maximization of short-run values, and, lastly,
to personalism. As opposed to either the "escapist" or "de-
velopmentalist" time orientations, the "exploitationist" pat-
tern manifests a 'ritualistic role pattern, a bureaucratic
leadership style, and a consumption-centered program orienta-
tion.'[31] The growth of the "exploitationist" orientation oc-
curs when old values are largely abandoned but new values
have yet to be incorporated. In this situation people are
likely to be ambivalent about change and therefore are likely
to fall back on routine and "ritualism" since the wider long-
run purposes of organizational activity have not yet been em-
braced at the personal level.

> This attitude is a distorted response to the pressure and
> tension of change. Such an attitude tries to maximize
> short-run returns through manipulation of existing cir-
> cumstances.[32]

Ambivalence toward change and being "between-values" are the crucial factors in Hahn-Been Lee's explanation of the "exploitationist" time orientation. The new values which civil servants have yet to internalize were, in large part, values imposed on the bureaucracy while it was colonized and these same values are still built into the bureaucratic structure in most new nations. We know from research findings that imposed goals are apt to be pursued in a formalistic and routine manner simply because the central, ultimate purposes of the organization have not yet become personal goals.[33] In the absence of long-run goals, a short-run, "exploitationist" orientation prevails. Hahn-Been Lee's reliance on discontinuity in socialization to explain the "presentist" time orientation is essentially the same as Pye's interpretation of similar political and administrative patterns in Burma.

A second and, we feel, more appealing explanation of this bureaucratic pattern focuses on the actual qualities of the environment. A further virtue of this approach is that it helps account for some forms of economic and political behavior as well. Many economists have noted that investment in transitional society is frequently characterized by short-run commercial transactions and high liquidity. This pattern of investment is largely due to the instability of the transitional polity and economy--the unpredictability of important factors beyond the very short run which might, if they

were stable, lead to more productive, capital intensive, long-run investment. Moreover, 'the investor in transitional society has engaged in short-run speculative activity before and knows that it balances out over a brief period.'[34] Given the uncertainties of transitional society, then, short-run commercial transactions which do not tie up capital in fixed plant and machinery for a long period may well be the most rational course for the investor.

The same thing might be said of bureaucratic behavior as well. Long-run commitments to organizational purposes may make little sense when those purposes are subject to frequent re-definition and where those who lead the organization often have to bend before the winds of change in order to preserve the group and its members. Since there is no consensus on ultimate goals, or even means, long-run values are difficult if not impossible to realize and, by default, short-run formalistic goals, or attachments to superiors rather than values, are likely to predominate. The almost exclusive concern with wages and conditions which characterizes associations of civil servants in Malaysia betrays this short-run, consumption orientation. The function of these associations seems to be the protection of present status against a capricious environment which will not permit more ambitious goals. In an unpredictable environment, unwavering loyalty to one's superior may provide some small measure of security and Malaysian civil servants are well aware of this. Promotion, in

were stable, lead to more productive, capital intensive, long-run investment. Moreover, 'the investor in transitional society has engaged in short-run speculative activity before and knows that it balances out over a brief period.'[34] Given the uncertainties of transitional society, then, short-run commercial transactions which do not tie up capital in fixed plant and machinery for a long period may well be the most rational course for the investor.

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the absence of achievement norms, depends most often on the
faithfulness of a subordinate rather than upon more tran-
scendent criteria. Thus, the pursuit of short-run gains, the
emphasis on fairly narrow, material, personal goals, and the
avoidance of long-term risks are as much a rational strategy,
given the environment we have described, as they are the re-
sult of ambivalence and confusion. Just as the economic cli-
mate does not encourage long-run investment, the bureaucratic
climate does not inspire a quest for long-run organizational
goals.

If the bureaucratic environment in transitional socie-
ty penalizes those who seek wider values, so does the politi-
cal environment. The risks of politics in transitional soci-
ety are so imposing as to discourage long-run strategies.
The concern with holding on to one's post at all costs and
the generally high level of opportunism in transitional poli-
tics illustrates a short-run, "exploitationist" orientation
toward the rewards of politics. The instabilities of the
politician's status in new nations may be comparable to the
situation of union leaders in the United States as Lipset has
described it.

. . . political positions in democratic nations are inse-
cure by definition. Politicians in most countries may
move from electoral defeat to highly paid positions in
private industry or the professions, but union leaders
customarily cannot do so. This means, as I have noted
elsewhere, that they are under considerable pressure to

find means to protect their source of status. Thus the
greater the gap between the rewards of union leadership
and of those jobs from which the leader came and to which
he might return on defeat, the greater the pressure to
eliminate democratic rights.[35]

The potential downward mobility of politicians in
transitional society is analogous to that of the union leader
in the United States and the need for "status protection" is
important to both. It is not surprising that many political
leaders in new nations, finding themselves in this situation,
eschew long-run commitments and concentrate instead on the
short-term material and status rewards of office. The very
real fragility and unpredictability of the political world,
as of the economic and, to a lesser extent, the bureaucratic
environment, lend a quite rational quality to the pursuit of
short-run, personal values.[36] These short-run goals are re-
alizable, in contrast with the tremendous risks attendant on
long-term enterprises where the future is unpredictable.

Throughout the first portion of this chapter we have
attempted to illustrate some essential characteristics of
transitional society, particularly by examining the constant-
pie orientation. In contrast with the large variety of so-
cial control mechanisms which preserved community solidarity
despite a fixed social product in traditional society, tran-
sitional society generally retains a constant-pie orientation
(since the modest economic growth of most new nations has, in

fact, not yet had any appreciable effect on average per capita income levels) but the social control mechanisms which mitigated its centrifugal influence no longer operate. Coupled with the constant-pie orientation, the inherent uncertainty and instability of transitional society (particularly in cities) is likely to increase the Hobbesian qualities of the environment. Because the "rules of the game" have broken down, the level of interpersonal distrust and suspicion is apt to rise and the formation of durable groups organized for long-run goals is likely to be much more difficult.

The only institution which might change the instability and uncertainty we have described is the government, since the more informal traditional mechanisms are no longer viable. Therefore the call for a strong government to restore firm controls over the society becomes both more frequent and widespread.

Until controls are restored, however, the pursuit of short-run goals and the avoidance of most long-term risks by businessmen, bureaucrats, and politicians makes "sense." Their orientation represents a realistic pattern in a constant-pie environment where the customs which governed both the rules for, and legitimacy of, the existing distribution of scarce values have weakened or disappeared. They are "in tune" with the world in which they operate rather than being the disoriented victims of cultural shock who can only respond pathologically to change.[37]

E. The Constant-Pie Orientation:
Poverty and Affluence

1. Poverty

In *Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building*, Pye attributes the inability of the Burmese to create durable, purposeful organizations to two central factors: (1) an uncertainty about the actions of others stemming from 'uncertainty about one's self' and (2) a lack of trust in human relationships.[38] Both are ultimately connected to the loss of personal identity in Pye's analysis and represent a failure to deal rationally with the environment. By contrast, we have attempted constantly to show how these same factors fit into an environmental context and are congruent with the existential base. As regards the first, we have suggested that uncertainty about the future and instability are facts of life in transitional society and that attempts to realize largely short-term personal goals represents a rational strategy against this background. The second factor--misanthropy--we have connected to the nature of traditional society and, more important, to the constant-pie orientation. As the constant-pie orientation is finally dependent upon a fixed social product, that is, upon poverty,[39] misanthropy is also associated with environmental variables.

Poverty and the social disorganization customarily accompanying social transition are powerful influences on belief systems, as we can see by examining their effects in the

western context. Oscar Lewis, in an article entitled "The Culture of Poverty," describes the similarities he found among urban poor, whether in London, Paris, Harlem, Mexico City, or Glasgow.[40] Many of the patterns he outlines are those which we have already found to be associated with the constant-pie orientation. In particular, Lewis cites the distrust and cynicism which permeates interpersonal relations, a "presentist" or hedonistic orientation which excludes goals not both narrowly personal and realizable within a brief span, and a type of authoritarianism. The variant of authoritarianism Lewis finds expresses itself through a belief in widespread moral decay and a wish that the government would put a stop to it all, using whatever coercion is necessary.

The behavioral and belief patterns Lewis describes are similar if not identical to the misanthropy and desire for strong government we found in Malaysia and which we argued were related both to constant-pie thinking and to the "presentist" time orientation typical of transitional society. What these findings suggest is that poverty may have its own "belief culture" independent of the cultural context in which it occurs. To be sure, the level of distrust and cynicism and "presentist" thinking probably vary directly with the level of social disorganization among the group being examined. The ghettos and islands of poverty in most of the West represent deviant cultures of poverty within nations enjoying

a relatively affluent life but, in most transitional nations, these cultures of poverty generally represent normal conditions of life. While the degree of social dislocation produces important differences, poverty nevertheless may involve what must seem to those experiencing it as a struggle against others for scarce, fixed resources. Both the constant-pie orientation and the beliefs it encourages and maintains may thus be a characteristic of poverty in its traditional, transitional, and modern setting.

2. Affluence

If the existence of a limited and small social product (i.e., poverty) has the important consequences for beliefs which we have indicated; then affluence should have the opposite effect. Examining these effects offers us an indirect means of testing some of the conclusions we have reached. The best known exponent of the consequences of affluence on political culture is, of course, David Potter who argues in his People of Plenty that "economic abundance" is primarily responsible for the democratic style in America.[41] Potter argues that the American economy was an expanding pie and that it was therefore easier to compromise on economic questions. Generosity was possible precisely because the gain of the "have-nots" was not the loss of the "haves." The frontier, for example, was an expanding pie of land resources and the landless could have land at no cost to existing landholders. The poor, for their part, need not assault the vaults

of the rich because they could count on receiving a portion
of the continuing additions to American wealth. As the
struggle over wealth was limited to dividing up the surplus
and did not threaten absolute positions, a democratic style,
Potter feels, came easily to Americans and sapped the life
blood of potential class revolutions. In short, social trust
and political trust were possible in the American atmosphere
of abundance; an atmosphere where all groups could move up
simultaneously.

In his interviews with the common men of Eastport,
Lane finds that abundance exerts a powerful influence over
their political beliefs too. He attributes their lack of po-
litical rancor and their easy-going political style to the
same economic surplus Potter described.

> The social outlook of Eastport is saturated with the in-
> fluence of the opportunity (abundance, escalation, ad-
> vancement) that characterizes life in that city. It
> makes possible and desirable to focus on the near future
> when anticipations will be realized; these men do not
> need to live in the present, as the underprivileged of
> the London slums are said to do, or in an afterlife, or
> in a millennial world future. They can afford to be tol-
> erant of political opponents because they are not threat-
> ened with extinction; they are confident of provender and
> shelter no matter what happens. The risks of politics,
> like its stakes, are diminished; politics becomes less
> important.[42]

What empirical evidence is there for Potter's thesis?
Unfortunately, the relationship between affluence and the

constant-pie orientation cannot be explored directly since it is a new measure and no cross-cultural or time-series data are available. We would expect, however, that the two are inversely related so the greater affluence would lead to a diminution of the constant-pie orientation.

While no direct test can be made, we can indirectly examine the relationship by making use of the known association of social trust with both constant-pie thinking and affluence. We already have evidence that the level of social trust and constant-pie thinking are inversely related at a statistically significant level (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, data is available for relating social trust to affluence. According to our predictions, this data should show that the more affluent the group or society, the higher the level of social trust (hence, the less constant-pie thinking).

In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba administered Rosenberg's "Faith-in-People" Scale to a cross-section of respondents in five nations. The American and British respondents score significantly higher in social trust than the Mexican and Italian respondents. That is, nations where there is relative abundance are likely to show greater interpersonal trust.[43] Furthermore, within each nation the level of social trust rises as the economic level of the respondents rises; a finding which belies the possibility that we have merely tapped cultural differences.[44]

A more impressive test of the relationship between af-

fluence and misanthropy--and, therefore, constant-pie think-
ing--would be a time-series within the same nation. Lane has
done this for the United States by tabulating responses to
identical poll questions over time.[45] His findings, which
are displayed below, lend strong support to our predictions.

TABLE 1

THE INCIDENCE OF THE FOLLOWING BELIEFS AND OPINIONS
HAS INCREASED/DECREASED OVER TIME IN THE U.S.
AS THE ECONOMY HAS EXPANDED[46]

	Belief or Opinion	Index
Increase	1. Social trust	("Do you think most people can be trusted?")
Increase	2. Confidence in the Future	("Ten years from now, do you believe Americans will be generally happier than they are today?")
Increase	3. Control over future	("When you make plans ahead, do you usually get to carry out things the way you expected, or do things usually come up to make you change your plans?")
Decrease	4. "Sense of crisis and of high national, personal, and group stakes in national elections"	(Variety of questions asking whether, or to what extent, an election will affect personal, national, or group interests.)
Decrease	5. Political Alienation	(Questions tapping civic qualities, honorableness of politics.)

Two variables which, in our own research, were in-
versely related to the level of constant-pie thinking--social
trust and felt control over the future--are both found to be

increasing along with economic expansion in the United States.[47] Similarly, the feeling that the stakes of politics are great and political alienation, which we suggested was common where the constant-pie orientation prevails, are less common through time in the American context.

On the basis of the findings by Almond and Verba and those by Lane, then, the case for an association between a fixed social product and the constant-pie orientation, on the one hand, and political alienation, social and political distrust, and lack of control over the future on the other, is strengthened considerably. Gradually, as the economy expands, as the struggle for scarce values becomes a variable-sum game rather than a zero-sum game, and as expectations of continued growth are created, the politics of a constant-pie society evolve into the politics of affluence where trust is easier, where one merely wants a share of the surplus created, and where the stakes of politics are less vital. "Constant-pie politics" do not disappear at once but probably considerably outlive the end of an economy of scarcity. The ideological superstructure only reaches a new accommodation with the changed existential base after some lag. But eventually attitudes appropriate to a society with growing wealth develop. The politics of moderate trust replaces the politics of distrust, allegiance grows where cynicism once flourished, and a more or less Hobbesian style of politics is replaced by the politics of compromise and modest generosity.

Amidst growing affluence, democracy is not a foregone conclu-
sion, since there are still important interests at stake in
politics. Nevertheless, both the risks and stakes of poli-
tics are substantially lower than they were for an economy of
scarcity and thus the obstacles to a democratic style are
substantially reduced as well.

FOOTNOTES

1. Foster, op. cit., p. 297. Foster also makes the dis-
   tinction between work and the production of wealth.

   In face, it seems accurate to say that the average
   peasant sees little or no relationship between work
   and production techniques on the one hand, and the
   acquisition of wealth on the other. Rather, wealth
   is seen by villagers in the same light as land:
   present, circumscribed by absolute limits, and having
   no relationship to work. One works to eat, but not
   to create wealth. Wealth, like land, is something
   that is inherent in nature. It can be divided up and
   passed around in various ways, but, within the frame-
   work of the villager's traditional world, it does not
   grow. (P. 298.)

2. I do not wish to imply that an individual leaving a
   slash-and-burn community can look forward to prosperity.
   On the contrary, he must clear land himself and will, in
   all probability, only produce a bare subsistence for him-
   self and his family--if he can sustain them until the
   first harvest. What he gains is simply freedom from de-
   pendence on the largesse of relatives in the village.
   Most anthropologists report that the reason for leaving
   is usually a desire for independence or a result of fac-
   tional quarrels in the village with the weaker party
   leaving, or even being cast out for some serious infrac-
   tion of village probity, rather than the desire for
   wealth.

3. Swift has noted the short-run orientation toward the fu-
ture among Malay peasants (op. cit., p. 170), and Foster
feels that the general suspicion which inhibits long-run
cooperation to be a consequence of the "Image of Limited
Good" (op. cit., p. 308).

4. Clifford Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A
Middle-Rung in Development," Journal of Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change (April, 1962), p. 244, quoted in
Foster, op. cit., p. 312.

5. Foster cites a host of studies testifying to the "mental-
ity of mutual distrust" which prevails in peasant commu-
nities. Op. cit., p. 302.

6. These are the same attitudes toward friendship which we
found among Malaysian civil servants. They share this
orientation with peasants as they share the constant-pie
orientation and we shall try to show later that a lack of
social trust is a characteristic of transitional society
as well as traditional.

7. Presumably, a very strong local government could enforce
cooperation in a peasant community but since, as Foster
points out, the locus of power is usually found outside
the community and prevents the growth of strong, inde-
pendent local power centers (op. cit., p. 301), this sit-
uation is unlikely. Nonetheless, we feel that a certain
degree of local order is generally established in peasant
villages and shall explore the nature of this order later

in the chapter.

8. Joseph J. Spengler, "Arthaśāstra Economics," pp. 224-259, in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler, eds., Administration and Economic Development in India (Durham, North Carolina: Duke Univ. Press, 1963), p. 259.

9. For Italy, see Banfield, op. cit.; especially the differences between the prosperous north and poorer south which clearly show the effect of the material environment on beliefs and behavior while cultural variables are held mostly constant. For Greece, see Foster, op. cit., p. 301. For Spain, see Michael Kenny, "Social Values and Health in Spain," Human Organization, Vol. 21, pp. 280-285.

10. Foster, op. cit., p. 302.

11. Swift, op. cit., pp. 153-154.

12. Banfield, op. cit., p. 87.

13. Swift writes of Malays, "The importance of the rich man is recognized but he is far from popular. Too obvious economic success opens the way for bad relations with kin and neighbors. The newly rising man runs great risk of shame if he blossoms too quickly with the symbols of his new status. Everyone will be watching for his first mistake, and longing for the day when he defaults on his hire-purchase payments and the Chinese comes to take his goods away." Op. cit., p. 152.

14. Cf. footnote 38, Chapter 3.

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15. A short run rise in per capita real income can, of
course, be achieved by drawing down foreign reserve bal-
ances, incurring large foreign debts, and even diverting
capital allocations to consumption. Under Nkrumah, it
seems that Ghana did precisely this. The short-run na-
ture of this strategy, however, is readily apparent in
the austerity program Col. Ankrah presides over at the
moment. Another short-run strategy would be a fundamen-
tal redistribution of wealth in a society with great
initial inequalities which would provide the majority
with rising real incomes in the short run. Something of
this nature occurred when U Nu's Burma created a "wel-
fare state" before it industrialized and, in effect, re-
distributed poverty. Because both are short-run meas-
ures, their influence on a constant-pie orientation is
not appreciable and, in the long run they perhaps rein-
force the orientation.

16. See forthcoming study of Malaya's economic growth by Van
Dorn Ooms in Yale Economic Growth Center's series. Even
from 1955-1964, the growth of the Malaysian economy is
not so impressive as one might anticipate. Per capita
GNP at market prices (more realistic than constant
prices since much of Malaysia's product is sold on the
world market) has risen from M$262 to M$294 or 12.59 per
cent in this ten year period. Pierre R. Crosson, Eco-
nomic Growth in Malaysia (Jerusalem: U.S. Department of

Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1966), p. 27.
See also Douglas S. Paauw, "Economic Progress in South-
east Asia," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1
(November, 1963), pp. 69-92. Paauw writes, "Most of
Southeast Asia's 215 million people--about 70 per cent--
appear to share approximately the same low levels of per
capita real income and consumption that was their lot
prior to World War II when the area was predominantly
under colonial control. . . ." P. 69.

17. We have generally assumed that the belief is the depend-
ent variable and the existential base the independent
variable. It is possible, although probably only in the
short run, to create among a population the expectation
that a nation's wealth will improve over time even
though no improvement has yet been experienced. This
act of faith might characterize the early post-independ-
ence period as well as periods when an old social order
is overthrown and a new one established with great prom-
ise and hope. But unless such faith is butressed by ex-
perience it is likely to wither and further efforts to
stimulate its growth in the absence of concrete results
is certainly foredoomed.

18. In the rest of Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Burma have
probably suffered declines in real per capita income in
the past few years while Thailand and the Philippines
have enjoyed some progress, but not as much as Malay-

sia. Vietnam is, of course, a special case. Where
growth has occurred outside the West—and Latin Ameri-
ca's record is more impressive than Southeast Asia's—it
has come about comparatively recently; it has been spo-
radic rather than continual; and its distribution has
often left the living standards of the broad masses un-
touched.

19. Almond, The Politics of the Developing Areas, op. cit.,
pp. 31-38. Almond's general reliance on the Parsonian
pattern variables which distinguish between traditional
and modern styles (manifest-vs-latent, diffuseness-vs-
specificity, ascription-vs-achievement, and universal-
ism-vs-particularism) lead to a "continuum" approach
which places transitional society at a more or less
"half-way point."

20. When we use the term "social" control mechanisms it
should be understood that in modern society in particu-
lar these controls may have been internalized and no
longer depend much on social reinforcement or social
sanctions.

21. Wilbert E. Moore, The Impact of Industry (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 34.

22. Ibid., p. 35.

23. Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology
of Comparative Administration," pp. 23-116, in William
J. Siffin, ed., Toward the Comparative Study of Public

Administration (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1957), p. 82.

24. Fred W. Riggs, "The Sala Model: An Ecological Approach to the Study of Comparative Administration," Philippine Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January, 1962), pp. 3-16.

25. The consequences of other-directedness are also different in transitional society. The other-directed man in traditional society is responding to cues and pressures which usually do not conflict and which reflect the settled norms of the community. Being other-directed in a transitional society, however, means responding to conflicting cues and social pressures. The seeming inconsistencies and changes of behavior often remarked on in transitional society may be largely accounted for by other-directedness in a social setting where different norms coexist and where social pressures are contradictory and/or ambiguous. The Malay who behaves differently at a traditional makan than on the golf course is not confused but merely conforming to different social contexts. Cf. Alex Inkeles, "Social Change and Social Character: The Role of Parental Mediation," pp. 357-365, in Smelser and Smelser, eds., op. cit.

26. Alvin Boskoff, "Postponement of Social Decision in Transitional Society," Social Forces, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March, 1953), pp. 55-72, passim.

27. Even when political contests seem to be between person-
alities rather than issues, key values are often at
stake. The personalities contending may represent dif-
ferent communities--different ways of life--or one may
be felt to be more religious and traditional and another
more secular and modern. In either case, even though
the issues remain unstated the fundamental choice be-
tween values is clearly present.

28. Muneer Ahmad, The Civil Servant in Pakistan: A Study of
the Background and Attitudes of Public Servants in
Lahore (Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964), p. 78.

29. Berger, op. cit., Chapter 3.

30. Hahn-Been Lee, Developmentalist Time and Leadership in
Developing Countries (Bloomington: An Occasional Paper
of the Comparative Administrative Group of the American
Society for Public Administration, 1966).

31. Ibid., p. 13.

32. Ibid., p. 5.

33. Berelson's proposition, although it specifies "small
groups," is applicable to the situation we are describ-
ing.

> If the small group's activities are imposed from
> outside, the norms set by the group are likely to be
> limited in character; if they are determined from
> within, they are more likely to take on the charac-
> ter of ideal goals, to be constantly enlarged and

striven for.

Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964), p. 336.

34. Hirschman, op. cit., pp. 14-20.

35. Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (London: Heinemann, 1963), p. 189.

36. Of course, another important reason for the tenacious clinging to political posts is a real fear that a host of divisive religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc. factions would destroy the fragile new state if the existing political elite were displaced. This fear is only part rationalization, as these primordial ties are an ever-present threat to the tenuous unity of new nations.

37. One might perhaps distinguish between "individual" and "system" pathology. Transitional society might be an example of system pathology but the patterns of individuals which we have described represent a more or less rational response to a system in which long run calculations are virtually impossible. It is the environment which is "deviant" or pathological rather than the individual. Given the environment of transitional society, it is the entrepreneur, the long-term investor, the person who seeks broad, non-personal values who merits study as a "deviant case"--the entrepreneur in England

in the early 19th century--rather than those we have de-
scribed as seeking short-run personal goals.

38. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building, op.
    cit., pp. 54-55.

39. As we pointed out above, the orientation is likely to
    outlive poverty since central beliefs are apt to endure
    for a time after the existential base which gave rise to
    it has disappeared.

40. Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty," pp. 252-261, in
    Novack and Lekachman, op. cit.

41. David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance
    and the American Character (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
    Press, 1954), passim.

42. Lane, op. cit., p. 220.

43. See Table 1 in Chapter 4.

44. Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 214.

45. See Robert E. Lane, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age
    of Affluence," American Political Science Review (Decem-
    ber, 1965), pp. 874-895.

46. In the case of "Control over Future," there are only two
    comparison dates which somewhat weaken confidence in the
    findings. The others have at least three comparison
    dates and often two of the dates occur near the begin-
    ning and end of World War II respectively and show no
    increase in the variable--indicating perhaps that there
    was no appreciable increase in the pie available for _

consumption during this period.

47. The attitudinal effects of affluence relate not only to
the high level of income but as well to a rate of growth
over time--probably a considerable amount of time--so
that people have experiences which justify the feeling
that growth is a permanent feature of the economy.
Growth marked by severe periodic depressions or stagna-
tion would not probably have the effects of stable, con-
tinuous growth.

III. DEMOCRACY

CHAPTER 7

THE SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

Until this point, our analysis has focused on central
beliefs--basic value orientations--and their influence on the
political beliefs of Malaysian civil servants. We have
traced the broad effects of a pessimistic view of human na-
ture, a "constant-pie" conception of desired values, and a
"presentist" time orientation as they extend their powerful
tendrils up into the realm of political beliefs.

In this chapter and the two following, the focus
shifts from central to intermediate and peripheral beliefs,
from latent to more or less manifest ideology. The center of
our attention changes in another sense too. Recalling the
four qualities shared by new nations which could provide the
basis for a set of common beliefs: (1) elements of a tradi-
tional culture; (2) poverty; (3) a past of alien Western
rule; and (4) rapid social change; we have already dealt at

some length with all except "3," the element of alien Western rule. The theories of liberal democracy are, of course, Western, and any examination of the nature and extent of democratic beliefs must concentrate on the impact of the West in these areas. While colonialism was the cutting edge of Western influence, that influence continues despite the fact that its original agents have now departed from the scene. Newspapers, movies, the widespread use of the colonizers' languages, the institutional legacy, and above all the educational system represent formidable vehicles for increasing both the weight and range of Western beliefs in now-independent states.

In fact, Western beliefs have perhaps acquired new influence precisely because they are no longer imposed. The past representatives of modernization, of Westernization, were outside the local culture whereas now the "conspiracy" is mostly an internal one, led by self-conscious local modernizers who may villify the West but are nonetheless the bearers of much of its heritage. In this context, the civil servants of Malaysia are perhaps the most significant group of "Western cultural agents" in their land and we intend to inquire as to how much and in what specific manner they have embraced liberal democratic beliefs[1] as their own.

We should hardly expect that democratic beliefs will find this new soil completely hospitable for it is littered with the rocks of conflicting central beliefs about man and

nature and many of the nutrients available in Western soil
are absent here. In such an environment the survival of this
tender plant will be tenuous and its growth uneven.

Chapter 7 is thus devoted largely to a description of
the sources of support for democratic beliefs among the Ma-
laysian sample. Chapters 8 and 9 describe the organization
and function of political information and beliefs and the na-
ture of support for democracy. In Chapter 10 we examine the
sources of support for paternal, administrative rule among
these civil servants while the final chapter is reserved for
some concluding remarks.

A. A Belief of Slender Means

One of the striking things about Malaysia, and most
other underdeveloped nations for that matter, is the relative
absence of either the primary or the secondary socialization
which is said to contribute to the growth of "democratic per-
sonalities" and democratic behavioral patterns. By now a
host of writers have suggested that there is a strong rela-
tionship between patterns of child-rearing and secondary so-
cialization on the one hand, and the creation of adults whose
beliefs, sentiments, and attitudes are supportive of a demo-
cratic style on the other.[2] Without becoming involved in a
lengthy discussion of this burgeoning literature we merely
wish to note that there is little basis for expecting demo-
cratic personalities to emerge from the patterns of primary

and early secondary socialization which characterize our sample.

1. Primary Socialization

According to Erik Erikson, one of the child's earliest established attitudes is a basic trust or distrust in the interpersonal environment.[3] When the child finds that his environment responds reliably to his cries for food and to his need for warmth and affection, he develops trust or confidence; if it does not respond, he develops distrust and anxiety. Presumably, this trust contributes to ego-strength, faith in people, and felt mastery over the environment, all of which have been found to assist in the growth of democratic personality. Child rearing in Malaysia, however, is marred by seemingly unpredictable alternations between shows of affection and its withdrawal.[4] Deprived of effective control over his world, the infant soon becomes painfully aware that the affection of even those closest to him may abruptly cease without warning or provocation. This pattern is hardly supportive of ego-strength, interpersonal trust, or confidence in managing the environment.

The nature of authority relationships in early childhood is important too, particularly in the development of ego-strength and independence. Encouraging a child's exploration of his environment and praising and rewarding him for his achievements, a pattern often ascribed to the American middle class, reassures him of his worth and bolsters his

self-confidence and independence. Ego-strength is the basis
for independent behavior and allows the adult to make his own
judgments and avoid becoming the passive instrument of oth-
ers.[5] In Malaysia, however, the emphasis is on punishment
for going against the wishes of parents rather than on re-
wards for achievements. The child soon discovers that it is
simple obedience which is required by his parents and not
specific accomplishments; agreement and submission, not as-
sertion. The habit of automatic obedience and submission to
the wishes of authority figures which are the most likely
consequences of this pattern are hardly characteristic of
"democratic man." Punishment in Malaysia, moreover, reflects
the situational ethic rather than universal standards of be-
havior. Inche' Abdul Karim can recall vividly the conse-
quences of taking mangoes from the neighbor's compound.

> [Why punished?] For stealing the neighbor's mangoes or
> fruits. Kampong people take it seriously that you don't
> behave well---and if the neighbors aren't important peo-
> ple or if they didn't find out that you had taken a
> mango, then your parents would just tell you not to do it
> again---but when the neighbor comes---then they must
> spank and take offense.

Others in our sample can remember similar experiences
when it was the situation rather than the behavior which dic-
tated the punishment.[6] In this context, the growth of a gen-
eral respect for law per se or a commitment to general ethi-
cal standards are severely stunted. Much of what we have

come to call "civic-consciousness" depends largely on pre-
cisely these qualities which child-training fails to promote
in Malaysia.

Two further points should be made about obedience and
punishment in the Malaysian setting. First, disobedience is
discouraged most often by the use of fear rather than by ex-
planation or moral suasion. Children are told that if they
are not obedient dogs will chew them up, spirits will take
them away, or, in the case of Malays, that a fierce, bearded
Bengali will carry them off. The component of fear and su-
perstition thus introduced into child-rearing hardly contrib-
utes to the development of more rational determinants of be-
havior or to personal responsibility, both of which are
linked with the democratic style. Secondly, when punishment
is administered, it is likely to be severe. Most of the civ-
il servants we interviewed can vividly recall occasions when
they were sternly disciplined by their fathers. One remem-
bers being repeatedly immersed in a stream for having dis-
obeyed his father; another recollects being tied to a tree
for the entire day after refusing to go to school; and so on.
The comparatively minor nature of the offense when coupled
with the draconian response is not calculated to produce the
balanced attitude toward authority figures which some have
suggested are appropriate to a democratic system.

By no means do we wish to suggest that the child-
rearing pattern in Malaysia is "pathological" in any general

sense. In fact, many Westerners might find it ideal with respect to its permissiveness, its avoidance of traumata, and its non-puritanical sexual mores.[7] Our purpose here, however, has been limited to showing that primary socialization in Malaysia does not conform to those patterns which, it is felt, promote the "democratic personality." The emphasis on dependence, non-participation, uncritical compliance with authority, fear, and the absence of dependable parental responses are at variance with the growth of interpersonal trust, with mastery of the environment, with an independent spirit, and with norms of participation--all of which are related to the "democratic style." If we are to find sources which can nurture and sustain a democratic system, we shall have to search elsewhere for them. The fact that the practices we have described for Malaysia are roughly in line with the practices of traditional societies elsewhere suggests that child-rearing patterns in most new nations offer scant sustenance for the development of a democratic style.

An important justification for including this short discussion of early training is simply that there is good reason to believe that primary socialization has more relevance for adult behavior in traditional and transitional societies than in fully industrialized settings. Comparatively, secondary socialization in a modern nation is much more elaborate and lengthy. It thus substantially dilutes primary training with beliefs and behavior learned in a protracted

school experience, in any of a host of secondary associa-
tions, etc. Since transitional society provides less of
these intervening experiences (and traditional society much
less), the effects of early socialization are relatively more
influential for adult orientations.

While family experiences are thus less attenuated by
later socialization in both the traditional and transitional
settings, the latter suffers from a lack of continuity be-
tween childhood and adult roles which does not plague the
former. In a simple society the headman's role is virtually
identical with that of the head of a large family as both
roles are cut from the same integral cultural fabric. But,
as we discussed in Chapter 3, transitional society is marked
by an imported, Western, political system cut from fabric of
a vastly different texture--a system which in all likelihood
conflicts with the orientations learned in primary socializa-
tion. Compared with modern societies, then, early training
in transitional states is of special note, not only because
of the relative weakness of secondary socialization, but also
because of the potential strains between the more or less
traditional family socialization on the one hand, and the
adult roles implied by a political system adopted from a
vastly different cultural context on the other.

If primary socialization does not contribute to the
growth of democratic personalities, neither do the basic
value orientations which we have described. The orientation

toward man is one which stresses his narrow selfishness and
lack of internal restraint. The heavy burden of misanthropy
and suspicion generated by this orientation leaves little
room for the trust and cooperativeness implied by a democrat-
ic system. A "presentist" time orientation inhibits the de-
velopment of long-run instrumental or cooperative strategies
necessary in a democratic polity. And, finally, the belief
that most desired values are scarce and their quantity fixed
by nature, leads these civil servants to conceive of politi-
cal and economic life as a zero-sum contest. Each of these
orientations, as we have shown at some length, nurtures po-
litical beliefs and values which are scarcely hospitable to a
democratic style.

2. Secondary Socialization

Not much support for democracy can be located in the
character of early socialization, nor among the basic value
orientations of our sample. But what about secondary social-
ization? When the political system is so different from fam-
ily norms, as it is in transitional society, later experi-
ences can play a crucial role in developing new attitudes
appropriate to democratic politics and thus substitute for
the lack of congruent early socialization. This is essen-
tially what Almond and Verba have said in focusing on how
late socialization can turn political "subjects" into "polit-
ical participants."

Family experiences do play a role in the formation of po-
litical attitudes, but the role may not be central; the
gap between the family and the polity may be so wide that
other social experiences, especially in social situations
closer in time and in structure to the political system,
may play a larger role.[8]

The special role that secondary socialization may play
in counteracting primary influences and preparing people for
democratic participation focuses our attention on the school
system, on voluntary organizations, and on the bureaucratic
experiences of the sample. As far as the authority patterns
and participation styles of these structures are concerned,
there is precious little in what the civil servants have to
say that would lead us to regard them as bastions of democra-
cy. Teachers were typically seen as strict, humorless task-
masters who demanded much rote learning and were not above
caning the recalcitrant with a length of rotan. There were
relatively few extra-curricular activities and those which
did exist were closely controlled by school teachers. The
school picture has, of course, changed a good deal since
World War II but most of our respondents were educated before
or immediately after the war.

Voluntary organizations might potentially provide dem-
ocratic experiences, but less than one quarter of these men
belongs to any group beyond an Old Boys' Association (second-
ary school alumni) to which they occasionally pay dues.
Moreover, as we noted in Chapter 4, those few who do belong

to voluntary organizations usually view them as facades be-
hind which individuals pursue wealth or status and cynically
exploit the group for whatever it is worth.

Bureaucratic experience in this context is mixed. The
fact that these men hold responsible posts in the government
means they not only have more knowledge of politics than most,
but also make decisions of some importance. Undoubtedly
their greater knowledge and their small niche on the Olympian
heights contribute to a feeling of civic competence. On the
other hand, the internal authority structure of the bureauc-
racy is hardly democratic. Lines of authority are clear-cut
and the distinctions in rank as indicated by salary and title
are impressively elaborate. Modeled along military lines as
it is, working life within the Malaysian bureaucracy is not
in itself likely to promote a flowering of the democratic
spirit.

Even the informal democracy that often develops within
a large organization is much weaker in Malaysia than in the
West. Acute status consciousness and the "upper-directedness"
which we described earlier conspire to minimize group deci-
sion-making, to restrict fraternization with subordinates,
etc. Thus, while their bureaucratic roles enhance our re-
spondents' sense of political efficacy, the authority struc-
ture into which these roles are organized do not help sustain
norms of internal democracy.

Although we have not by any means attempted a system-

atic treatment of primary or secondary socialization, it is
abundantly clear that little support for democracy is to be
found here. Anyone casting about for "democratic patholo-
gies" in these areas would be amply rewarded in his quest.
Given the effects of early and late socialization, it is far
from astonishing that one does not find adults who fit our
stereotype of democratic personalities. In fact, on the
basis of socialization and central beliefs it would be sur-
prising if one were to find even a moderate level of commit-
ment to democratic forms and style. And yet it is probably
true that the civil servants of Malaysia represent the larg-
est significant group in the nation which is supportive of
liberal democratic norms and Western political values. How
does this commitment, imperfect as it is, come about?

3. Two Sources of Support for Democracy

When we spoke of socialization in school and in the
bureaucracy we were speaking largely of the latent socializa-
tion provided by authority patterns, etc. What we have ne-
glected--and what is too often neglected in studies of polit-
ical socialization--is the manifest political training which
takes place in school or at work. When Almond and Verba came
up against adult patterns which conflicted with what one
might have expected on the basis of latent socialization,
they were obliged to conclude that:

    The latent political socialization that is involved in,
    say, experiences with family authority patterns may cre-

ate certain predispositions toward political attitudes
within the individual; his receptivity to certain types
of political relationships may be increased. But this is
obviously an inadequate explanation of his political at-
titudes, for there are other forms of political sociali-
zation. There is, for instance, manifest political so-
cialization--the intentional teaching of political
attitudes in the family and in school.[9]

It is precisely this manifest political socialization,
particularly in school, which seems to account for much of
the commitment to democratic values among the men in our sam-
ple. During our discussions of democracy and freedom their
comments take on the distinct hue of a classroom recitation.
Quotations from Lincoln, Mill, Churchill, and other "heroes
of democracy" spring uncertainly to their lips from the pages
of dimly but fondly remembered school texts. And let us not
forget that most of them were in school when Malaya was still
a colony and received their instruction from teachers who,
for the most part, firmly believed in the British system.
Their curriculum was the same any English child would have
had to tackle and if, in Malaya, it did not so much produce
loyalty to Britain, it did produce a substantial loyalty to
the British system.

The Britain they came to know through their teachers
was, for the older men, the most powerful nation in the
world, the most civilized, and the richest; so it stood to
reason that this had something to do with her system of gov-
ernment. For the younger men, the light of Britain was some-

what dimmed by nationalist onslaughts and initial British
losses in World War II, but nonetheless its ideals were the
very weapons which were turned against it in the struggle for
independence.

Learning about the British system in Malaya was all
the more effective since it was conducted in abstracto.
While English, French, or American children receive much the
same abstracted, ideal picture of their own political system,
they also hear the more concrete and often more cynical ob-
servations of their parents and, later, can measure the sys-
tems' ideals and freedoms against their own experience and
that of others. At some point they must draw together the
threads of experience, compare them to what they have been
taught, and emerge with an evaluation of some sort. This op-
portunity to test political theory against fact in their own
lives was not open to Malaysian civil servants.[10] It is al-
most as if English school children were to be taught about
the theory of the Greek city state--by Greeks who had a vest-
ed interest in presenting the system in its most advantageous
light. We have perhaps exaggerated a bit, but, except for
those few who managed to spend some time in England, the pic-
ture of the British political system was painted in the
rosiest and most idealistic hues and was unsullied by first-
hand experience. The selective nature of information about
Britain taught in Malaya's schools, and the conditions under
which it was offered, helped generate an abstract commitment,

however imperfect, to liberal democracy.

The process of explicit learning about the British system, moreover, did not stop when these men finished secondary school or the university. Most of them, when they joined the civil service, were trained by, and often served under, British colonial servants. While learning the tools of their trade they were introduced to the ideals of the British public service:

> . . . that power is a social function and not simply domination; that office is a public service and not a fief to be exploited in return for personal service to a prince; that people are really equal before the law and that their rights, even if unstated in constitutions, can exercise a restraint on the power of government.[11]

Unlike what was taught in school about the British system in England, these were norms which could be measured against colonial reality. And while performance occasionally fell short of these high ideals, the British colonial servants in Malaya for the most part acted in line with their principles. Thus, bureaucratic training and experience served in this sense to reflect favorably on the already esteemed British political order and to enhance a belief in democratic norms.[12]

Neither instruction in school nor in the civil service is quite adequate to explain how these men acquired a commitment to democracy. After all, a majority of those elites in new nations who call for non-democratic solutions to political problems were educated in an atmosphere similar to the

one we have described. For many of these elites, knowledge of Western democratic norms has not meant commitment to them but has served rather as a tool to explain why they are not applicable to the local situation.

What may commit these men, more than others, to Western political norms is the simple fact that they have gained much under the democratic system. While neither the style of primary or secondary socialization contributes to democratic beliefs, their own progress and success under the system does, in fact, generate a degree of loyalty. Almost all of these men are better off than their fathers; they enjoy greater incomes, greater prestige, and greater security. They are not the unattached, déraciné intellectuals who have become radicalized because there is no place for them in the society. They are simply the opposite side of the coin from this dispossessed intelligentsia which has gravitated to trade unionism, journalism, teaching, and other fields where neither the financial or status rewards are as satisfying as those of the upper bureaucracy. Our respondents, occupying high posts in the civil service, have been integrated into the system and been given great prestige by it, so it is not surprising that they have a certain stake in its continuance.[13]

What we are dealing with has been called the "halo effect," or, more broadly, "stimulus generalization."[14] These men have every reason to be satisfied with the opportunities

for education, status, and pay their society has afforded
them, and this general satisfaction inevitably colors their
evaluation of the political system as well. It makes little
difference whether or not their advancement is objectively
traceable to the nature of the political system itself, since
the fact that their achievements have, in part, occurred
under a particular form of government is enough to generate
this "halo effect."[15]

Manifest political socialization and a general sense
of satisfaction with the system may seem a slender basis for
democratic ideology, but in the absence of more substantial
foundations, they play a significant role.

B. Support for New Political Systems in New Nations

Democracy, among the elite group which we have exam-
ined, receives little nourishment from early family training
or from the style of secondary socialization. It depends for
support almost exclusively upon the manifest norms which are
taught at school, through the mass media, and in occupational
life. Distinguishing along these lines between the latent
characterological and experiential support for democracy on
the one hand and the manifest, learned support on the other,
we can construct the following diagram:

FIGURE 1

VARIETIES OF SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN DIFFERENT STATES[16]

	Manifest Socialization	Latent Socialization	
	Taught Norms	Experiential	Characterological
Democratic New Nation (Malaysia)	+	– (+)	– (+)
Post-Revolutionary Democratic Nation (Mexico?)	+	+ (–)	+ (–)
Old Evolutionary Democratic Nation (England)	+	+	+

The changes in the existential base--type and level of economic activity, urban-rural residence, social stratification, other demographic variables, etc.--which prepare the basis for a new ideology are likely to be "accretionary" rather than "avulsionary" by their very nature. These are the same variables which are largely, but not entirely, responsible for the basic cultural changes which in turn affect experience and character over a long period. If, as in an "old evolutionary democratic nation" such as England, the nature of the reigning ideology changes at roughly the same rate as these accretionary factors, it remains more or less congruent with latent socialization and thus stabilizes the

system.[17] Revolutionary changes, because they occur while
the old order is still strong enough to put up stiff resist-
ance, are apt to install a somewhat less stable political or-
der since the existential base is only partly supportive.[18]
In this situation, latent socialization contains some ele-
ments which sustain the new order and other elements which
tend to undermine it.

In a new nation like Malaysia, however, the new order
is more exogenous in origin than indigenous. As a result,
latent socialization provides relatively little experiential
and characterological underpinning for the new democratic re-
gime. The mere fact that, for the most part, resistance to
the nationalist revolution for independence in colonial areas
has seldom been as violent and uncompromising as the resist-
ance to revolutions in which a new (in most cases, bourgeois)
class ousted the traditional ruling class of their own na-
tion, means that the new order in an ex-colonial area accedes
to power before its bases of latent support are well devel-
oped. Some support, of course, does exist as a result of the
social and economic changes wrought by the colonial process
itself, but this support is likely to be more tenuous in the
democratic new nation than in the post-revolutionary democra-
cy.[19] The net effect of this situation in democratic new na-
tions is simply that manifest political socialization must
bear a greater weight in supporting the political system.
Perched, as it were, on one slender foundation pillar, it is

less likely to survive the various storms which beset it than
is an old, evolutionary democratic nation which can depend on
all three pillars for support. Unstable as it is, the demo-
cratic new nation finds that latent socialization, instead of
buttressing a democratic form of government, constitutes an
additional burden it must carry.

To this point we have focused on what might be called
"legitimacy." But we indicated above that an important rea-
son why Malaysian civil servants identify with the democratic
system is because they have experienced individual and col-
lective satisfactions within it and thus tend to evaluate it
favorably. That is, for civil servants at least, democratic
government has been _effective_ in meeting their aspirations.
What the system lacks in legitimacy it makes up for by its
effectiveness. This distinction between legitimacy and ef-
fectiveness has been lucidly explained by S. M. Lipset.

> Effectiveness means actual performance, the extent to
> which the system satisfies the basic functions of govern-
> ment as most of the population and . . . powerful groups
> . . . see them. Legitimacy involves the capacity of the
> system to engender and maintain the belief that the ex-
> isting political institutions are the most appropriate
> ones for the society. . . . While effectiveness is pri-
> marily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative. Groups
> regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate
> according to the way in which its values fit with
> theirs.[20]

In the absence of substantial legitimacy--reflected in

the style and content of latent and manifest political so-
cialization--effectiveness furnishes only an uncertain, pro-
visional footing for a democratic regime. As Lipset notes,
the Austrian and German regimes in the late 1920's enjoyed
little legitimacy but "remained reasonable effective." But:

> When the effectiveness of various governments broke down
> in the 1930's, those societies which were high on the
> scale of legitimacy remained democratic, while such coun-
> tries as Germany, Austria, and Spain lost their freedom,
> and France narrowly escaped a similar fate.[21]

Should the effectiveness of the democratic system in
Malaysia and other democratic new nations decline much, they
would not have "capital" in the form of legitimacy on which
to weather the crisis and, in all likelihood, would not
emerge with a democratic form of government. In fact, this
is substantially what has occurred in most of those new na-
tions which have already abandoned democracy. It is ironic
too that democratic new nations, which must rely upon effec-
tive government to preserve their political system while it
sends down still frail roots of legitimacy, are in most re-
spects poorly equipped to provide effective government by
virtue of their lack of capital, technical skills, organiza-
tional competence, etc.

The relative instability of democracy in new nations
is thus thrown into sharp relief when we consider that the
experiential and characterological sources of legitimacy are
weak in our sample. That democracy continues to maintain its

uncertain purchase in these circumstances is due in large part to manifest political socialization and a presently adequate level of governmental effectiveness. Its future would be cast in grave doubt if the level of satisfaction with the system's output were to decline for any reason. Even more than the post-revolutionary democracy, the democratic new nation must rely for its survival more on what it does than what it is.

FOOTNOTES

1. By liberal democratic beliefs we mean support for "First
   Amendment" freedoms like free speech and freedom of as-
   sembly, support for "due process" against arbitrary state
   action, and a preference for a representative government
   elected by popular franchise.

2. Among others, we might include Lucian Pye, Margaret Mead,
   Harold Lasswell, Robert Lane, Erik Erikson, Gabriel
   Almond and Sidney Verba, O. Mannoni, and Else Frenkel-
   Brunswick.

3. Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: W. W. Nor-
   ton & Co., 1950), pp. 219-222.

4. This despite the fact that weaning and toilet training
   are typically later in the Malaysian context than in the
   Western. The pattern of maternal affection described
   here is based on h.M.B. Murphy, "Cultural Factors in the
   Mental Health of Malayan Students," op. cit., passim;
   Judith Djamour, Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore,
   London School of Economics Monograph on Social Anthropol-
   ogy No. 21 (London: Athlone Press, 1959); and the au-
   thor's observations.

5. For a discussion of the relationship between ego-strength
   and democratic attitudes see Robert E. Lane, Political
   Ideology, op. cit., Chapter 7.

6. The author personally witnessed the punishment of two
   sisters who were caught stealing a sarong from a neigh-

bor's clothesline. They were bound together and shorn of their hair while the neighbors gathered to shame them. From the neighbors' comments it became clear that such drastic measures had been taken because they had been caught stealing from a powerful family in the kampong.

7. The reader may be surprised that we have not mentioned the substantial differences between Malay, Chinese, and Indian child-rearing practices. Important as these differences are, we have focused on the similarities among all three so we might talk of the group as a whole. An excellent discussion of these differences and their consequences is contained in H.M.B. Murphy, op. cit.

8. Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 305.

9. Ibid., pp. 268-269.

10. The colonial regime itself might have remedied this situation, but the prevailing criticism was that the British had failed to give the freedoms to their colonies which they extended to their own people. Socialist or communist critiques might have served this function too, but unlike some other colonies, they were few and far between in Malaya and, in any case, were scarcely reflected in the school system. One has the impression that in French colonies—especially from the prewar Blum government onward—socialist critiques had more influence in colonial schools.

1. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community: An
   Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of
   Egypt, 1804-1952 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1961),
   p. 57. This book contains a sensitive analysis of the
   failure of the liberal democratic nationalists in Egypt
   which is applicable ceteris paribus to many other new
   nations.

2. In another sense, bureaucratic experience worked against
   democratic norms and we shall take this up in the fol-
   lowing chapter.

3. This would not hold true in these nations where politics
   has all but replaced administration, and where civil
   servants have lost status and high pay and have been at-
   tacked as a group by politicians.

4. Lane, in Political Ideology, found the same phenomenon
   among working class Americans in Eastport. Op. cit.,
   pp. 91-92.

5. It might well be argued that these men have the colonial
   regime more to thank for their position than popular de-
   mocracy, since their status and power were greater be-
   fore local politicians assumed power. This point of
   view, however, overlooks the fact that it was independ-
   ence and the consequent departure of expatriates which
   was responsible for their rapid advancement. It is true
   nonetheless that under colonialism an administrator made
   decisions which are now specifically political, and we

shall examine the effects of this on ideology in Chapter 9.

16. Plus "+" signs indicate support for democracy while minus "-" signs indicate non-supportive or conflicting socialization. Where two signs appear together, the one above indicates the predominant influence of socialization; the one in parentheses a minor, or deviant, influence.

17. Of course, political changes are uneven and lag behind or spurt ahead of changes in the existential base but one can distinguish between situations of relative equilibrium and those of severe disequilibrium.

18. If resistance is very prolonged, the situation is probably more auspicious since the accretionary changes have gone so far that they are more supportive of the new order.

19. The post-revolutionary nation suffers from the special problem of social antagonisms and cleavages exacerbated by the revolutionary process itself, but this is a subject for separate analysis.

20. S. M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1959), pp. 77-96.

21. Ibid., pp. 81-82.

CHAPTER 8

THE NATURE OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

A. The Organization and Function of Political Material

Before we plunge into a discussion on the character of the democratic beliefs of these civil servants, some space should be devoted to the organization and shape of their beliefs.

If we judge by the findings of Lane or Converse, the way in which Malaysian civil servants order facts and beliefs in their minds is not unlike the way the American "common man" arranges his ideas.[1] First, with perhaps only four exceptions, these bureaucrats seldom "contextualize" political material; rather they "morselize" it.[2] That is, the political events about which they think tend to remain isolated; they are only rarely placed in either the historical or spatial contexts which might invest them with greater meaning.

When they speak of Sukarno, for example, he emerges simply as a madman without reference to either the conditions which produced him or the long-run consequences of his rule. The secession of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation is similarly seen as basically an affair of personal pique among leaders with little reference to the broader ethnic and economic questions involved. Education, of course, is important here as it provides powerful tools for contextualization and, in fact, the level of contextualization is somewhat higher among university graduates. Nonetheless, "morselizing" is the rule rather than the exception.

Secondly, it is important to note that formal ideologies--socialism, communism, capitalism, etc.--play an insignificant role in ordering the political beliefs of these 17 men. There are, of course, notions of what is democratic and what is not, what capitalism and socialism mean, and so on, but even here there is no rigidity. Between what is clearly democratic and what is clearly undemocratic, there are a host of possible situations which, for them, are "more-or-less," not "either-or." The absence of much formal ideology is surely one reason why political information is morselized since formal ideologies provide the context within which the barrage of political news can be ordered and distilled. Without the ordering principles which a formal ideology offers, then, political beliefs and events are likely to be littered about, a small group here, another there, with few

cognitive paths connecting them.

One does not have to look far to discover why formal ideologies have little currency among administrators in Malaysia. There has never been a social upheaval of major proportions which would, as the French Revolution did, create the conditions in which the search for a new symbolic framework to explain what is happening becomes paramount. Social changes have sometimes come suddenly to Malaya, but they have come in digestible amounts and usually without the great social disorganization which destroys continuity. Across the Straits of Malacca the intense search for an explanatory ideology in Indonesia reflects that nation's political history as the weakness of formal ideology reflects Malaysian experience.[3]

At least two important ideological consequences follow from the "morselization" of political material and the relative absence of formal ideology among the Malaysian sample. First, the weakness of contextual thinking often leads to a personalization of political causes. Thus Sukarno's vanity is alone responsible for the orgiastic excesses of Indonesian policy; Hitler for Germany's crimes against the Jews; and Churchill for the gallant British war effort. Inasmuch as an analysis of impersonal causes requires contextualization of a sort, these men find it easier to attribute most effects to the operation of human will.[4] The problem with this orientation toward people is, of course, that it focuses on individ-

uals rather than issues, on personalities rather than poli-
cies. When things go wrong the answer is to throw out the
"bad guys" and replace them with "good guys." In this con-
text, little learning takes place and an instrumental or
means-end approach fails to guide evaluations of the politi-
cal world.[5]

If the morselization of political events and the weak-
ness of formal political theories inhibits integrative think-
ing by these men, it also produces a kind of openness toward
new information. There is no rigid, pre-determined framework
into which new information must be fitted or which excludes
contradictory material.[6] Since little integrative thinking
takes place, the conflict between different pieces of infor-
mation is often not perceived but, when it is, the dilemma is
faced squarely; there is little evasion. In fact, one might
fairly say that these men avoid judgment and commitment when
they can. And by suspending judgment in this way, they keep
open as many ideological options as possible. Mr. Tay is
typical in this regard. When I ask him about the advantages
of democracy he takes care to leave open a line of possible
retreat:

> Well, I haven't seen the other systems yet. . . . To be
> able to give you the advantages---you must know the other
> system---unless it's just through readings and books.

Like Mr. Tay, most of the others make clear that their polit-
ical judgments are of a provisional character. Not only are

they open to new information which would challenge their tentative notions but they tend to confine their convictions to what they have directly experienced; they will not take someone else's word for it.[7]

Much of the political openness of these men is traceable to their other-directedness. As we noted before, most would prefer to be respected for their ability to get along with others rather than for their independent views. If their minds were already made up, they would sacrifice much of the flexibility they feel is needed in responding to others and accommodating to the social context. A majority, in fact, do not enjoy political discussions with others who may disagree with them. They are all willing to admit that political argumentation serves to sharpen their own opinions but, to their minds, this small yield does not begin to justify its social disruptiveness. Inche' Mohd. Amin, for example, dislikes talking with those who disagree with him because "I don't want to quarrel over small things---there's no point of disagreeing over small matters." For him, politics is simply not important enough to merit upsetting others. Mr. Khoo sees similar consequences: "It is difficult---you make no headway at all---and they get rather angry, you see." If politics were more salient to them they might feel differently, but it is not.

Coupled with an unwillingness or inability to contextualize, the emphasis on the social function of political

discussion tends to focus attention on those political events having the greatest entertainment value. Almost all prefer political discussion with someone who jokes and keeps things from getting too serious rather than with someone who has all the answers. (Kamalam: "We normally don't like people who know too much---because they don't make it very pleasant.") (Inche' Mustapha: ". . . this serious discussion shouldn't last too long or it may become a bore---you have to just ask questions.") If political information and discussion is valued for its socializing function, for its ability to bring men together rather than to divide them, attention is diverted away from basic issues toward the trivial or the spectacular. For most of these men, the Daily News is more in keeping with their information needs than The New York Times. Political information, then, does not seem to tie in closely with the political beliefs of these civil servants, either to reinforce their beliefs or contradict them; it is instead judged more for its spectator appeal.[8]

B. The Character of Democratic Beliefs

Our introductory remarks about the organization and function of political material are essential in placing our analysis of the character of democratic beliefs in its proper context. The very process of ordering a discussion of personal political beliefs is likely to create the mistaken impression that the beliefs themselves are ordered, coherent,

and have, as it were, a life of their own. Thus, it is important that we begin with an appreciation of the tendency of these men to "morselize" and personalize, the openness of their beliefs, the inconsequential role which formal ideology plays, and the social function which political information performs for them.

With all this in mind, we can turn to a description of their democratic and non-democratic beliefs. To begin, we can specify at least five criteria which, if put into question form, provide a rough measure of the "democraticness" of a man's political beliefs.[9] These criteria, phrased in their undemocratic variants, are:

1. A scorn for the mass electorate.
2. Distaste for the confusion and delay of parliamentary procedures.
3. A preference for temporary dictatorship in time of threat.
4. Unrelieved cynicism about the democratic procedures in organizations they knew.
5. Doubt about the future of democracy.[10]

Taking each in turn, we should be able to construct a serviceable map of the nature of support for democracy among our sample.

1. Scorn for Mass Electorate

In response to a question asking whether everyone "no matter how ignorant and careless should have an equal vote" all 17 men agreed--some emphatically, others a bit reluctantly--that even the least of their fellows must have access to the ballot. The unanimity of their reaction is indeed im-

pressive, particularly in light of the fact that the electo-
rate to which they refer is, by the measure of education at
least, less competent to exercise the vote than its Western
counterpart. Having at their disposal a situation tailor-
made for elitism, they choose not to make use of it.[11]

Mr. Khoo is typical of those who support the popular
vote with some reluctance, but are nevertheless certain about
what is required.

It should be each person one vote. In a new nation like
us we should---we must have some tolerance because quite
a number of them are illiterates.

Here the decision is taken with both eyes open and the prin-
ciple of 'one man, one vote' affirmed in spite of general il-
literacy. Khoo is willing to support a democratic norm with
full knowledge of its dangers and costs. If Mr. Khoo in-
clines to paternalism, Mr. Tay is more affirmatively populist:

I think everyone should have an equal vote, subject to
age of course---I don't think education or wealth should
be any factors at all.

The consensus on this issue is such that most men re-
plied, "Of course, equal vote" or something to that effect,
and we have only Mr. Tay's long-windedness to thank for a
more elaborate reply. One suspects that their unanimity re-
flects something absorbed from the nationalist movements in
the colonial areas. Was it not the British after all who
claimed that Malaysians, Indians, and Africans were not suf-

ficiently educated--or perhaps even congenitally incapable--
to become mature citizens? The nationalist rejoinder was to
demand the same self-determination and popular government
which the British people enjoyed and for which Britain had
borne such great hardships during World War II. Since denial
of popular rule was the most striking hypocrisy of a demo-
cratic colonizing nation, it is scarcely surprising that the
nationalist revolutions generated widespread and lasting sup-
port for the universal franchise. The assertion of national
collective worth which characterizes nationalism requires
nothing less than equal civic privileges for a people who are
as worthy as their foreign rulers.

International fashion may play a role here too. Elec-
tions have become the index par excellence of democracy and
self-determination. A host of United Nations' reports con-
demn the denial of the vote to indigenous populations in
Angola, Southern Rhodesia, and South West Africa and demand
self-determination. As the most apparent manifestation of
popular rule, elections have become an absolute requirement
of any state that aspires to international respectability.

2. Distaste for Delay and Confusion of
Democratic Procedures

The frustrations of democratic procedures are, as
these men view them, considerable. Whether they find the de-
lays and confusions sometimes useful or completely destruc-
tive, all agree that these problems beset a democracy more

than other forms of government.

In spite of the procedural burdens of democracy, al-most two-thirds (11) of the men find enough that is useful in the delays, or in the democratic system itself, to compensate for these frustrations. Only six intimate that the liabilities are perhaps too great; that efficiency and speed may require a change in the system.[12]

Sundram, who supports democracy in full knowledge of its shortcomings, makes an explicit comparison between democratic and totalitarian systems. Asked if democracy creates confusion and prevents important things from getting done, he replies:

Well, the process may be slow but you reach the end. The important thing is you reach the end and with the full backing of the population. In a totalitarian system you reach the end much faster but with a lot of discontent.

The inefficiency of democracy is not contested by Sundram, rather, he affirms it and says he values contentment and wide accord more than speed. Inche' Mustapha, adopting his common pose as amateur psychologist, seems to have much the same set of preferences:

Yes, I think democracy is a very costly thing and it takes so long to do some things. You have to get the majority opinion---it is a very costly thing. . . . It is a waste of time and a waste of money too. But whatever the final conclusion, everybody knows what it is all about. The funny thing is that once a human being has expressed

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his opinion---whether he is followed or not in the decision is immaterial.

Although the "costs of democracy" are more vivid here, full consultation is valued over speed. Along with most of the sample, both men feel that a happy ship which reaches port behind schedule is preferable to one which arrives on time carrying a mutinous crew. Implicit in their statements is the view that short cuts may not be efficient over the long run, however attractive their immediate advantages may seem.

The sources of this tolerance for the inconveniences of democracy may perhaps be sought in the dangers these men see in the authoritarian alternatives to democracy. Eliminating the delays and confusions of democratic procedures would mean allowing some individual or small group to assume undiluted control of the nation's affairs, a prospect these men do not relish--at least in normal times. As we have said before, the general expectation is that unrestrained leaders are likely to follow a natural human inclination to self-serving and to exploit their post for whatever personal gain it may yield. In this context, the function of the democratic system, however imperfect its controls, is to prevent leaders from becoming plunderers by requiring the consent of the governed. These men do not want unrestrained leaders; they are distrustful of what would happen if human motives were given full rein. They feel that the price of speed and efficiency will in all probability be pillage by voracious

leaders. This is a price most of them are unwilling to pay.[13]

About a third of the sample nevertheless finds the costs of democracy too great or, in most cases, perceives the delays and confusion without at the same time grasping the function that delay might serve. Inche' Hussein's views are more or less representative of this group. Agreeing that democracy causes confusion and prevents important things from getting done, he continues:

> Yes, it does . . . it can. [Why?] Because democracy itself is a very expensive thing. You have to take into account the voices of everybody and reduce it to a tiny thing before decisions can be arrived at. Along the same lines it takes longer to get things done---you have to consult everyone. Since all can express themselves there are bound to be contradictions, so it becomes confusing at times.

Conjuring up a thunderous din of contending voices in which it becomes impossible to hear or be heard, Inche' Hussain finds the process of democratic consultation a nearly impossible task. He seems to focus upon the social disruptiveness of political debate which we mentioned earlier in this chapter. Viewed in this fashion, political debate destroys group harmony. When it continues for too long a time, and on a large scale, it ultimately leads to violence and permanent division. While those who are more tolerant of the problems of democratic consultation see the process as one which builds consensus and popular support, Inche' Hussein

looks at the same process and discovers divisiveness and discontent. Among the six administrators who find the delays and confusion of democracy severely crippling, then, there is on the one hand a concern with the divisions created by political quarrels and, on the other, a feeling that many important decisions cannot wait for the public to make up its mind--a preference for decisiveness.

3. Preference for Dictatorship in Crisis

Asking respondents whether they agree there is need for a dictatorship in a time of crisis is not unlike asking whether they think democracy creates delay and confusion. What is new is the assumption of a crisis--a situation which places a premium on decisiveness. The one asks whether the delay and confusion caused by popular government are serious handicaps in the normal course of events while the other asks whether they are tolerable in a crisis. One would expect that some of those who are willing to endure delay and muddles in ordinary times would find them dangerous luxuries in a crisis situation.

As we would anticipate, support for democratic procedures falls off substantially in a hypothetical crisis situation. Only two of the men (12 per cent) are reluctant to endorse a 'crisis dictatorship' or are explicit about provision being made for a return to democratic norms afterward. The other 15 accede readily to the requirements of the situation as they see it. Mr. Khoo, representing the majority here,

echoes the sentiments of Inche' Ja'afar, whom we quoted ear-
lier, in saying that one must adopt the same methods as one's
competitors in order to survive:

> During war there should be a temporary dictatorship. Es-
> pecially when things were very black in England, Church-
> ill had to become a dictator. It was one dictator
> against another and the stronger one wins.

For Inche' Abu Bakar the conclusion is the same, but it is
the problem of speed that is uppermost in his mind:

> [Dictatorship in crisis?] Yes! [Why?] Because in a
> time of crisis there is not time for getting the views
> ---'cause any time lost might endanger the national situ-
> ation.

For most of the men, then, a crisis situation is com-
pelling enough to resort to personal or committee rule. The
situation is far from academic to them since they all experi-
enced the postwar Emergency when normal colonial rule was
abandoned for military administration and the more recent
'mini-war' with Indonesia during which certain freedoms were
suspended. In fact, from the time of the Japanese occupation
on, these men have lived in a continual atmosphere of incipi-
ent or actual political crisis. There is, furthermore, a
clear recognition on their part of the perilous situation of
a nation of but nine million beset by communal tensions and
facing 100 million Indonesians to the south and 700 million
Chinese to the north. Recourse to dictatorship, when set in
this context of national fragility, is surely more compre-

hensible than it might be in a stable, secure democracy. A crisis situation is both more real and compelling to them than it would seem to Englishmen or Americans.

Over and above the special dangers faced by a small nation in Southeast Asia, there is some reason to suspect that the commitment to democratic procedures is weaker here than in most Western contexts. The commitment is more "formalistic" in the sense that it tends to weaken quickly when it threatens other values like security, stability, etc. working class respondents in the United States, for example, "shied away" from endorsing even a temporary dictatorship in the midst of a war "with a threat of atomic bombing."[14] Confronted with the final holocaust, then, American respondents were still reluctant to countenance a dictatorship. It would seem that democratic procedures are very highly placed values in America; they are doggedly held to in circumstances which would prompt their scrapping in Malaysia. This comparison serves to illustrate the formalistic nature of democratic beliefs among the Malaysian elite which we shall explore more systematically later in this chapter.

4. Unrelieved Cynicism About Democratic Procedures In Organizations They Know

We have already discussed how these Malaysian bureaucrats evaluate the operation of voluntary organizations with which they are acquainted (Chapter 4, Section B). More than two-thirds of them are quite cynical. They see individuals

exploiting organizations for social recognition and power, and for ulterior rewards as
well. In particular, their comments contain sharp criticisms
of the small cliques which discourage wider participation so
that they might retain their leadership positions, complaints
against those who threaten to quit unless they are elected,
and a distaste for the motives of those who join and fail to
pull their share of the load.

Two quite distinct factors appear to account for these
men's cynicism about voluntary organizations. First, their
generally pessimistic assumptions about human motives are
projected to include individual behavior within an organiza-
tional context. This process is particularly apparent among
those who have few or no group memberships and who therefore
can more easily invoke their imagination in describing what
happens in general. If, however, this were the main well-
spring of cynicism, one would expect that those who partici-
pate actively in voluntary organizations would be markedly
less cynical. But this is not the case; those with more ex-
perience in groups of this sort are every bit as cynical as
those making judgments from afar. Even Inche' Mustapha, who
serves on no less than four school boards and is an official
of two charitable organizations, is discouraged.

   And I was once secretary of a non-political youth organi-
   zation until I resigned last year when I found that some
   of the leaders were making use of the organization for
   their own ends.
   [And later] I'm losing touch with many groups---because

I've withdrawn from so many of them because of the leadership.

Since research findings in the West have indicated that persons with more political experience are generally less cynical about political institutions than non-participants, it is curious that those of our administrators who have extensive group experiences should be as cynical about these groups as those who are less active. The answer to this apparent paradox lies in this actual nature of voluntary groups in Malaysia. With some notable exceptions, the majority of them are not the open, democratic forums which would provide their members with the satisfaction of having actively participated and influenced policy. Many of Malaysia's service organizations, not to mention religious groups, are cast in a somewhat traditional mold where high status, elderly leadership perpetuates itself and discourages wider membership. Voluntary groups are, as Inche' Mustapha notes, in fact used frequently as personal vehicles, and prominent politicians, relatives of Malay sultans, civil servants, and wealthy Chinese patrons often exercise a tenacious, durable control over their executive bodies and policy directions.

The point here is simply that, for many of these men, cynicism about how private organizations are run is based on concrete experience within groups which are run along less than democratic lines. Their cynicism about these organizations may actually serve to highlight their commitment to the

norms of popular control rather than to indicate a lack of such commitment. If most organizations are not open or democratic, a democrat would be justifiably cynical about their mode of operation.

5. Doubt About the Future of Democracy

A substantial majority of the civil servants (11 of 17) are pessimistic about the durability of democracy in their nation. Their pessimism either focuses on the willingness of leaders to forsake democracy when it threatens other values such as unity and economic development, or upon the feeling that communism, as the wave of the future in Southeast Asia, may sweep all before it. Inche' Ja'afar may serve as an example of both concerns. Asked if the future of democracy in Malaysia is bright, he answers:

Not bright in the short term because some of these countries think they have something to do in a hurry---and they are willing to sacrifice democracy to do that---like Guided Democracy in Indonesia. And again there is another factor in this part of the world---communism and its ability to infiltrate. It tries in the democratic system. They may succeed by their subversion in a democratic system and once they get the majority vote they won't get out. So in order to stop communism perhaps you have to sacrifice some democracy---but I suppose that's not a fair academic answer since, if it's really a democracy, then the communists must have a chance too.

Here is Inche' Ja'afar as the agonized democrat first wondering whether one might not have to forsake democratic

freedoms to survive against communism, and then realizing
that without full freedoms democracy is already lost. The
threats he sees in the desire of leaders to develop their na-
tions at a gallop and in the efforts of communism to exploit
the many strains and discontents of a transitional society
are no shadows called up by a fertile imagination; they are
the legitimate concerns of any democrat in Southeast Asia.

Kamalam is pessimistic too. He concentrates largely
on communism but does not neglect the conditions which might
widen its appeal:

> Of course I'm purely basing this on what I've read but I
> have the feeling that communism is spreading fast, espe-
> cially in poverty-stricken areas. If a man is very, very
> poor and communism promises him a square meal, he will
> accept communism.

Like Inche' Ja'afar, Kamalam recognizes that democracy in his
country is a frail bloom unlikely to escape the plough shares
of poverty, ambition, and communism. His pessimism over the
future of democracy is hardly an indication of his own lack
of democratic attitudes but rather a more or less judicious
appraisal of the situation as it is.

Taking all five criteria of democratic beliefs togeth-
er, what can we then say about these Malaysian administra-
tors? On the first two criteria their democratic attitudes
compare favorably with the Americans of Eastport in support

of a universal franchise and in tolerance for the delays and confusion of democratic procedures. That this tolerance fades quickly in the hypothetical crisis presented as the third test reveals a formalistic quality to their democratic beliefs, but it may as much reflect the compelling reality of such crises in the Southeast Asian context.

Cynicism about democratic norms in organizations they know and pessimism about the future of democracy (the last two criteria) are hardly adequate tests of a man's "democraticness" in an environment where most groups are run along oligarchic or authoritarian lines and where the prospect for democracy is in fact bleak. Both of these questions are not asked in a vacuum; they ask for an evaluation of what exists rather than for subjective preferences. While the replies of these men clearly imply that they would prefer democratic organizations and a durable democratic nation, they are too clear-sighted and frank to mask what they observe. Their pessimism about democracy's future and their cynical appraisal of groups in Malaysia are not pathological distortions; they are rational efforts to evaluate things as they are--to approach reality rather than flee from it. Here again is a case where attitudes which would seem pathological in the stable Western context are seen to be rational or "expected" when the context is radically different. If a constant-pie orientation and a short-run time perspective have an existential base in transitional society, so do pessimism about the

future of democracy and cynicism about how organizations are run.

On balance then--and we must emphasize that we are only dealing with peripheral beliefs here--Malaysian civil servants are for the most part supportive of democratic norms. After revising our interpretation of their statements to take account of the existential base, they measure up fairly well to the limited criteria of "democraticness" we have used here. While the extent of their democratic attitudes might not compare so favorably with an equivalent U.S. elite group, they do not fall very short of American working class respondents in this regard.

A more persuasive test of democratic beliefs, however, would not only be to inquire into their content but also ask how consistent they are with other beliefs and how deeply they penetrate. Only in this fashion can one estimate how unambiguous these beliefs are and whether they can withstand situations where other important values are at stake. We shall attempt to answer these questions in Section C below.

C. The Formalism of Democratic Beliefs

As we noted at some length in the previous chapter, democratic beliefs in Malaysia receive scant support from the nature of primary or secondary socialization. Instead, they are tenuously sustained by the content of manifest political socialization as taught in school, through the mass media,

and on the job, and by satisfaction with the outputs of a
fragile democratic system. When democratic beliefs cannot
rely upon any of the deeper sources of characterological sup-
port--when they confront enduring central orientations such
as social distrust or a predisposition to seek only short-run
personal gains--their lack of substantial ballast is painful-
ly evident. Having no anchor deep within the personality,
democratic beliefs of this sort lead a very precarious life
indeed.

"Formalism" is a term which, when applied to beliefs,
indicates their lack of depth and weight. A person's beliefs
are formalistic to the extent they do not penetrate and mold
other beliefs or affect behavior. The Soviet Constitution of
1936, for example, was a formalistic instrument because it
made provisions for freedoms which were never really granted;
it never represented what was really going on--especially in
1936! Similarly, if a set of democratic beliefs represents
what is "really going on" within an individual, they should
be powerful enough to influence other beliefs as well as ac-
tual behavior. About behavior this study can have little to
contribute, but it can ask how far democratic beliefs seem to
penetrate the rest of the belief system.

1. Formalism in the Interviews

Estimating how formalistic a democratic belief is can
be a very complicated business. But as a first approximation
we may say that when a particular democratic belief is stated

and then seems clearly to be contraverted by more specific comments, that belief is presumably formalistic since it fails to carry much weight with other beliefs.[15] Evidence of this nature for the formalism of democratic beliefs in our Malaysian sample is abundant in the transcripts. Very briefly, we shall illustrate what we mean with three examples.

Inche' Mohd. Amin provides us with a case where support for democratic norms evaporates quickly when adherence to them might threaten other, more important values. When I ask him what he would lose if his country were not democratically run, he delivers without pause an impressive catalogue of what he would be reduced to:

> I would lose the right to elect a leader---the right to vote and choose a leader---the right to voice grievances in a peaceful way. If you lost all this you would have nothing left but to accept orders from the top---good or bad---there would be no means of redress.

But shortly after, when we turn to a discussion of keeping Malaya united in the face of communal tensions, the values of democracy are suddenly shuffled into second place.

> The leader has to use the power vested in him to keep the people under control. This way may not be democratic but you have to do it.

His last sentence is the crucial one. In some situations the leader will "have to" forsake democratic means to assure tranquility and unity. There is the feeling that in a fissiparous nation like Malaysia, democratic methods are simply

not adequate to the primary tasks of unity and control.

Inche' Hussain exhibits much the same pattern when we
talk about the freedoms which a democracy protects. Asked
what the word "freedom" makes him think of, he replies:

> Your mind is free---you can do what you like---your inde-
> pendence is not threatened. Freedom of speech---that is
> very important.

Later in the same session, however, when he is pondering
whether freedom of speech can "go too far," a new value ap-
pears which seems to supercede free speech. He answers:

> Because if there is too much [freedom of speech] then
> there would be a tendency to abuse these freedoms and
> therefore it would be difficult to administer. There
> would be less respect for government---for the ruling
> government.

As we continue our discussion, Inche' Hussain makes it clear
that it is the problem of "mudslinging" which concerns him.
The loss of respect for the government which mudslinging en-
tails is, for him, potentially dangerous enough to require
some limitation on freedom of speech. In other words, popu-
lar respect for "the ruling government" takes precedence over
freedom of expression when a choice must be made. It is not
that he places no value on free speech. On the contrary, he
believes in it, but not as strongly as he believes in certain
other goals. Freedom of expression, having little weight, is
shaken loose when it must contend both with Malaysian reali-
ties and with more strongly held beliefs.

As our third illustration of the formalistic quality of democratic beliefs we may turn to Inche' Ismail who, all things considered, is one of the strongest democrats in the group. His critical mind and literary ambitions seem to contribute to his appreciation of liberal democratic freedoms. For him, democracy means

> Equal rights---to live---to pursue one's interests within the sanction of laws and cultural tradition. The freedom to voice opinion and being given the right to have your opinion considered; not just heard but considered.

Not only does he realize the distinction between being allowed to speak and having one's opinions "considered," but he is full of scorn for those who structure freedoms to serve their own interests. Of such leaders he says:

> A person who has certain powers in his hand---like Sukarno with 'Guided Democracy' and all that nonsense--- wants freedom only at certain places and certain times.

In this context it is surprising that Inche' Ismail would like to limit freedom too. His criteria for distinguishing those who merit full freedoms from those who are to receive a more limited package are of course not so crass as he assumes Sukarno's to be, but they are nonetheless criteria for the distribution of freedom.

> If freedom is given to a man who is confident, well-studied, who has grasped the important things in life then it's OK, but it's not if it's given to one who needs guidance and hasn't grasped the meaning of life in its

fullness. If there is too much freedom in politics, every Tom, Dick, and Harry will start mixing in. This would be disasterous to the administrative side and all those sections that deal with the enforcement of law.

If these standards were really to be applied, there would be precious few left to enjoy full freedoms, although we may be sure that Inche' Ismail would fall within this select group. The freedoms in which he believes would lead to chaos if extended to "every Tom, Dick, and Harry," so they must be reserved for the thinking, mature elite which is capable of exercising them responsibly. Again, the commitment to democratic freedoms finds itself outranked by the need for order and harmony.

Time and time again in our conversations the sincerely held democratic beliefs of these men tend to crumble when they are besieged by beliefs which are more firmly rooted in their personalities. A belief in democratic norms "costs" very little when no other cherished objectives are in the balance, and it is only when it is tested against such adversaries that its weight is actually known. If, for example, a man affirms his belief in free speech and later asserts that this or that seditious person should be put behind bars; or, if he speaks of his commitment to freedom of assembly and then calls for a certain "subversive" group to be proscribed, we must conclude that his belief in these freedoms is somewhat formalistic since it fares badly in the competition with other values. It is this kind of formalism which character-

izes a good portion of the democratic beliefs held by Malaysian administrators.

The illustrations we have used, although not selected for this purpose, tell us a great deal about the beliefs against which democratic convictions flounder. For Inche' Mohd. Amin the need to "keep the people under control" is worth sacrificing some democracy; for Inche' Hussain it is the preservation of "respect for the ruling government" and the prevention of "mudslinging" which takes precedence over free speech; for Inche' Ismail it is the anarchy generated by the ignorant that necessitates withholding some freedoms from them. The common element in all these qualifications to freedom centers on harmony or control; a shared feeling that broad freedoms broadly distributed would in all likelihood lead to a level of disorder that "would be difficult to administer." In short, the belief in freedom runs into the much stronger basic value orientation we outlined in Chapter 4: the belief that men will destroy the social fabric unless a firm discipline imposed from above limits their scope for self-seeking. This central belief—precisely because it is central—is so firmly and deeply anchored in the personality that it easily emerges victorious when it chashes with a peripheral belief in liberal democratic freedoms. The democratic commitments of these civil servants operate in the substantial shadow of basic orientations with clear anti-democratic implications, and, when they meet, the contest is

unequal, for democratic convictions have few allies outside of manifest political socialization while central beliefs can rely on the support of primary socialization, traditional norms, etc.

Finally, we must emphasize that all 17 men have good reason to fear for the social and political fabric of their nation. Communal riots, racial allegiances, and armed threats from abroad are the realities that form the inescapable background against which their call for order and discipline must be viewed. Westerners are seldom faced with situations where liberal democracy may jeopardize stability, but for Malaysians, the dilemma is real. Their basic value orientations predispose them to expect breakdowns in public order; the Malaysian realities provide enough evidence to convince them they are not mistaken.

2. Democratic Beliefs and Formalism in Questionnaire Results

In an effort to gain a firmer and more elaborate picture of the nature of democratic support among Malaysian civil servants, a questionnaire was administered to 116 bureaucrats outside our small sample. The items were selected, and occasionally adapted, from Herbert McClosky's article, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics."[16] In his research, McClosky argues that we can codify the central canons of liberal democratic thought and present them in a question form to establish the degree of adherence to these norms in a

population. To this end he has constructed questions which tap attitudes along the following dimensions:

1. Free Speech and Opinion.
2. Rules of the Game--(mostly due process).
3. Specific Applications of Free Speech and Procedural Rights.
4. Political Equality.
5. Economic Equality.
6. Cynicism toward Government and Politics.
7. Political Futility.

By asking the same questions of a Malaysian elite which McClosky administered to a broad sample of Americans, we have an opportunity to compare the extent and nature of democratic beliefs within each group.[17] The variety of questions employed also allows us to speak of democratic support in a more selective and discriminating way than we have thus far been able to.

a. Free speech. The comparative results for "Freedom of Speech and Opinion" are presented below in Table 1.

Comparing support for free speech and opinion among the groups, the Malaysians choose the democratic alternative as often or more often than the American groups in three items and less frequently on four items. Aside from their unwillingness to endorse the rights of atheists and agnostics, they achieve roughly the level of "democraticness" as the American electorate and do not fall far short of the American "influentials."[18] And if we take a minimum of 75 per cent, as McClosky does, to indicate a "democratic consensus," the Malaysian administrators qualify since their over-

LE 1   FREE SPEECH AND OPINION

Items	% Choosing Democratic Alternative			% by Which Malaysians Less Democratic (-) or More Democratic (+) than:	
	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate	Malaysian Civil Servants	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate
People who hate our way of life should still have a chance to talk and be heard.	86.9	81.8	97.	+ 10	+ 15
Nobody has the right to tell another person what he should and should not read.	81.4	80.7	66.	- 15	- 15
Unless there is freedom for many points of view to be presented, there is little chance that the truth can ever be known.	90.6	85.2	91	no diff.	+ 6
No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.	96.4	94.3	91	- 5	- 3
Freedom of conscience should mean the freedom to not believe in God [Allah] as well as the freedom to worship in the religion of one's choice.	87.8	77.	37	- 51	- 40
I would not trust any person or group to decide what opinions can be freely expressed and what must be silenced.	79.1	64.6	53	- 26	- 12
You cannot really be sure whether an opinion is true or not unless people are free to argue against it.	94.9	90.8	97	+ 2	+ 6
Average	88.2	82.1	76	Average Difference for All Items	
				- 12	- 6

The questions given here are those administered to the
Malaysian sample. Occasionally, a change--usually incon-
sequential--was made from McClosky's items to make the
question clearer to Malaysian respondents. Questions al-
tered in any way at all are marked with an asterisk, and
the original formulation can be found in Appendix B. In
question 7 of this table, for example, "can't" was changed
to "cannot."

all average of democratic responses is 76 per cent.[19]

b. Rules of the game. Free speech and opinion are perhaps the best known doctrines of liberal democratic ideology and they appear to have significantly penetrated the belief system of Malaysian administrators. On the other hand, a concern with due process—with the "Rules of the Game"—is as important as freedom of speech but is not nearly as prominent in the popular mind. When democratic beliefs tend to be formalistic, it may be due process which is cast aside before more celebrated freedoms such as free speech. Table 2 gives the comparisons for the items grouped under "Rules of the Game."

The results show, as was anticipated, that support in all three groups for the "Rules of the Game" drops off considerably from the level achieved on statements of free expression. What is notable, however, is that the drop-off is much more pronounced in the Malaysian sample than among either the American influentials or electorate. The magnitude of difference between the Malaysians and American samples increases roughly threefold over the more modest figures for "Freedom of Speech and Opinion." The average gap between Malaysian administrators and U.S. influentials on items focusing on free speech was 12 per cent, but for due process it increases to 35 per cent: while for the U.S. electorate the gap widens from 6 per cent to 19 per cent. As striking as these margins are, they would rise to 40 per cent and 24 per

TABLE 2   RULES OF THE GAME

Items	% Choosing Democratic Alternative			% by Which Malaysians Less Democratic (-) or More Democratic (+) than:	
	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate	Malaysian Civil Servants	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate
1. People ought to be allowed to vote even if they cannot do so intelligently.	65.6	47.6	78	+ 12	+ 30
2. I do not mind a politician's methods if he manages to get the right things done.	74.4	57.6	29	- 45	- 29
3. It's all right to get around the law if you do not actually break it.	78.8	69.8	21	- 58	- 49
4.* In dealing with subversives, sometimes you cannot always give them all the legal rights which peaceful citizens have, otherwise many will escape the law.	75.3	52.6	20	- 55	- 33
5. We might as well make up our minds that in order to make the world better, a lot of innocent people will have to suffer.	72.8	58.4	59	- 14	- 1
6.* Very few politicians have clean records, so one should not get excited about the mudslinging that sometimes takes place.	85.2	61.9	21	- 64	- 41
7. There are times when it almost seems better for the people to take the law into their own hands rather than wait for the machinery of government to act.	86.7	73.1	58	- 29	- 15
8. To bring about great changes for the benefit of mankind requires cruelty and even ruthlessness.	80.6	68.7	54	- 27	- 15
				Average Difference for All Items	
Average	77.4	61.2	42,5	- 35	- 19

cent respectively if we were to eliminate the responses to the first item dealing with commitment to the universal franchise on which, as we noted earlier, Malaysians are in wide agreement for special historical reasons.

The comparative results for Table 1 and Table 2 represent persuasive evidence for the formalism of democratic beliefs among this Malaysian elite. Democratic ideology has been absorbed in a highly selective fashion with its more prominent doctrines of free expression penetrating with much greater success than the somewhat more recondite canons of due process. A certain amount of formalism can be observed in both American samples too, but the degree of formalism in both these groups is so much smaller than for the Malaysians as to constitute a difference in kind as well as degree.

If we again refer to McClosky's 75 per cent consensus figure, the absolute levels of democratic responses among Malaysian bureaucrats have ominous implications. Only on the mass electorate issue do they achieve this figure, while for half of the eight items they do not even muster 30 per cent support for certain "rules of the game." Particularly when the problem centers on the standards of behavior applied to elected officials or "bending" the law, very few administrators rally to the defense of democratic norms. Bear in mind, for a moment, that the group we are examining is presumably one of the most important carriers of democratic ideology in the underdeveloped world. Surely, if the "rules of the game"

find so little patronage among these educated, Westernized power-holders, we can hardly be sanguine about the resources of democracy in a nation like Malaysia.

c. Political equality. Table 3 summarizes the comparative results of a series of statements which express scepticism about the civic qualifications of the electorate and imply elitism or authoritarianism as the way out. Here, too, the Malaysians are in each case less inclined to choose the democratic response than either the influentials or the electorate in America. The percentage points by which they fall short are, on the average, greater than for the free speech items but somewhat less than the wide gap on due process statements.

Even though the Malaysians are asked here to evaluate their national electorate which, in fact, is less sophisticated and literate than most Western voting publics, the low frequency of democratic responses is quite alarming. They choose the democratic alternative less than one third of the time on all but one of the four items and the overall average is less than 30 per cent. In the light of these results, their marked support for a universal franchise which we noted earlier must be based on sheer attachment to the principle rather than on any faith in their people's capacity for civic duties. More than two thirds of these civil servants appear to have little faith in the wisdom of the electorate to make the choices entrusted to it by popular government. It is

TABLE 3   POLITICAL EQUALITY

Items	% Choosing Democratic Alternative			% By Which Malaysians Less Democratic (-) or More Democratic (+) Than:	
	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate	Malaysian Civil Servants	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate
1. The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what's best for them.	59.2	42.0	22	- 37	- 20
2. It will always be necessary to have a few strong, capable people actually running everything.	51.5	43.8	39	- 13	- 5
3. Political "issues" and arguments are beyond the understanding of most of the voters.	62.5	37.7	26	- 36	- 12
4. Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run.	57.4	38.9	32	- 25	- 7
				Average Difference for All Items	
Average	56.1	40.6	29.8	- 27	- 11

some comfort to realize that their pessimism probably has a basis in reality, since it indicates that they have no illusions about the handicaps which a largely illiterate electorate imposes on a democracy. Nonetheless, this does not alter the fact that the Malaysians are more willing to entrust the political system to "a few strong, capable people" than either American group.

Some of the scepticism found here may hark back to evaluations of human nature. Items 1 and 4 imply that democracy is crippled by people's penchant to pursue their own short-run interests at the expense of the community and this is exactly the dominant view of human nature among our 17 administrators. This orientation may predispose them to hold a low opinion of the possibilities for a "civic culture" in their nation.

    d. Specific applications of free speech and procedural rights. Table 4 displays the summary findings for a number of statements in which support for free speech and due process are tested against other values. Respondents are asked if they favor the free expression of people who "don't know what they are talking about," whether due process should extend even to "dangerous enemies of the nation," and so on. The construction of these statements allows us to see how universal principles fare when they are taken from a largely rhetorical context and placed in a setting which demands the sacrifice of other valued goals. It is one thing for a man

TABLE 4   SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF FREE SPEECH AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

Items	% Choosing Democratic Alternative			% by Which Malaysians Less Democratic (-) or More Democratic (+) Than:	
	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate	Malaysian Civil Servants	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate
Freedom does not give anyone the right to teach foreign ideas in our schools.	54.5	43.3	48	- 6	+ 5
A book that contains wrong political views cannot be a good book and does not deserve to be published.	82.1	49.7	59	- 23	+ 9
If a person is convicted of a crime by use of evidence which is not legal, he should be set free and the evidence thrown out of court.	79.6	66.1	63	- 17	- 3
In dealing with dangerous enemies of the nation, we can't afford to depend on the courts, laws, and their slow unreliable methods.	92.6	74.5	32	- 61	- 42
When the country is in great danger, we may have to force people to do certain things against their will, even though it violates their rights.	71.5	63.7	14	- 57	- 50
A man ought not to be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he is talking about.	82.7	63.3	36	- 47	- 27
				Average Difference for All Items	
Average	77.2	60.1	42.0	- 35	- 18
Average without item 1	81.7	63.7	40.8	Without item 1 - 41	- 23

to be an "other things being equal" democrat but since, in the real world, democracy does imply that other goals are postponed or foregone, these items are a more realistic test of democratic beliefs.

As on the "Rules of the Game" items, Malaysians fall far below both American groups in their support for free expression and procedural rights. The average frequency with which they elect democratic alternatives is 18 percentage points below that of the American electorate and a full 35 points behind the level of American influentials. Averaging the frequencies of democratic choices over all six questions, Malaysian administrators fall well below the 50 per cent level (42 per cent).

While the level of democratic support among Malaysians is extremely low here, it would have been even lower if we had eliminated item 1 which has a very different meaning in the Malayan context. After all, the school system in Malaya was founded precisely to teach foreign ideas like science, geography, law, and medicine, and this is undoubtedly the reason why the Malaysian replies are comparatively more democratic on this item.[20] To object to foreign ideas in schools in Southeast Asia is tantamount to objecting to the educational system itself.[21] As low as they are, then, the Malaysian figures may have been overstated.[22]

The figures from Table 4 also offer persuasive evidence for formalism of democratic beliefs in free speech and

opinion. Items 1, 2, and 6 deal with specific applications
of this freedom and the average frequency of democratic
choices is only 48 per cent, while for the more rhetorical
statements of Table 1, the figure was 76 per cent. Fully 28
per cent of those who muster tropological support for free
speech seem willing to abandon their belief when they are
asked to make sacrifices to defend it. Many of democracy's
defenders desert when the assault on their position begins.[23]

If the belief in free speech were not formalistic, one
would expect some "carry-over" from rhetoric to application.
That is, those who support the principle of free expression
should, if this belief has "weight" and depth in their ideol-
ogy, be more supportive of the same principle in difficult
circumstances than those who do not seem committed to the
principle in the first place. In a rough way, we can test
for formalism by comparing the performance of individuals for
the items of Table 1 (Freedom of Speech and Opinion) with
their performance on the statements in Table 4 (Applications
of Free Speech and Procedural Rights).[24]

We can see quite clearly from Table 5 that there is no
relation between scores on the first set of items and scores
on the second set. Those who score high on general support
for free expression are no more likely to score high on the
specific applications than those who score low. There is no
evidence whatever that abstract affirmation of free speech
means anything in terms of defending these freedoms in diffi-

cult circumstances. This is the most persuasive indication thus far that democratic beliefs among Malaysian bureaucrats are formalistic and tend to crumble under pressure.[25]

TABLE 5

CORRELATION OF SCORES FOR FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OPINION WITH SCORES FOR SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF FREE SPEECH AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

		Specific Applications of Free Speech and Procedural Rights	
		Low Scorers	High Scorers
Freedom of Speech and Opinion:	Low Scorers	48.7% (19)	51.3% (20)
	High Scorers	52.6% (20)	47.4% (18)

The formalism of democratic beliefs apparent in our conversations with Malaysian government servants has been independently confirmed and further clarified by the results of the questionnaire administered to other bureaucrats outside this small sample. Not only do even the most celebrated principles of liberal democracy find less support among Malaysian administrators than among the U.S. electorate (not to mention U.S. influentials), but the gap increases dramatically when we move to democratic norms which are equally central although much less prominent in the public mind. Among the American groups too there is less support for due process

than for free speech (especially among the electorate). The
magnitude of the decrease, however, is much more striking
among the Malaysians. That democratic notions are largely
formalistic is further substantiated by the fact that those
who affirm democratic norms in the abstract abandon those be-
liefs in specific applications just as often as those who
lack even an abstract commitment. No bonds unite rhetoric
with practice. And, finally, when it comes to evaluating the
capacity of the masses to shoulder their democratic responsi-
bilities, the realities of their nation and their assumptions
about human nature appear to lead over two thirds of the Ma-
laysians to discount the ability of the populace to choose
wisely.

Manifest civic learning in the classroom or via the
mass media is apt to be, by itself, highly formalistic wheth-
er it occurs in the industrialized West or in transitional
settings. In stable, Western democracies, however, this man-
ifest socialization to democracy can draw on the capital of
small group experience, family training, tradition, and even
the desire to conform to popular norms. Set in this context,
manifest training is merely the visible greenery of a plant
which has sent deep tap roots into the cultural soil. When,
however, as in Malaysia, belief in liberal democratic norms
lacks this deep root system, it must instead depend on the
tenuous effectiveness of democratic government and manifest
political training. Without more substantial resources, dem-

ocratic beliefs remain peripheral; they do not run deep or
strong. Their formalism can be seen in sharp relief whenever
they come into conflict with central beliefs or value orien-
tations which are firmly embedded in the cultural tradition
and which imply quite different standards of justice, author-
ity, and freedom.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Lane, Political Ideology, op. cit., Chapter 22, pp. 346-363, and Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," pp. 206-261, in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964).

2. The terms are borrowed from Lane's Political Ideology, op. cit., p. 350.

3. For a searching discussion of Indonesia's quest for an ideology, see Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," pp. 47-76, in Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, op. cit.

4. This is less true for the more educated, younger administrators who more readily perceive impersonal, social forces. This variation is treated more fully in the Postscript to Chapter 9.

5. See Lane, Political Ideology, op. cit., p. 308, for a discussion of why personalization is dysfunctional for democracy.

6. For an example of the accommodation between traditional and modern medicine in Malaya, see Robert J. Wolff, "Modern Medicine and Traditional Culture: Confrontation on the Malay Peninsula," Human Organization, Vol. XXIV (Winter, 1965), pp. 339-345.

7. There is a little of the machismo pattern here. These men see themselves as autonomous and have a certain fear of appearing to be influenced or manipulated by others.

8. For evidence that this pattern is also characteristic of
    the American electorate see the paragraphs entitled
    "People who know a lot are often unpleasant" and "Knowl-
    edge taken seriously leads to controversy" in Lane's
    Political Ideology, op. cit., p. 366.

9. This measure is borrowed from Lane, ibid., p. 84. As we
    shall explain later, this measure is not entirely ade-
    quate for our purpose but it can serve as a first ap-
    proximation.

10. Ibid., p. 98.

11. Asked the identical question, three of Lane's fifteen
    respondents in Eastport, U.S.A., "argued for some kind
    of screening process to eliminate 'the ignorant and the
    careless.'"

12. Malaysian civil servants are, as a group, only slightly
    less tolerant of the confusions and delays of democracy
    (11 of 17 tolerant) than Lane's respondents (11 of 15
    tolerant).

13. Another, and much more speculative explanation for the
    general tolerance of the burdens of democracy might re-
    late back to their childhood training. Most of these
    men were pushed and ordered about by their fathers and,
    because they resented it, they want their children to
    make their own decisions without parental prodding or
    impositions. Similarly, in politics they do not want to
    force their views on others--nor do they want a leader

who will impose his views on them and reduce them to
simply obeying orders. Thus, the fact that these men
had authoritarian fathers may contribute to their sup-
port for a form of government where people do not get
pushed around or are expected to fall automatically in
line. The dynamics of this inter-generational psycholo-
gy are paradoxical since authoritarianism is generally
assumed to be transferred rather than extinguished from
one generation to the next. For a related argument
which supports this line of reasoning for the Indian in-
telligentsia, see Edward Shils, "The Intellectual Be-
tween Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation," in
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Supplement I
(The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1961), pp. 80-81.

14. Lane, Political Ideology, op. cit., p. 65.

15. It should be clear that we are not speaking of hypocrisy
in any sense. Hypocrisy implies conscious deception
while our use of formalism means only that certain be-
liefs are less important or influential than others with
which they clash.

16. American Political Science Review (June, 1964), pp. 361-
382. For a complete listing of the items which I have
borrowed, see Appendix B, Section B.

17. Not all of McClosky's questions were used for the Malay-
sian sample since some of them seemed too politically
sensitive and others were so redundant as to lengthen

the questionnaire unnecessarily.

18. Influentials comprise delegates and alternates to the Democratic and Republican conventions of 1956. In view of the lower response rate from Southern subjects, there is some indication that the level of democratic support from influentials is somewhat overstated. If so, the gap between Malaysian civil servants and American influentials is in fact smaller than these results imply.

19. The 75 per cent consensus level is an entirely arbitrary figure. Other levels might be chosen depending upon what research variables are being considered. Since consensus usually means more than 50 per cent agreement but less than 100 per cent unanimity, we have adopted McClosky's 75 per cent figure which falls midway between the two.

20. Calculating the comparative figures excluding item 1 leaves the Malaysians 23 percentage points behind the U.S. electorate and 41 points below the U.S. influentials figure.

21. Some of those who elect to disapprove of "foreign ideas" in schools may have in mind the recurring problem of communist influence in Chinese "middle" schools. This is the most obvious reason why some respondents would agree that "foreign" influence in the schools is to be condemned.

22. The Malaysian figures of item 2 may be similarly affected

since an enormously high respect for books per se developed under the colonial regime since they so often were the symbol of British rule, whether in the form of General Orders or the Bible.

23. Items 3, 4, and 5 concern specific applications of the "Rules of the Game" and the average frequency of democratic responses for these items is 36 per cent. This is only 6 per cent below the average figure for the due process statements in Table 2. The relatively small difference is due simply to the absence of even much formalistic support for due process, so that the dropoff from rhetoric to application is, of course, small.

24. The test is not ideal since Table 4 contains three items dealing with procedural rights rather than free speech. Nevertheless, if there were substantial "carry-over" the relationship should appear in spite of the dilution effects of the three procedural statements.

25. While democratic norms show little penetrative power, the socialist norm of economic equality has fared much better. On three items dealing with the responsibility of the state to provide a decent job, a decent house, and an adequate income to its people, the Malaysians score considerably higher than either American group. Only when they are asked "if there will always be poverty" do they reveal a fatalistic (zero-sum?) outlook.

CHAPTER 9

CYNICISM: THE TYRANNY OF THE WESTERN MODEL

All the men with whom I spoke had attended schools and universities patterned after the British model where they followed curricula identical to those in England, and where they learned Anglo-Saxon practices and values. Later they were recruited by Englishmen to serve in a British style administrative system. The standards and goals of this structure were, and still are in large measure, cast in an unmistakably English mold. Both in school and in the civil service their success was gauged by how well they had learned the lessons which England had sought to convey. Small wonder then that all of them came to by their Western (British) orientation honestly.[1] They are all the more Western oriented since their English education and high administrative posts are what set them apart from the general population and confer on them their status and prestige.

The maintenance of a Western orientation among higher civil servants is further encouraged by a political elite which is itself largely pro-British and committed to liberal democratic ideals. They do not experience the pressure for change which besets bureaucrats in nations which, like Indonesia, have experienced an intense revolutionary nationalism and have abandoned liberal democracy for more syncretic ideologies.

Out of this acculturation to the West has come the feeling that what is Western is superior to what is Asian (Malay, Indian, Chinese).[2] When they speak of the West, a vague tone of deference enters their voice; it is not the deference accorded to the sacred but rather a stance appropriate in the presence of someone of high position or achievement.

The importance of Western standards is especially evident when they speak of the Asians whom they most admire. With few exceptions, the men they cite are the highly Westernized Asians whom the West itself has honored. Sundram, for example, heard Nehru speak in Malaysia and especially admires him "because Nehru could use the English language better than most native Englishmen could use it." Nehru earns Sundram's plaudits for excelling by British standards—for beating the English at their own game: their language. Other civil servants have different heroes but, like Sundram, when they take the measure of a political figure, they judge

by the same standards they feel an Englishman would use.

Nowhere is the Western orientation of these 17 men more apparent than when they talk about their hopes for Malaysia's future. Modernization is irrevocably linked to Westernization in their minds and, indeed, they do not distinguish between these two distinct processes. With no detectable psychic hardship, they feel modernization will make their nation more like the West; the civic culture of a stable democracy is perceived to be every bit as modern as the steel mills or armies of technicians and engineers which characterize industrial states.

A. The Idealization of the Western Political Model

Malaysian administrators are committed, at the peripheral level, to the Western political model by their training and occupation. But the model they carry around in their minds reflects the conditions under which it was learned. It is an idealized model, both sketchy and incomplete, much like the model of the U.S. political system as it is conveyed to high school youths in America. The philosophical rationale for the system is there, so are the formal provisions for its operation--the great documents--and so too are the celebrated dramas of its finest moments. What is lacking, as we have noted, is the corrective of experience which could fill the gaps and put flesh (blemishes, scars, and all) on the statuesque conception of English democracy which they have ab-

sorbed.[3] Their abstract and highly idealized understanding of how Western parliamentary democracy actually operates is, to a social scientist's eyes, a Weberian "ideal type" which no reality has ever approximated.

As admirable as high standards are, they sometimes make life in the here and now difficult to swallow. Having civics textbook notions, particularly about how the British political system works, they cannot easily avoid becoming cynics when they look at their own polity. There is thus no place in their scheme of democracy for the organization of communal groups along racial lines which has taken place in Malaysia. It is taken as a great failure of Malaysian democracy that such groups should have arisen and most of these men feel that venal politicians are to blame. What they fail to recognize, since it clashes with their conception of the principled politics of democracy, is that most politicians in a democracy will appeal to whatever issues and identifications are most salient for their constituents.[4] They are driven to disappointment and cynicism because they had hoped the political elite would encourage broad civic views among the masses rather than the ethnic loyalties, pressure politics, and patronage which they see developing.[5] Such phenomena are not so discordant with the democratic beliefs of Englishmen or Americans, but there is no room for them in Western democracy as Malaysian civil servants conceive it. Political conflict, by their lights, should take place exclusively on

"classical" issues such as "workers' rights," "the defense of freedom," or "socialism" as they imagine it does in the West. When they see the traditionally oriented masses organizing with other goals in mind, they fear it signals the death of democracy rather than the beginning of the integration of these groups into a democratic framework.

The idealistic conception of Western democracy held by these civil servants is but a part of a broader pattern of selective acculturation to the West. What is learned from any new and dominant culture generally follows a distinguishable sequence. Limited new institutional and behavioral forms are likely to be transferred well before the central values which such forms represent.[6] Legal forms, for example, are adopted more easily and quickly than a more general belief in an institutional framework to protect citizens against the arbitrary acts of leaders.[7] For some time, then, constitutions are likely to acquire the properties of an amulet or charm which protect the wearer against "bad government" with little appreciation of the social values or structural restraints which make these guarantees effective. Legalism and constitutionalism are valued per se--as forms-- quite apart from their content.

Much the same pattern can be observed in the prevailing conception of Western technology and science as well. One economist, for example, has commented that non-Western elites often attribute quasi-sacral or magical qualities to

Western scientific techniques and expect them to provide so-
lutions for even the most intractable problems.[8] Five-year
plans in the non-West are often a case in point, as is the
fascination with "T.V.A.-like" structures that promise whol-
istic solutions to problems which must frequently be attacked
in a more selective fashion. Technical recommendations are
adopted in toto and the problem is henceforth considered
solved.[9]

We have perhaps overstated the pattern here, but the
purpose is merely to show that Western technology and legal
forms are subject to precisely the same selective, idealistic
distortion as are Western political forms. They are under-
stood formally but not contextually, and thus their formal
adoption is expected to confer the same beneficial results
which, it is imagined, followed their adoption in the West.
when they fail to flourish or work the miracles which are ex-
pected of them, the blame is laid to their new soil as often
as it is to a failure to understand the plants themselves.
Surely the soil is not all it could be, but the potential of
the plants has been grossly over-valued from the start.

When a newly acquired piece of machinery fails to live
up to its advance notices--to change the metaphor--there are
at least two options available to the person who acquired it.
He can conclude that the machine was no good in the first
place--that he made a mistake in ordering it--or that the op-
erators are not competent to make it work. When these admin-

istrators look at the operation of democracy in Malaysia they
feel it is not really working and are faced with a similar
choice. Either democracy is not quite the magnificent insti-
tution they had thought or else Malaysians are just incapable
of making it work.[10] If the first alternative is preferred,
it is likely to set off a search for some new political sys-
tem, either borrowed or syncretic—as in Burma—to replace
what has been rejected. Perhaps because they are more firmly
committed to Western forms, Malaysian civil servants elect
the latter course; they find the problem in the operators and
not in the machinery. The attractiveness of democracy is un-
diminished for them and they conclude that its marred success
is due to the shortcomings of the Malaysians themselves.

B. Cynicism in the Interviews

When we ask those we interviewed how Malaysians meas-
ure up to democratic ideals, most of them seem acutely con-
scious of how poorly their country compares to what they sur-
mise are Western political standards. For some, this is a
fact which they accept with only mild disappointment, but for
many others it evokes a strong cynicism.

After he has described the qualities of an ideal mem-
ber of parliament, Mr. Tay shakes his head vigorously when
asked how close Malaysian M.P.'s come to this ideal. "Not
like England," he says, "they just toe the party line, the
majority of them." Of course, most British M.P.'s toe the

line as well, but this is just the point. Mr. Tay supposes
that the British M.P. represents the interests of his con-
stituents at all times and goes against party policy whenever
his conscience commands. The average Malaysian M.P. appears
by contrast to be a spineless follower only because Mr. Tay
imagines that politics in England are conducted by men who
act on behalf of principles regardless of the cost.

Inche' Abu Bakar is somewhat more realistic about how
elected officials should ideally behave but his evaluation of
Malaysian politicians is no less unfavorable. He thinks an
M.P. should "try to reconciliate [sic] between what his elec-
torate requires and the party interests." Malaysia only
reaches the "fifty-fifty" level by this criterion since:

> Here they are interested more in staying in power than in
> a reconciliation between the two.

We are not, I think, reading too much into his state-
ment by suggesting that when he says "here" he is implying
that elsewhere M.P.'s may think more of principles and less
of "staying in power." Undoubtedly, "elsewhere" means the
West.

Others are more explicit than Inche' Abu Bakar. For
example, Mr. Khoo estimates whether Malaysian citizens ap-
proach the ideal by comparing them with what he assumes to be
the Western standard. Defining the good citizen as a patri-
ot, he says:

Among the newer nations they don't come up to the fifty

per cent level. They think of themselves first. In England and America they think more of the country---it takes the older nation to get the right person. [How about politicians?] Most of them never reach the fifty per cent line. You wonder why they should run for a post at all---they are hypocrites.

...ch of what Mr. Khoo says has some basis in fact, but he may well overestimate the gap between his nation and America or England because of the selective nature of his information about the West. He also proposes a theory, namely, that the are of a nation is what produces "citizen-patriots." Having a notion like this saves him from too much cynicism since he has traced a route by which Malaysia can eventually achieve western standards of citizenship.

Incbe' Mustapha, like Mr. Khoo, has a theory to explain why Malaysians do not meet Western political norms but his theory is more elaborate. His ideal citizen is one who fights for principle and accedes gracefully when he finds himself in the minority. Asked how Malaysians measure up to this ideal, he replies:

I think this sort of ideals [sic] are quite prevalent in developed countries---but in countries such as ours it will take time. There may be one or two such people now ---it will take time since democracy is new in this part of the world.

[And later] Not many [principled party members] in our country yet---because they don't have that real foundation of being independent. Once you have that spiritual

and financial independence, then you can have principles.
Here the cynicism has all but disappeared since Inche'
Mustapha feels he understands why Malaysians are inept at de-
mocracy now and how they might improve over time. His cogni-
tive grasp of the situation wards off cynicism but, unfortu-
nately, his perspective is comparatively rare in the sample.

Lacking Inche' Mustapha's perspective or optimism,
most of the others are disheartened and/or cynical about the
outlook for democracy in Malaysia. Mahalingam makes it clear
that his countrymen are at fault rather than the democratic
system:

> In this country, you know, we don't consider this country
> a democracy in the true sense. If the Tengku [the Prime
> Minister] puts up anyone, he will be elected. It would
> be very rare for him not to be elected. Where people are
> not ripe for it, there is no such thing as a democratic
> country. I always say we have curselves to blame---Brit-
> ain did a brilliant job---that's where maturity counts.

Mahalingam's program to reform Malaysia is much more radical
than any of the others would be willing to countenance. From
his secure armchair he calls for the destruction of the tra-
ditions and religious superstitions which burden his nation--
but this is only the posturing of a fertile imagination.
Nanalam, being less given to fantasy, seems to regard the
situation as irremediable and fears Malaysia will never ap-
proach Western standards.

[Ideal citizen?] The first thing is to---don't break any

laws of the country. This is the question of a law-
abiding citizen first and if you can do any good, for
heavens sake do it---and don't do any wrong. That state
will never come about but I would love to see it happen.
[How close do Malaysians come?] I doubt whether we'll
ever reach that stage---but I believe Switzerland is
quite a peaceful state.

Finally, when these men measure Malaysia against the West,
there is often the feeling that "the West is looking." They
are quick to admit the shortcomings for which they suspect
the West ridicules them. Inche' Zukifli is acutely embar-
rassed for his nation when Malay M.P.'s shout "Go to hell!"
to a prominent Chinese opposition figure.

What's the use---the whole world can see us and what we
do in our parliament. It's better just to walk off.

The Western orientation is so strong that there is a tendency
to view their own country's politics as they suppose the West
views it.[11] Such "goings on" could not possibly occur in the
London of graciousness and fair play about which they have
learned and it is taken as a mark of Malaysia's backwardness
that it should have occurred in Kuala Lumpur.

For most, then, there is little or no expectation of
substantial improvement and they are driven to a certain cyn-
icism about the operation of democracy in their nation.
Their cynicism is certainly based to some extent on an appre-
ciation of real differences; e.g., Malaysians are less in-
clined to accept political defeat with equanimity than Eng-

lishmen. In spite of these real differences however--and
this is the point--the ways in which they have learned about
the West have so distorted and idealized Western practices
that the gap they perceive is all out of proportion to these
real differences. Consequently, their cynicism is also
greater than what the actual differences along would merit
and must therefore be traced to the perceptual distortion en-
gendered by colonialism.

C. Cynicism in Questionnaire Results

We can make a rough estimate of the level of political
cynicism among Malaysian civil servants by comparing their
responses to those of Americans on a series of questions de-
signed to tap this attitude. Table 6 below summarizes the
results.

On all six items Malaysian administrators choose the
more cynical reply more frequently than either American group
and, on the average, their cynical response rate is well
over the 50 per cent level. This high level of cynicism is
all the more significant since they are an elite which, under
other circumstances, would be expected to constitute one of
the most allegiant groups in society. Instead, they seem to
have little faith in those who have been chosen to represent
the people and almost no expectation of a wider distribution
of political power (item 5). Their pattern of response thus
supports the conclusion that they trace the weakness of Ma-

TABLE 6   CYNICISM TOWARD GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Items	% Choosing Non-Cynical Alternative			% By Which Malaysians "More Cynical" (+) or "Less Cynical" (-) Than:	
	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate	Malaysian Civil Servants	U.S. Influentials	U.S. Electorate
There is practically no connection between what a politician says and what he will do once he gets elected.	78.6	46.0	44	+ 35	+ 2
I usually have confidence that the government will do what is right.	81.6	89.6	78	+ 4	+ 12
To me, most politicians don't seem to really mean what they say.	75.3	44.9	31	+ 44	+ 14
Most politicians are looking out for themselves above all else.	63.7	45.7	34	+ 30	+ 12
No matter what people think, a few people will always run things anyway.	70.0	46.2	17	+ 53	+ 29
Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country.	77.1	58.9	51	+ 26	+ 8
				Average Difference for All Items	
Average	74.4	55.2	42.5	+ 32	+ 13

laysia's political system to the quality of its managers rather than to flaws in the machinery itself.

The belief that the politicians are not capable of making democracy work in Malaysia is closely connected with the conviction that the people as a whole are unsuited to the burdens which democracy places on their shoulders. This connection is strikingly borne out by the correlation between scores on "Political Equality" items (items which, for the most part, focus on the capacity of the people to understand issues and choose wisely) and scores on "Political Cynicism." See Table 7.

TABLE 7

CORRELATION OF SCORES FOR "POLITICAL EQUALITY" WITH
SCORES FOR CYNICISM TOWARD GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

		Political Cynicism	
		High in Cynicism	Low in Cynicism
Political Equality	Low Support for Political Equality	76.3% (29)	23.7% (9)
	High Support for Political Equality	20.9% (9)	79.1% (34)

chi^2 = 47.52 with 1df $p < .001$

The link between these two variables is quite a strong one. Cynicism about politicians and government is associated closely with cynicism about the capacity of the people for

democratic self-rule. We are not arguing that there is a causal sequence between the two but simply that both are part of a broader pessimism concerning the operation of democracy in Malaysia. The commitment to democratic forms endures but the hope that Malaysians can now, or even in the future, make a success of the system is largely absent.

A certain pessimism about how well democracy works in new nations is probably common to most Westernized, postcolonial elites. We have argued that this pessimism has at least three distinguishable sources. First, the prevailing assumptions about human nature and the environment do not lead these men to expect the civic, tolerant, compromising citizens who contribute to a democratic polity. Second, their pessimism is also based on experiential factors. The widespread illiteracy, primordial ties, and social distrust which characterize most new nations have in fact impeded the growth of a civic culture and all of the men are painfully aware of these handicaps. Finally, the over-idealization of the Western democratic model, particularly among Westernized elites, has vastly intensified the painfulness of these shortcomings and thus contributed to the widespread growth of cynicism about the "democratic potential" of both leaders and masses.

The cumulative product of all three factors is a kind of political alienation. Now, alienation has generally re-

ferred to the feeling that the government is run unfairly for others, and by others. A person is alienated from the polity when he says, "I am the object of political life . . . 'they' do not care about me . . . the rules of the game are unfair, loaded, illegitimate."[12] But the alienation we have found is of a different variety. It is based partly on utopian expectations about the operation of liberal democracy which are in turn created by the process of selective learning inherent in the colonial situation. This is the tyranny of the idealized Western model which regards much of the ordinary cut and thrust of politics an illegitimate and unworthy; which admits only politicians who carry their consciences on their sleeves; and which expects the masses to organize around the banners of great principles. The pursuit of such a visionary chimera is this is bound to produce cynicism when it runs against democratic politics in the real world.

On the one hand, these government servants are committed to a set of democratic norms, however distorted, and on the other hand they believe that the people and politicians of Malaysia are incapable of making the system work as they think it should. Supporting a form of government that one feels is not functioning well seems an unstable situation in the long run since it creates cognitive dissonance. Such dissonance is almost certainly the central dilemma of most democrats in new nations.

This dilemma could be resolved in a number of ways:

democracy could be redefined so that it coincides with what is actually happening in Malaysia or "what is actually happening" could be distorted so that it approximated their conception of democracy. The solution of Malaysian administrators combines some of both alternatives. We shall argue in the next chapter that they are predisposed to an elitist-tutelary democracy solution by their training, by cultural tradition, and, above all, by the realities of post-colonial Malaysia.

FOOTNOTES

1. We are speaking, of course, of a peripheral orientation.

2. Research among students in East Africa has provided strong evidence for the proposition that "The more acculturated identify themselves more closely with the representatives of the new culture than do the less acculturated and are more ready to view them as superior or dominant." Leonard H. and Mary B. Ainsworth, "Acculturation in East Africa," The Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 57 (1962), pp. 931-935.

3. Of course, they are aware of the "bad" policies Britain has followed from time to time but this awareness is not the same as an understanding of how British politics actually works.

4. Byron Weiner says much the same of Indian senior officials in his Politics of Scarcity, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

5. These men have ethnic political loyalties too but they are always cast in terms of wider issues such as economic equality, political rights, etc.

6. Doob, op. cit., p. 166.

7. Most of the 17 civil servants express a preference for a "government of men rather than a government of laws" since men are "more flexible" and "more humane" than rigid legal principles which often fail to place equity in a broader context. And yet they all seem devoted to "legalism" when it is considered by itself.

8. Hirschman, op. cit., Chapters 1-3.

9. For a detailed description of how this has occurred in Burma see Louis J. Walinsky's Economic Development in Burma: 1951-60 (New York: 20th Century Fund, 1962).

10. Some combination of each is, of course, equally possible.

11. By far the most impressive discussion of the psychological effects of colonialism which lie behind this attitude is O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonialism, op. cit.

12. Lane, Political Ideology, op. cit., p. 162.

CHAPTER 10

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

In the first portion of this study we traced the con-
sequences for political beliefs of certain basic value orien-
tations. These orientations embrace assumptions about envi-
ronment and about human nature which seriously undermine the
cooperative, civic styles necessary, particularly among
elites, to sustain a democratic polity. The tenuousness of
democratic beliefs is all the more apparent from question-
naire results which show that the overall strength of demo-
cratic beliefs is comparatively low, that democratic beliefs
tend to be formalistic, and finally that cynicism regarding
popular government is widespread.

We have seen that the slender commitment to democratic
norms which does exist among Malaysian civil servants re-
ceives scant reinforcement from the patterns of primary or
secondary socialization, but must instead depend largely on

manifest political training and a continuing satisfaction with the effectiveness of a democratic regime. When we discussed secondary socialization previously, however, our attention was centered on the nature of educational experience and participation in voluntary organizations. What we have thus far neglected is the considerable influence of these men's occupational lives on their political beliefs. This chapter, then, is devoted to an examination of the "civil service experience" as it affects political ideology.

Analyzing the administrative life of these men requires that we narrow our focus somewhat from the broader phenomena we considered earlier. Unlike basic value orientations which form part of a broad cultural pattern, or even educational patterns which are at least shared by the entire Westernized elite, the occupational experience of these men is characteristic of only one sector of this Westernized elite. And, as we narrow the focus, we similarly forfeit some of our capacity to generalize our findings to groups outside the administrative cadre. In spite of this stricture, however, the civil service experience does have limited applicability to Westernized politicians in Malaysia. Many now prominent politicians began their careers as civil servants and left only on the eve of independence. In 1963, for example, 50 per cent of the Alliance Party's Cabinet were one-time members of the administrative corps.[1] This situation is also typical of much of the elite in nations such as

India which have acceded to independence without revolution-
ary upheavals. The bureaucratic experiences which we shall
describe are thus part of the heritage of the political elite
as well as the bureaucratic elite in a good many new nations.

If the nature of colonial education contributed to a
certain distortion of the Western political model, the nature
of colonial administration introduced peculiar distortions of
its own. We shall suggest that it gave rise to a preference
for paternalistic, administrative rule which was then rein-
forced both by the actual gap between the Westernized elite
and the masses, and by the virtual bureaucratic monopoly of
knowledge and skills.

A. The Impact of Colonial Administration

1. The Colony as an Administrative State

To speak of the administrative experience of these men
is to speak of the colonial administration for, with few ex-
ceptions, they were trained by and served under the colonial
regime.

Like the more celebrated Indian Civil Service, the Ma-
layan Civil Service (MCS) was the elite corps of administra-
tors which ruled its portion of the vast Empire encumbered
only by occasional intervention from the Colonial Office.
Much as the Jesuits in Paraguay, the MCS saw itself as a
philosopher-king entrusted with the instruction and elevation
of the colonial peoples. Initially, the MCS was inspired by

the dynamic and revolutionary creed of imperialism but later, in the period which concerns us, the creed had perished under the blows of World War I, colonial scandals, and, most important, the loss of faith in Britain's natural right to rule. With some notable exceptions, from 1900 on, racial barriers grew apace and the motives of financial reward and social mobility largely replaced the missionary fervor of the Victorian era.[2] By the time the first of our sample joins the colonial administrative elite in 1926, it is already an entrenched, conservative ruling class more concerned with protecting its status and privileges than with transforming the colony. Emphasis on law and order and the perquisites of power rather than development or sense of mission thus dominated the atmosphere of 20th century colonialism into which these men were incorporated.

Two other aspects of colonial administration are important in assessing its influence on political ideology. First, the bureaucracy itself embodied not only the executive functions of the state but many of the legislative and judicial functions as well. The bureaucratization of the regime tended to routinize political decisions--to divert what would have otherwise been political clashes into questions of legal authority and the interpretation of regulations. This is not to say that politics was eliminated--for there were important decisions to be made. But since the colonial regime rested ultimately on force and not popularity, appeals to popular

passions were unnecessary and politics became an integral part of bureaucratic in-fighting. The point here is simply that politics was confined almost exclusively to the administrative apparatus of an essentially authoritarian state. In this context, the question of what the people wanted was superceded by the question of what was best for them as determined by their rulers.

The absence of normal political life in the colony was, of course, justified by the belief that an enlightened administration could rule more in the people's ultimate interests than could a fully indigenous regime. The agent par excellence of this enlightened rule was the all-powerful District Officer. Aubrey Menen was not entirely facetious when, in his novel The Prevalence of Witches, he has Catallus remark after being posted as a District Officer in North India:

I came up to Limbo because I had always wanted to possess a country of my own.[3]

The District Officer was indeed a virtual ruler in the often substantial territory under his jurisdiction and, to the colonized population at least, he was the very symbol of British rule. He was responsible for collecting taxes, settling disputes, providing land titles, promoting the welfare of his district and, most important, preserving law and order. The high status and great satisfactions afforded this representative of the Empire were such that many who advanced later to high posts in the capital city recalled district

work with great nostalgia as the most gratifying of their careers. It was scarcely surprising that the English youth fresh from a public school, whose conscious function was to train the ruling class, should be awed by the experience of actually ruling over a district of perhaps a hundred thousand souls on his first assignment. District work was preferred often to staff work largely because it offered the satisfactions of personal rule. The directness of district life-- riding into a kampong to receive reports from the elders, try criminal cases, and settle civil disputes on the spot--provided the deference and feel of power which policy-making in the capital could never match.[4]

If serving as District Officer was an awesome experience for the Englishman, it made just as indelible an impression on Malaysians who saw the D. O. on his rounds. Inche' Ja-afar, asked about his childhood ambitions, recalls above all the D. O.

My impression in those days---the most important man in the world was the District Officer. He was the personification of law and order---of right and wrong---an upright man. It was only later that I discovered there were others. And my ambition in childhood was always to become a D. O. and go to England.

Inche' Ja'afar's experience is fairly typical among our sample. Most of the others first knew colonial rule through the personage of the District Officer and to become a D. O. was a common ambition among them. It was particularly

the kingly or praetorian ethos of district rule which made such a lasting impression and captured their imagination. And, for many of them, the ambition was eventually fulfilled. What is more, the office did not tarnish in the process for, with few exceptions, they still look on district work as more satisfying than other posts in the administration.

In summary, then, we can enumerate the following aspects of colonial administration which--as they were experienced by these men--seem to be most relevant for the political beliefs we shall discuss shortly.

1. Initiation into a ruling elite concerned with law and order before development and intensely protective (in the trade union sense) of its own status and privileges.
2. An experience of--and in many cases a participation in--a form of authoritarian rule where the desires of the governed were less important than the judgments of the ruling class.
3. An experience of administrative rule free from popular control and political pressure, with political decisions falling within the confines of the administrative structure.
4. An experience of direct, personal rule as a District Officer.

In looking over these aspects of colonial rule one is struck by the extent to which British colonialism and traditional rule share common traits. To be sure, the legal structure is new and so is the rational, secular basis of decision making, but in other respects the similarity is impressive. Both colonial and traditional politics limit popular participation, both are ruled by individuals or a class which believes in its right to rule by virtue of superior qualities, and both are concerned more with the preservation

of an orderly status quo than with social change. Without overlooking the important differences--especially the fact that colonial rule is foreign rule--we would like to suggest that the style of colonial rule is perhaps more akin to traditional rule than is popular democracy. Thus, while rejecting its foreignness, the acceptance of the pattern of colonial rule may have demanded less of a change in central values than the acceptance of the pattern of liberal democracy. When we speak later, then, of the attractiveness of administrative rule for these men, we should bear in mind that its appeal may stem from its resemblance to traditional government as well as from acceptance of the colonial pattern per se.[5]

2. The Ideological Deposit of Colonial Rule

The ideal relationship between the people and their leaders, as these men see it, does not differ in many respects from the colonial pattern. That is: they envision a class of people who "know best" and expect to rule in the interests of the people. Like the colonial system where a small number of relatively highly educated officials were placed in authority or, for that matter, the pre-colonial system of rule by a traditional elite, a small group is expected to rule independently of popular desires by virtue of its superior qualifications.These men would encourage in the masses the traditional belief that this natural elite is best fitted to direct the nation and that only harm could come

from following popular whims.

a. The citizen as a subject. In the paternalistic but authoritarian state these civil servants visualize, the functions of the mass of citizens are quite limited. Having little part in the selection of leaders or the choice of policies, they are expected quite simply to "stay in line" and follow the instructions of the ruling elite. When these men speak of the "ideal citizen in a democracy," the qualities they mention most frequently are loyalty, respect for law, and obedience. These are the qualities of the ideal "subject" as opposed to the "citizen/participant" qualities of voting, discussing issues, or fulfilling civic obligations.[6] What is required is the passive, compliant subject rather than the active participant who seeks an independent voice, however modest, in political life.

The emphasis on "subject" qualities is prominent throughout the interviews. When Kamalam, whose comment we cited earlier, was asked what the ideal citizen in a democracy should do, he replied:

The first thing to do---don't break any laws of the country. This is the question of the law-abiding citizen first. If you can do any good, for heavens sake do it--- and don't do any wrong.

Kamalam's ideal citizen should "do good" when he can, but obeying the law is clearly the most important and explicit obligation of citizenship. By comparison, Inche' Abu Bakar's

description of the ideal citizen in a democracy is even more restrictive.

> I think he should obey whatever rules there are and keeping [sic] away from mischief.

Once Inche' Abu Bakar has finished his sentence there is nothing more to say. Following the rules and "keeping away from mischief" completely exhaust the functions of citizenship for him. When we turn to Inche' Zukifli and ask the same question, however, the parallel between the traditional pattern and what he desires of the citizen becomes all but explicit.

> We are now in the democratic world---well if the citizen ---if they just behave like the Tengku [the present Prime Minister] or do what he says, there'll be no trouble. There's trouble because the Tengku says one thing and they do another. They are not patient. The Tengku, though, he believes in God, he is patient---but modern people, they're too impatient.

"Trouble" comes from being impatient and not following the instructions of the leader. The ideal citizen, Inche' Zukifli implies, was much more prevalent in traditional society than in the post-colonial Malaysia he now knows.

Except where the context makes it explicit, as in Inche' Zukifli's case, it is hard to tell whether the subject qualities desired of citizens flow from a desire to re-establish traditional norms or a desire to retain colonial patterns. The difficulty, as we explained, arises because in

both traditional and colonial rule, the citizen is expected to comply with political legislation rather than to help initiate it. That is, the masses in both systems are expected to acquiesce to a purely subject role and not pressure or criticize their rulers.

If the impression were given that these men were traditional--or colonial--in most other respects, we would do them a disservice. For the most part, they see and applaud the steady expansion of education, the growth of industry, etc. But when it comes to changing the relationship between ruler and ruled, they are much less sanguine. A majority of those who realize that the broad changes sweeping Malaysia will foster the growth of political groups and create more demands for participation are distressed, for they see the ideal citizen as a law-abiding follower of the rulers in an administrative state.[7]

b. The obligations of parental rulers. While the people continue as subjects, their leaders are to be paternalistic in the sense that they govern in the ultimate best interests of their clients. Our use of the term "paternalism" embraces not only paternal discipline but also the maternal functions of protection and support. There is little need to dwell on the former since the preference for firm rule to prevent people from acting against the community interests was treated in some detail earlier. Only the cajoling and threats of a strong leader can, as these men see it,

persuade citizens to cease taking advantage of their fellows.
The maternal functions may be less prominent but they are
nonetheless important in the full conception of paternal
rule.

When Jeganathan talks of the duties of the Prime Min-
ister, the protective aspect of paternal rule stands out most
clearly:

Of course the Prime Minister is worried about the Defense
Pact [with Great Britain]. Even though he has his minis-
ters, he is the grandfather of everything. With our
Prime Minister, everyone knows they can go to him and get
redress---the way it should be. The people have so much
confidence in him---it is like hero worship.

The Prime Minister, as the "grandfather of everything," lis-
tens to the grievances of his people and helps when he can.
One may look on grievance procedures of this sort as the only
acceptable form of political expression in traditional or co-
lonial regimes. In neither are popular demands or protests
sanctioned before decisions are made, but the door is always
open to those who seek redress for the consequences of state
action. Both the Malay sultan and the colonial D. O. are so-
licitous of the people who gather each morning to await an
audience in hopes of redress or assistance. The request for
action takes the form of a personal and humble appeal, never
a political demand or threat.

Aside from being accessible to personal laments, the
paternalistic ruler also sponsors events which both express

his support for traditional values and strengthen the bonds
between him and his people. It is this function which Inche'
Nordin appears to have in mind when he is asked whether the
general public takes enough interest in the activities of
government. He answers:

> I think it is anyway a policy of the government. It's
> official routine. We have a Koran contest and the angle
> is for religious people to come forward. And we have
> games and the angle is for sportsmen to come forward.
> And then we have festivals to encourage people to be cau-
> tious [sic] and conscious and everything.

An Englishman asked the same question might well cite wider
popular knowledge of government decisions, but Inche' Nordin
chooses to focus on the activities of government which are
less manifestly political. Here is the participation without
control which characterizes traditional rule and, to a great
extent, colonial rule as well.

    c. The style of popular participation. Paternalistic
rule requires that citizens remain subjects and emphasizes
the firmness and discipline exercised by the ruler. But as
we have seen, it does leave room for some popular influence
and participation. The form which popular participation
takes, however, is quite in keeping with paternal rule, in
that it either offers largely symbolic rewards or places the
citizen in the role of supplicant.

    Most of the civil servants interviewed consider the

representations of the public in much the same light as would
a traditional or colonial regime. That is, humble requests
are entirely appropriate, while popular demands or demonstra-
tions are not considered legitimate means of influencing poli-
cy.[8] The status relationship seems important here since ap-
peals and requests imply that one is addressing a superior
while demands are more often addressed to equals or inferi-
ors. When these men talk of their dealings with the public
it becomes clear that they are more sympathetic to the ap-
peals of the humble subject than to the demands of the citi-
zen. Inche' Mustapha is typical in this respect when he ex-
plains the dilemma of not being able to meet a client's
request.

> There are several types of people. It's easier for me to
> deal with rural people---they are simple and, if I ex-
> plain clearly, they are satisfied.

Like the others, Inche' Mustapha prefers kampong folk because
they are more docile and more easily satisfied than urban resi-
dents. He finds the traditional/colonial relationship easier
to handle than one between civic equals.

There is another factor at work here aside from the
general preference for paternalistic rule. A relationship of
equality between bureaucrats and clients might, they feel,
jeopardize the impartiality of the civil service and open the
door to corruption. As Inche' Ja'afar says when asked whether
the public thinks the civil servant is difficult to approach:

As a matter of fact, in certain spheres you discourage being approached. In the legal and defense spheres, for example, someone may walk in with fruit to the magistrate's house---although that's rare---and you may have to throw him out. Based on that, it may seem we are not approachable---but we are trying to be just and not be accessible to parties.

Mr. Khoo echoes these sentiments in explaining why some people might fear civil servants.

The kampong people fear the civil servant because people in the kampong know that civil servants are incorruptible. But the man on the street doesn't think so.

The implication of what both men say is that impartiality becomes impossible unless the client retains some fear of the bureaucrat who, for his part, remains aloof and relatively inaccessible. Under colonialism it was easy for the British to maintain this social distance between rulers and ruled by virtue of their foreignness but, for Malaysian civil servants, a special effort is necessary because of their very closeness to the culture. As Braibanti has written, the bureaucrat in a new nation must "exaggerate the drama of his detachment" in order to shield himself from the claims of kinship and ethnic group which permeate his society. ". . . the mere posture of familiarity inevitably creates a reputation for partiality which leads to actual partiality."[9]

The marked preference for a non-egalitarian relationship with clients---the rejection of demands in contrast to

appeals--and the social distance which this implies can thus be viewed from two angles. On the one hand it maintains a pattern common to both traditional and colonial societies, and on the other it serves to insulate the civil servant from particularistic pressures, thus retaining the impartiality of colonial administration.

d. Alienation from popular democracy. From what we now know about these men's beliefs, it is hardly surprising that a good portion of them are alienated from democracy as it is now practiced in Malaysia. Both their expectations and their preferences conspire to produce this alienation.

First, their abstract, idealized conception of democracy--"the politics of principles," civic mindedness, and enlightened leadership--was bound to fare poorly when measured against even the relatively successful democracy of their own nation. Important as it is, we should not overemphasize the alienation-producing effects of this distortion of the Western model, since the actual commitment to democratic norms among Malaysian civil servants is not particularly high, nor is their faith in the capacities of the masses for self-rule.

This brings us to the second and more crucial distortion of the Western model in the direction of a paternalistic administrative state guided by a qualified elite with the acquiescence of a deferential population. While there is an apparent conflict between this distortion toward paternalism and the idealized understanding of Western democracy, it is

not a conflict which is consciously perceived. In fact, these men hoped that within a democratic framework the population would see that it needed the guidance of the Westernized elite and would thus give this elite their full backing to govern in the best interests of the nation. Such a solution would have allowed a form of rule patterned closely on the traditional/colonial model, but with the consent of the governed as democracy required.

As it has turned out, however, they could not have their cake and eat it too. Democracy in Malaysia has meant the rise of less Westernized politicians, appeals to popular passions, the politicization of primordial groupings, and the race for spoils. Given their restricted conception of democracy, what is occurring seems but a crude caricature of what a democratic polity should be and cannot but lead to disillusionment. In particular, though, it is the decline of respect and deference due the rulers which creates much of the distaste for political life in the new Malaysia. Inche' Nordin expresses his unhappiness over the new arrangement quite explicitly:

> [Do people _fear_ civil servants?] No, it's unlike before.
> Before the war there was good _respect_, but now it's
> changed. They say you have two eyes and I have two eyes.
> They're even fighting for equality now---there's some
> women in the Parliament and before the war no women would
> come forward. Before the war they had their own self-
> respect. They lost their self-respect. They think 'you

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do harm to me and I'll do it to you.'

[Civil servants difficult to approach?] A few, but not many---unlike before. Now everybody is conscious. You're equal no matter what your job. A farmer, since he makes good money, thinks he's equal to the District Officer and says, 'I don't respect you.'

Others put it somewhat differently but, for the most part, their sentiments are the same. Democracy as it functions in Malaysia neither measures up to their image of Western democracy nor does it retain enough of a paternalistic, noblesse oblige cast to suit their preferences. Instead of general popular acceptance and support for rule by the Westernized elite, they see the beginnings of a revolution of political equality which, as we noted in the previous chapter, they reject. Instead of harmony they hear the din of factions engaged in petty bickering. Instead of political principles and honor, they see appeals to primordial sentiments and increasing corruption.

Part of their disillusionment is assuredly traceable to the nature of the colonial education system which promoted a conception of democracy completely torn from its moorings in reality. But, for the most part, their alienation from Malaysia's political life stems from a predisposition for paternalistic rule on the traditional pattern--a predisposition which was strongly reinforced by their experience in a colonial bureaucracy that, particularly in the prewar period, was as strongly elitist and paternal as traditional regimes.

They had hoped that, after the colonial rulers were thrown out, the new, Westernized, indigenous elite could continue to rule in much the same manner with the approval of the masses —a local, popular paternalism to replace a foreign, unpopular paternalism. They were poorly prepared for the fundamental flaw in the relationship between the rulers and the ruled which has begun to develop since independence; it has left them alienated from the very political system in which they still exercise great power.

e. Status decline and attitudes toward politicians. Our attention has been thus far focused on the style of rule by colonial bureaucracy and its effects on political beliefs. But the evaluation of a political system is seldom separable from attitudes toward those who are "in charge" of the system. To complete our picture of how Malaysian administrators view the political life of their nation we must know not only what they think of their political system, but what they think of their politicians as well.

The view of politicians among these men is colored strongly by the fact that in Malaysia, as in all new nations, administrators have suffered a decline in status vis-a-vis politicians. Before independence, bureaucrats were the rulers, but there is now a new class of politicians whose decisions they must implement. They find themselves reduced from the status of rulers to the position of public servants who must bow to the authority of elected ministers. Whereas they

once both made policy and executed it, they have lost much of the policy-making role to an elected elite. Most of the administrators resent this loss of power. Mr. Lim, for example, laments the subservience of the civil service to politicians when he is asked which group is most important in national development.

> This is---politics do come in here. The civil service will have to depend on the politicians. They will have to play the tune of the politicians---unfortunately, I should say.

While the loss of power is regrettable to most, the loss of status and prestige seems to be much more prominent. No longer must the citizen look exclusively to civil servants to redress grievances, for he has acquired a new ally whom he can enlist to bring pressure on the administration. These administrators are painfully aware that the power of politicians has reduced their status in the eyes of the people.[10]

As Inche' Mustapha replies when asked what the 'man in the street' thinks of the civil servant:

> They say they are paid too highly and work too little. But there has been a change of attitude recently---even among the Malay community. In those days when you were in the government service you were very powerful---and now there's a more powerful man---like the minister whom you can approach. So government service is not so highly graded as before.

Thus while these civil servants see the politician as

a self-seeker par excellence because of their general beliefs
about human nature, they also harbor a more specific animus
against politicians for robbing them of the prestige they en-
joyed before independence.

Much of their criticism of politicians reflects quite
clearly the basis on which they feel qualified to rule them-
selves. It is their education and Westernization which en-
abled them to rise in the colonial administration and which
they find sadly lacking among the new politicians. They as-
sume that Western education—which was the justification of
colonial rule—is also the attribute that should qualify one
for rule in the post-colonial society. The politicians as a
group are thus denigrated for their relative illiteracy,
their inability to speak English, and their failure to pass
their Senior Cambridge Exams.[11]

This generally low view of politicians would be of
little note were it not for the fact that it further contrib-
utes to a vague feeling that democracy has failed in Malay-
sia. The colonial bureaucratic experience of administrators,
and their preference for rule by an intellectual elite, make
it impossible for them to have confidence in the ability of a
less educated, less experienced body of politicians to suc-
cessfully guide the nation. And what are they to think of a
political system which through elections has cast up a new
political elite so manifestly less qualified than they to
rule in the public's best interest? Never very strong to be-

gin with, their belief in democracy is further undermined by
the politicians it has produced as well as by the rise of
communal, particularistic politics.

B. The Post-Colonial Basis for Paternal Rule

The nature of colonial rule, as we have examined it,
has tended to create a predisposition to paternal-administra-
tive rule on the part of these civil servants. What has not
been explained sufficiently, however, is how this preference
has survived to the present amidst the spread of democratic
beliefs, nationalist populism, etc. The influence of coloni-
al administration and traditional patterns may well account
for the sources of the preference for paternal rule, but does
not explain its persistence in post-colonial Malaysia.

In keeping with our approach to political beliefs
throughout this study, we hope to show that the inclination
to paternal-authoritarian government has a basis in the real-
ities of the environment; that, like the "constant-pie" ori-
entation, it represents a more or less rational adjustment to
actual conditions. Political beliefs which feed on these
conditions must, of course, meet the psychological needs of
their supporters. Pye realizes this when he sensitively
analyzes the colonial socialization of Burmese administra-
tors, their feeling of being abandoned by the British, and
their consequent alienation from the new political life of
Burma. What he overlooks, however, is the fact that the

hankering for paternal rule on the colonial model, like any
belief, contains certain assumptions about the environment.
And if these assumptions fail significantly to match reality,
the belief must eventually change or it will perish. The
failure of communism in England or the United States, for ex-
ample, has undoubtedly a great deal to do with the failure of
its assumptions to match realities as they were experienced
by most people.

The durability of the belief in paternal/authoritarian
rule can, we feel, be explained by the fact that its implicit
assumptions about reality conform substantially to realities
in Malaysia--or in other new nations for that matter. In
brief, the relative power of the bureaucracy, the political
leadership which it actually provides, its domination of vol-
untary organizations, and, finally, the very real danger of
national disintegration; all provide an impressive basis for
a belief in elite rule. We shall treat each in turn below.

1. The Resources of the Bureaucracy

Although the administrative structure in Malaysia no
longer enjoys its complete, pre-colonial monopoly of power,
it nonetheless represents the largest, most cohesive elite
group in the nation. The competing political and commercial
elites are neither as well organized nor as experienced in
the exercise of power.

Fritz Morstein Marx, writing about the role of the
bureaucracy in the political development of the West, empha-

uses that:

> It had the triple advantage of greater intellectual re-
> sources, elevated social status, and close identification
> with the government.[12]

All three criteria apply equally well to Malaysia as to the
West. As far as "intellectual resources" are concerned, the
general level of education and special skills is far higher
among the administrative elite than in any competing elites.
Only at the Cabinet level do the educational qualifications
of politicians approach that of the higher civil service.

The social status of the bureaucracy is similarly
high. As much as the men interviewed may grumble about the
new status of politicians, the civil service remains the
group which makes most of the decisions which directly affect
the citizenry and, although recourse to political influence
is now possible in the event of a rebuff, most of the popula-
tion still looks to civil servants for assistance and advice.
In part, this is because the structures which might influence
legislation before it is passed are still weak in Malaysia
and it is only at the enforcement stage that individuals can
affect government policy. Influence before bills are passed
means dealing with politicians; influence over enforcement
requires appeals to the civil servant. Not only must the
general population influence policy via the administrative
route, but politicians themselves find they must rely on ad-
ministrators to draw up legislation, formulate development

plans, etc.[13] Both the location of the bureaucracy in the power structure and its intellectual resources thus serve to enhance the bureaucrat's status in the eyes of both the masses and other elites.

Still another factor greatly enhances the prestige of the administrative elite. The domain of government, until recently at least, has been the domain of the English language and there has thus been "a positive correlation between skill in spoken English and status in the eyes of the vernacular speaking public."[14] The civil servants' command of English, which is at the same time the badge of their education, makes them the interpreters of the mysteries of English law and regulations to the unschooled masses and contributes to the great prestige they enjoy.

Not only does the Malaysian civil service benefit from 'greater intellectual resources" and "elevated social status" which Fritz Morstein Marx ascribes to Western bureaucracies, but it is also, in his terms, "closely identified with government." Given the similarity in social backgrounds of politicians and administrators, and in the absence of a sharp division between them on policy matters, the administrative corps has retained a great deal of its power: and enjoys the confidence of the political elite.

The resources of the bureaucracy are impressive whether we measure by its expertise, its status, or its share of decision-making power. By and large, it has lost little of

the resources or the authority it exercised under the coloni-
al regime. Competing elites have yet to greatly dilute its
power. That is to say, its position as an educated, experi-
enced ruling elite has not been seriously undermined in post-
independence Malaysia. If higher civil servants see them-
selves as a paternal ruling group, they do not greatly distort
reality.

Bureaucratic Leadership and Initiative

The power of the bureaucracy in Malaysia is not at all
confined to its administrative role but extends, as well, in-
to most voluntary associations and interest groups. A good
many of the interest groups in the nation were established by
administrative initiative and their leadership is often com-
posed largely of serving or retired civil servants. This
pattern is most striking in the rural Malay areas, but is
widespread in urban centers as well.

The bureaucratic domination of non-governmental groups
has maintained a pattern characteristic of the colonial re-
gime and has seriously retarded the growth of truly autono-
mous power centers. What develops is politicization without
democratic control since representatives of the government,
in their capacities as officers of these groups, are playing
a major role in the formulation of demands and appeals to the
authorities.[15] Popular participation in these organizations
is encouraged, but popular control over national policy is
not encouraged--the function of these organizations, as the

ruling elite sees it, is to generate support for the govern-
ment's program rather than to create new demands and claims
on the nation's resources.

The officers of school boards, religious committees,
sporting associations, and charitable groups are drawn heavi-
ly from the ranks of the civil service. Division I adminis-
trators, in particular, are likely to simultaneously hold
posts in a number of such organizations. Until little more
than a decade ago, even manifestly political organizations
were often led by District Officers and other bureaucrats.
At present when most civil servants are forbidden to hold po-
litical posts, petty officials and retired administrators
still hold many local party positions and higher civil ser-
vants often act in an ex-officio advisory capacity to local
branches of the United Malay Nationals Organization
(U.M.N.O.).[16]

The pervasive influence of the bureaucracy in extra-
governmental groupings is attributable to many factors but,
in a real sense, it occurs almost by default. Most of the
demands generated in a still largely traditional society are
likely to be "personalistic" in nature, so if associational
groups are to exist at all, they are likely to be the crea-
tions of the bureaucratic and political elites.[17] In the
West, such organizations grew more or less naturally from the
general level of social organization and represented the slow
growth of autonomous, organized demands. But in a new nation,

they tend to be "hot house" organizations, created and nur-
tured by the urban, educated elite.

It is not as if the Western educated bureaucrats have
ousted local leaders and usurped their positions. On the
contrary, local groups have welcomed bureaucratic leadership
and guidance for obvious reasons. First, they realize that
only this sort of leadership can meet the authorities on an
equal footing with a thorough knowledge of whom to approach
and a familiarity with the provisions of the law. Appreciat-
ing the considerable resources of status, knowledge, and ex-
perience administrators can bring to bear on government, they
are willing--even anxious--to accede to official leadership.
Second, there is a long tradition of relying on those of
higher status to organize political activity which derives
from both the pre-colonial and colonial periods. This pat-
tern is not confined to Malaysia alone; Banfield has comment-
ed on it in southern Italy and those who have studied Indian
efforts at local panchayat rule have noted that virtually all
the initiative has had to come from the top.[18] Both the rel-
ative absence of local organizational initiative along modern
lines, and the traditional reliance on high-status leader-
ship, have thus created a system tailor-made for domination
by the administrative elite. Both the bureaucrats and those
they guide find this relationship quite natural and appropri-
ate.

One further reason for the prominent role of adminis-

rators in public life is related to an important difference
between Western nations and new nations at comparable stages
of economic development. In most of the West during the ear-
ly stage of economic growth, the government was not expected
to be uniquely responsible for community welfare, industrial-
ization, or employment. Since people did not look to the
government for the solution to these problems, there was less
need for organized interests to tie in closely with the cen-
tral government. The pattern in new nations, however, is
quite different, since the national authorities have assumed
a host of functions which require a much higher level of or-
ganized support or compliance. Given the path of development
which they have chosen, and the level of social and economic
organization from which they begin, these organizational re-
quirements must be met largely through the leadership efforts
of the educated, governmental elite.

In summary, then, the overwhelming resources of the
bureaucracy, the popular acceptance of administrative leader-
ship, the weakness of local group initiative, and need for
structure through which the government can push its develop-
ment program all conspire to perpetuate an environment that
leaves few alternatives to bureaucratic leadership.

3. The Fear of the Retrograde Masses

The preference for paternalistic state in which the
masses are expected to support the policies of an educated
elite has yet another, and perhaps more crucial, basis in the

environment. The unity of Malaysia is a very tenuous affair and all of the civil servants are well aware that the entire structure could collapse under the pressures generated by ethnic and religious antagonism. Already these primordial hostilities have sorely tested the national fabric. The secession of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, for example, can be largely attributed to communal tensions. A belief in the fragility of national unity is thus not an idle notion assignable merely to a bureaucratic inclination to Caesarism. It is rather a belief based on a realistic assessment of the forces threatening national unity in Malaysia.

First of all, these civil servants see that the skills and knowledge required for modernization are concentrated in the Westernized elite. If modernization is to occur at all, they must play a central role in organizing the support of a largely apathetic and traditional population. Secondly, they recognize that unless there is centralized political and administrative leadership, primordial demands which might well tear apart the nation will come to the fore. Those demands which are organized independently of the government are likely to emphasize the parochial, religious, linguistic, and ethnic identifications that are paramount to most of the citizenry. Should these demands become politicized before the masses are "incorporated into the greater community,"[19] the outlook for preserving the integrity of the nation would

diminish drastically. These men are not concerned with na-
tional unity only because they wish to rule, but also because
they appreciate the clear and present dangers to that unity.

All this illustrates the essential dilemma of the
Western educated elites in new nations like Malaysia. It is
too simple to characterize them as essentially anti-democrat-
ic, for their quandry is much more complex. If they encour-
age full popular democracy they know all too well that they
are entrusting the destiny of their nation to the most tradi-
tional and reactionary forces which threaten to destroy it
even now.[20] They recognize that, if the Westernized intelli-
gentsia rules, the growth of democracy will be retarded, but
this seems a lesser evil than the probable consequences of
popular rule now. The fact that the masses are retrograde is
thus enough to convince them that they must, for the time be-
ing, continue as the oligarchic tutors of an eventual democ-
racy in Malaysia.

There are persuasive reasons, based on the nature of
traditional and colonial rule, for anticipating a predisposi-
tion to paternal rule among the administrative class of a new
nation. The colony was an administrative state in which cit-
izens were confined to "subject" roles. Moreover, their ex-
perience under the colonial system, and the rise of a politi-
cal elite to dilute their authority, has contributed to their
alienation from the style of popular democracy and to a dis-

uste for the politician's role. Persuasive as these argu-
ments are, they do not adequately explain the dogged persist-
ence of these beliefs in the post-colonial era.[21]

To account for the durability of a paternalistic ide-
ology we must see to what extent the implicit assumptions be-
hind paternalistic rule match the existential base of the so-
ciety. Here we discover that the realities of Malaysia and
most other new nations are quite congruent with the assump-
tions behind "tutelary democracy."[22] The educated, Western-
ized elites hold a virtual monopoly of the knowledge and
skills needed for modernization, the masses expect and wel-
come the initiative and leadership of the bureaucratic elite,
and, most important, the primordial attachments of the
masses, if politicized, would doubtlessly place the very ex-
istence of the nation in jeopardy. Only because tutelary de-
mocracy conforms in these essential ways with the realities
in new nations is its appeal so irresistable.

*   *   *   *   *

Postscript C. New Themes: A Minority Case

The generalizations made in Chapter 9 hold true for
the entire sample with few exceptions. The exceptions, how-
ever, are interesting ones. The three, perhaps four, civil
servants who see things somewhat differently than the rest
are also among the younger group recruited since the colonial
period and are university graduates. This is not to say that

the younger, educated civil servants are all different from
the picture we have outlined, since as many fit the pattern
described as do not. The only exceptions, however, do fall
in this category and seem to share certain beliefs and atti-
tudes distinct from the sample as a whole.

We are dealing here with such a small number of bu-
reaucrats that it would be presumptious to suggest that they
represent the "wave of the future." Nonetheless, what dis-
tinguishes them from the rest of the sample appears to be re-
lated to their post-colonial recruitment and their high edu-
cation, so that we might anticipate their views becoming more
common among the administrative class as their numbers in-
crease. Since this is the first and only occasion on which a
discussion of intra-sample differences has been attempted,
and since the enterprise is so frankly speculative, we have
chosen to relegate it to postscript status.

Two new themes are most prominent in my discussion
with this small sub-sample: (1) a more favorable view of
popular government and politicians; and (2) a livelier appre-
ciation of underlying social changes which they feel auger
well for Malaysia's future. Each of these themes is elabo-
rated briefly below.

1. Politicians and Democratic Politics

Most of the civil servants, recalling our earlier com-
ments, were not inclined to look favorably upon either the
rise of politicians or the increasing participation of the

population in political life. Sundram typifies the views of
this group when he explains that civil servants are more im-
portant to national development than politicians.

> I think the civil service is the best guide to the poli-
> ticians. The politicians are just there to please the
> public. They all want a factory in their own constituen-
> cy but the civil servant must decide which is of most
> benefit to the people.

Politicians, here, are little but a public relations
gimick to give the populace the appearance of power over de-
cisions without its reality. The educated, younger civil
servants we are examining, however, are much more "at home"
is a popular democracy in which politicians play an essential
role. Perhaps because they never were a part of the colonial
administrative structure, they seem less alarmed at the de-
cline of bureaucratic power in Malaysia. When Inche' Abdul
Karim is asked whether administrators or politicians are more
essential in national development, his response contrasts
sharply with that of Sundram:

> I think the government---government here includes the po-
> litical section---because I think politicians can best
> assess the needs and requirements of the people while the
> civil service merely carries out or implements policy.

The civil service performs an important function, but
basic policy is left in the hands of the politicians. Anoth-
er member of this group, Inche' Zaharuddin, is similarly ap-
preciative of the politician's place in a democratic polity

and he explicitly describes the change that has occurred since independence:

> The politicians---I think we must distinguish the func-
> tions here---politicians, they make policies. They want
> to uplift the standards of the people but the civil serv-
> ice must work it out---how to do it. If the civil serv-
> ice is weak, then the politicians can't do it. That's
> the difference---before, the civil servants do both
> things---they are politicians. Now sometimes you find an
> old officer who served during the British times and can't
> adjust themselves. They quarrel with the politicians and
> just order people to do things. In those days the word
> of the government servant was law.

Inche' Zaharuddin is not only aware of the new and more mod-
est role of the civil service in an independent Malaysia, but
he also clearly seems to approve of the wider responsibility
given politicians. It is not merely the fact that these
younger men did not have their power stolen by nationalist
politicians which predisposes them to accept the new arrange-
ments in good grace. They also seem to have a firmer commit-
ment to a new relationship between the rulers and the ruled.
By and large, unlike most of their colleagues, they applaud
the slowly increasing popular participation in political life
and favor a relationship with the people in which the civil
servant is not perhaps reduced to the commonplace, but is
certainly no longer the natural ruler of the nation.

In contrast to the others, they do not regard public
use of the civil servant as entirely healthy. Asked if the

*man in the street" respects the civil servant, Inche' Abdul
karim replies:

I think at the moment, yes---more than enough. [Does
public interest help the civil service?] Oh, yes! One
thing, it puts you on your toes always. When the general
public takes interest in government machinery, they al-
ways went better [sic] so you must find ways and means to
improve. If not, you get a well-contented and satisfied
civil service.

Far from wanting to return to the bureaucratic status of co-
lonial days, Inche' Abdul Karim feels there is too much fear-
ful respect for the civil servant. He looks with satisfac-
tion on the growth of public pressure which prods the
bureaucracy to become more effective.

Mr. Tay, the third member of this small group, is
quite outspoken in his appreciation of the new scheme of
things. He too sees the value of popular access to elected
officials in improving the quality of government. His opin-
ion about whether or not the public takes enough interest in
government activities is clear and decisive:

Certainly. For example, in this department alone, if our
policies are found to be inadequate, there will be repre-
sentations to the government. The ministers are so ap-
proachable. It is not difficult to see him and air your
views.

[Does public interest help civil service?] Certainly---
those days are gone when, before independence, their
views would not even be heard at all. This is represen-
tative government---I think it works quite well.

Mr. Tay's preference for representative government is not meant as an endorsement of Malaysian politicians. Like the rest of the sample, all three are in fact full of comments on the shortcomings of their nation's politicians but, unlike the others, their criticism is not part of a general rejection of the politician's role in society. What distinguishes these three civil servants from the others is rather a general satisfaction with a political system in which popular complaints and demands are taken up by politicians. They are certain that Malaysians and their politicians fall far short of making the system work effectively, but they lack the inclination to administrative rule which characterizes most of the sample.

Whether we attribute this new attitude to the fact that these three men were never a part of the colonial administration or to the coincidence that they were all impressionable teen-agers at the height of the nationalist movement, there is no doubt that their conception of the relation between rulers and ruled is what sets them apart from the others.

2. The Cognitive Basis of Optimism

When most of the 17 civil servants look at political life in Malaysia today, they are struck by the absence of principle, the growth of primordial demands, and the rise of ill-trained politicians feeding at the public trough. The three young, educated civil servants we are examining see

these disillusioning aspects of Malaysian democracy too, but they see much more besides. In particular, they see the expansion of education and national loyalty which in the long run, they expect, will make for a better and more democratic society. They are able to look past the immediate and discouraging to the long-term and hopeful. Thus, when they are asked whether Malaysia is getting closer to an ideal society, they reply optimistically, for they have a longer vision which permits optimism--a vision which the others lack. The importance of education in building an ideal society is apparent in the remarks of Inche' Abdul Karim and Inche' Zaharuddin.[23]

> Inche' Abdul Karim: I think we are getting closer. [Why?] People are becoming more courageous to voice their opinions. This helps make the ideal society come closer. This is closely tied with the educational system, the more educated are the more courageous to voice their opinions. Of course, this expression of opinion should be done with the best of intentions.

> Inche' Zaharuddin: I think we are going closer, at least here in Malaya. [Why?] In the first place the form of government has been changing---it's becoming more representative government. And, secondly, with the development of education, the people are becoming more civic-minded---and so they become more conscious of their responsibility towards society.

Education is the vehicle by which Malaysia will approach the ideal society. On the one hand, it gives people political principles on which to stand (Inche' Abdul Karim) and, on the

other, it promotes national, civic consciousness (Inche'
taharuddin). Throughout my discussions with this small
group, it became evident that they view education as a uni-
versal solvent which will gradually eliminate selfishness,
irrationality, and particularistic concerns from the politi-
cal landscape. As a result of education or civic training,
people will forget their trivial differences and cooperate in
the common interest. Education will bring them to a closer
identification with the nation and assure its solidarity and
cohesiveness.

In a sense, the great faith placed in education as the
means of achieving the "civic culture" is quite naive. It
reverses the plausible proposition that democracy does not
flourish amidst general illiteracy to say that education will
produce democracy. Education is perhaps necessary for democ-
racy to flourish, but it is surely not a sufficient condi-
tion.[24] Nevertheless, this view does have its virtues, since
it focuses on education as an important prerequisite of de-
mocracy--a prerequisite which helps to dilute primordial
ties, reinforce civic skills, and replace superstition with
knowledge. One feels that these men are arguing from their
personal experience here. They feel, justifiably, that their
own educational experience has contributed to their national
consciousness, their appreciation of democratic ideals, and
their ability to avoid the racial and religious prejudice
which threatens their nation. And, in fact, it is largely

the educated elite of Malaysia who are committed, however tenuously, to democratic forms and who have been able to transcend the strong pull of communal loyalty. Thus when these men pin their hopes for Malaysia's future on education, they reflect their personal experience and the experience of their nation.

The ability of these three men to see broad education-al changes as a transforming force is but an illustration of a much more important skill they have acquired. The skill we are speaking of is a cognitive skill that is generally a product of education. Where other administrators see only the immediate din of communal demands and untrammelled self-seeking, these men are able to look beyond the present and see the broad social changes which could alter how Malaysians think and behave. This process implies that human nature is not irrevocably fixed for all time but is instead tied, at least in part, to environmental factors which, if they could be changed, might affect human nature itself. Knowledge of this sort is perhaps the distinguishing feature of modern man and it inevitably suggests that the future is not either immutable nor in the hands of God alone, but can be the proper object of collective action. This is the crucial cognitive basis of optimism which these men possess, and which is largely absent in the others.

We can observe how this cognitive skill changes the nature of problems by turning for a moment to Inche' Zaharud-

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din's discussion of two problems which confront any new na-
tion. The first is the great gulf separating the urban
masses from the rural peasantry in Malaysia. Explaining why
kampong people look at national affairs differently from ur-
banites, Inche' Zaharuddin displays a considerable degree of
sophistication.

> I think the difference stems up from their surroundings.
> The village people look at---I think they tend to compare
> ---they associate what they see with life in their own
> village. If, in the village, the social life is differ-
> ent---so they may think the social life in the cities is
> wrong. [Later]---it's because of their surroundings---
> it's based on what they are used to see or experience.

Most others, when treating the same problem, imply that
kampong folk are different from urban people in an irremedi-
able way that has more to do with their basic nature than
with their mode of life. Inche' Zaharuddin, however, traces
the difference to rural "surroundings" which leaves open the
possibility for change if the rural "experience" is somehow
altered. The same understanding of background factors is
manifest too, when Inche' Zaharuddin discusses the cause of
poverty.

> I think I tend to agree that inequality is the cause of
> poverty. If we don't have equality of opportunity be-
> cause we have poverty---and we have poverty because we
> don't have quality of opportunity. It is a vicious cir-
> cle---if you're poor and have no education, you can't get
> a good job and therefore you have no money and you are

poor and you can't get a good education. So it goes
round and round.

This is neither a very elaborate nor very rigorous argument,
but there are the unmistakable beginnings of a real sophisti-
cation here. Compared to what most of the civil servants
have to say about poverty, it is even more impressive. For
example, Inche' Zukifli comments, "It's [poverty] because of
the head of the country---or the chief doesn't care much
about the country." Or Jeganathan: "There're quite a number
of causes---one is that you want to take life [sic]---you
don't want to struggle for a living and want and want life on
a golden platter." The other two causes Jeganathan suggests
are "squandering money" and "keeping up with the Joneses."
Inche' Zukifli's statement implies that the only way out of
poverty is to have a leader who "cares" while Jeganathan sees
no solution as long as people are lazy spendthrifts. In nei-
ther statement is there any appreciation of the impersonal
causes at work; an appreciation which would provide a basis
for optimism and sustained collective action. Inche'
Zaharuddin's cognitive skills, on the other hand, allow him
to see beyond intractable personal motives to environmental
factors which are, in the long run, not beyond human control.

Those who lack the cognitive skills of Inche' Zaharud-
din are generally pessimists about Malaysia's future. They
look about themselves and see individualism, selfishness,
communal tensions, etc. from which there seems to be no exit.

In contrast, the few young, educated respondents who can ap-
preciate both the effects of the environment and the slow but
massive changes taking place in Malaysia, thereby have a
foundation for their faith that a better future is even now
being forged amid parochialism and self-seeking. The basis
for their optimism is almost certainly the broader cognitive
grasp with which their high education has endowed them.[25]
Writing about the ways education expands the explanatory re-
sources of men, Lane concludes:

> . . . a central civic function of education is to release
> men from reliance on personalistic explanations, to en-
> rich their explanatory repertory to include social and
> impersonal causes. Ignorance personalizes! More than
> that, it causes men to think of men as autonomous of
> their environment, permitting explanations of why they
> act as they do solely in terms of a series of motives--
> rage, greed, ambition.[26]

In a real sense, then, these men are "the modernizers"
of a new nation. For it is largely they who are able to so
analyze the present as to see a viable path to the future--a
future which need not depend solely on pure human motives and
the good intentions of leaders.

3. Paternalism: The Present is Not the Future

The three men we are discussing are thus distinguished
by their greater commitment to popular democracy in which
politicians are not mere appendages of the administration,
and by an optimism about Malaysia's political future which

grows from their understanding of impersonal causes.

If colonial socialization and an inability to see more than the immediate and disillusioning aspects of political life were the central factors predisposing civil servants to paternalistic rule, we would expect not to find such a preference among these three men--for they differ from the sample in precisely these respects. And yet, we do find the inclination, albeit milder, to elite rule among this group as well.

Taking Inche' Zaharuddin as an example, since he is perhaps the strongest democrat in the sample, we discover that he nonetheless feels paternal rule by an educated elite is desirable. When he is asked whether democracy creates confusion and prevents important things from being done, he answers:

> Yes, it does. [Why?] Then it's because the machinery is not functioning well or the people don't reach the standard where the machinery----the democratic machinery may be a little too far reaching or high for the ordinary people to follow. That's where 'guided democracy' comes in.

And again when deciding whether the people or the elected leaders know what's best for the country, he says:

> The elected people because the danger is that----of ordinary people----they are not in a position since their self-interest always dominates their position.

In the context of our entire discussion, it is clear why Inche' Zaharuddin thinks Malaysian citizens are not yet ready for their full civic responsibilities. It is because, as he

said, "The percentage of the people who can be good citizens in Malaysia is still small." Those he would include as good citizens are the "civil servants" and "those with secondary education"; a minute fraction of the total population. As far as ideal party members are concerned, "in our society we have far to go," and the same applies for members of parliament too.

Committed as they are to democratic forms, these men are not blind to what they consider the shortcomings of their nation. They, like the others, are disturbed by the strength of communal hostility, the narrow concerns of politicians and citizenry alike, and the tenuous unity of Malaysia. It is therefore inadequate to trace the penchant for 'guided democracy' or administrative paternalism to colonial socialization or a weakness of vision. In spite of their democratic views and faith in the future, the future is not the present. In the Malaysia of today, 'guided' or 'tutelary' democracy appeals because, as we have said, its assumptions about the environment match much of what these men have observed--the lack of national loyalty, the absence of much civic-consciousness, widespread illiteracy, etc. It is the reality of Malaysia's condition which predisposes even the young, educated administrators to elite rule in spite of their attachment to democratic ideals. Whether one agrees or disagrees with them, they come to paternal rule via the route of reason--not out of past prejudice, ignorance, or a lust for power.

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert O. Tilman, "Policy Formulation, Policy Execution, and the Political Elite Structure of Contemporary Malaysia," pp. 346-355, in Wang Gung wu, ed., Malaysia: A Survey (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 350.

2. James Allen, "The MCS: Fact and Fiction" (unpublished paper, 1964). Allen perceptively traces the growth of "the new class"--the apparatchiks--who gradually replace revolutionary imperialism with bureaucratic colonialism.

3. Quoted in Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," pp. 36-440, in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), p. 395. For a detailed description of the District Officer in India, see Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India: Vol. II, The Guardians (New York: Schocken Books, 1964).

4. Mannoni argues persuasively that colonial rule afforded Western man the opportunity to assuage his inferiority complex by governing a "simpler" society while the dependence of the colonized on the colonial officer constituted a patron-client relationship natural among the Malagasies. Mannoni, op. cit., Chapters 1, 2, and 3.

5. If the appeal of an administrative state is strong among the Westernized elites, it would surely be even more familiar and comfortable for the general population, to whom notions of liberal democracy are strange indeed.

6. These terms are borrowed from Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, op. cit., pp. 168-185.

7. This finding conforms with what one would expect from the responses to the "Political Equality" items in the previous chapter where affirmation of popular capacity for self-rule was the exception rather than the rule.

8. The Indian government appears to conform to the same pattern of rejecting demands but listening to "private deputations." Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity, op. cit., p. 188.

9. Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," op. cit., p. 394.

10. Pye, in his Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building, op. cit., pp. 223-227, suggests that the Burmese administrator has more than just a problem of downward mobility; he shows how politicians have brought the civil servant's loyalty into question by charging that he collaborated with the British against the nationalist movement. Though charges of this nature are not unheard of in Malaysia, they are quite rare because of relative ease with which Malaya acceded to independence. In fact, Malayan administrators played an important role in their national independence movement and, until recently, in local party branches.

11. They also criticize politicians for attempting to influence administrative decisions on behalf of their clients

and for what they perceive to be increasing political influence over promotions within the civil service. Mr. Khoo on how civil servants 'get ahead': "Some rise on political influence---moving with the right people. . . ."

12. Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Development," pp. 62-95, in LaPalombara, ed., op. cit., pp. 66-67.

13. Politicians may complain about the red tape and narrow legalism but, in general, they retain a grudging admiration for the administrative service of their nation.

14. Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," op. cit., p. 391.

15. Fred W. Riggs feels that the role of the bureaucracy in guiding these organizations "lays the foundation for totalitarianism." While this conclusion goes further than the circumstances merit, the pattern in Malaysia does certainly imply a "weakening of the prospects for democratic control." Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," pp. 120-167, in LaPalombara, op. cit., p. 141.

16. For a detailed description of the administrative domination of the most powerful Malay political organization, see M. G. Swift, Malay Peasant Society in Jelebu (London: The Athlone Press, 1965), 11. 158-162.

17. To a certain extent the trade unions and business groups do represent centers of power which are largely inde-

pendent of government control and yet not traditionally
oriented.

18. See High Tinker, "The Village in the Framework of Devel-
opment," pp. 94-133, in Braibanti and Spengler, eds.,
op. cit. For a superb but impressionistic view of the
failure of local initiative and organization in India as
a whole, see Kusum Nair, Blossoms in the Dust: The Human
Factor in Indian Development (New York: Praeger, 1962).
In Malaysia, civil servants are quite aware of the wide-
spread dependence on external initiative and often wish
the people would do more for themselves. As Sundram
puts it, "That's the Asian attitude toward things. They
like to be pushed around, they're not like the English
or Americans---they expect things to be done for them."

19. A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 43.

20. This dilemma is described in similar terms by Moneer
Ahmad in his study of civil servants in Pakistan. The
Civil Servant in Pakistan: A Study of the Background and
Attitudes of Public Servants in Lahore (Karachi: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1964), p. 242.

21. In particular, they fail to explain a similar tendency
among the political elite of many new nations which ex-
perienced less of the type of colonial socialization
that characterizes the administrative class. See espe-
cially Shils, The Intellectual Between Tradition and

Modernity: The Indian Situation, op. cit.

22. Shil's term. Cf. Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), pp. 60-67.

23. Mr. Tay simply mentions "knowledge" as the reason why Malaysia is getting closer to the ideal society but does not elaborate.

24. Nadau Safran writes that the liberal democrats of Egypt also expected the growth of education to strengthen the prospects for democracy. Op. cit., p. 148.

25. Education alone is obviously not a sufficient cause for this cognitive grasp, since two or three other young, educated administrators in the sample lack these qualities.

26. Lane, op. cit., p. 310.

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

The reader who is familiar with Malaysia will no doubt feel that I have failed to do justice to many of the historical and contemporary factors which affect political ideology in that nation. This is a shortcoming to which I readily confess. In this study, I have purposely avoided Malaysia's uniqueness and sought, instead, to explore that portion of elite political ideology which Malaysia might share with other new nations. This special focus of attention has necessitated an emphasis on the common effects of alien Western rule, of poverty, of traditional culture, and of rapid social change as experienced by the new states. In the process, Malaysia's unique brand of multi-racial politics, her economic successes under gifted and wise political leadership, her struggle to make liberal democracy work, have all been shortchanged--unfortunately but unavoidably.

A. The Existential Base and Central Beliefs

When Western social scientists turned their attention to underdeveloped nations after World War II, they discovered a host of beliefs and patterns of behavior which seemed quite irrational to them. Political scientists and economists in particular were disheartened by the common failure of Western-inspired institutions to function effectively in the hands of their new owners. The political party, political scientists found, operated quite differently and served functions which its Western counterpart did not; the economic planning group, the economists discovered, either avoided decisions or made them according to criteria which they could not fathom.

Perhaps because of the growing influence of psycho-analysis in the social sciences--especially in anthropology--the explanation for the failure of these institutions was sought in the cultural personality of the Burmese, of the Indians, of the Egyptians, or whatever peoples were being examined. And since the traditional cultural norms had in every case been subjected to the hammer blows of an imposed Western rule and rapid social change, it was quite plausible to surmise that the elites of new nations were suffering through an "identity crisis" brought about by this "broken" pattern of socialization. The political ideology of the elite, in this context, was viewed as an internal dialogue meant to assuage the intra-psychic conflicts of its holder; ideology became a defense mechanism to blame the West for

personal failures, to reconstruct a glorious past, and so on. How a personal ideology of this sort might change is never clear--for who is to know when someone suffering from a personality disorder will come to his senses. Realities are unlikely to have any effect on him since his ideology is constructed as a defense against a painful or threatening reality.

If this study of ideology in a new nation has merit at all, it shows how a person's ideology must in some sense be a reality-serving mechanism rather than a reality-cheating mechanism. A belief which, in the industrialized West, appears to be irrational--appears to misconstrue the existential realities--may well be quite congruent with the environment in a traditional or transitional state. The "pathology," if there is any, is to be sought in the nature of the environment, not in the individual. A man's ideology need never precisely fit his experience; it may change more slowly than the existential base, but it cannot survive long if it consistently distorts essential features of the environment. The Sicilian peasant who immigrates to the United States, for example, gradually realizes that his expectations about interpersonal behavior and about the environment do not give him a reliable picture of reality in his new setting. If he lacks the resources to adjust his ideology to the new environment, then perhaps his children, or his children's children, will make the ideological changes which will equip them

for success in their new milieu. This process is not confined to immigrants; it takes place within a nation as its existential base changes too. The other-directedness among Americans to which David Riesman takes such exception may thus simply represent the social antennae necessary for survival in an epoch of social and geographical mobility requiring constant adjustment to new surroundings.

1. Constant-Pie Thinking

Of the basic value orientations which we discussed, the man-nature orientation is the most significant since it relates most closely to the environment. Malaysian civil servants have what we have elected to call a "constant-pie" orientation to nature. That is; they assume a fixed scarcity of desired material goods. The political ramifications of this assumed scarcity are enormous. Much of political and economic life becomes a struggle of one individual, family, group, or nation to enlarge its slice at the expense of other individuals, families, etc. In the context of a zero-sum environment, concern is focused on the distributive justice of the political system, trust and cooperation are discouraged, and generosity toward other competitors for scarce values becomes an invitation to plunder.

The constant-pie orientation is not the product of individual pathology; it rises rather from a more or less accurate assessment of the limitations of the material environment. Peasant society almost everywhere is characterized by

, fixed social product, and even in new nations which, like Malaysia, have experienced substantial economic growth, progress has not been either of the magnitude or the duration which would change basic expectations. The assumption of scarcity as the permanent condition of man is congruent enough with the actual experience of people in the new states to persist as a central orientation. Its origin may lie in the material strictures of traditional society, but it continues to draw sustenance from present conditions.

2. Social Distrust

The orientation toward human nature of our Malaysian sample is characterized by general social distrust and by the conviction that external control mechanisms are required to restrain man's natural rapaciousness. Both are natural companions of constant-pie thinking; we should hardly anticipate a flowering of brotherly love in a situation where the gain of one is the plunder of another. The statistical association of misanthropy with constant-pie thinking is but a reflection of the underlying Hobbesian qualities of a zero-sum economy.

Pye finds that the Burmese too ". . . tend to see each other as individuals seeking personal material advancement or personal political power . . . ," but terms it a ". . . bias in perspective.. ..." created by Burmese socialization.[1] Banfield, however, discovers the same pattern among southern Italian peasants[2] ("amoral familism"), while Oscar Lewis de-

lures that social distrust and cynicism are typical of the
urban poor of London, Paris, Harlem, Mexico City, and Glas-
gow.[3] In spite of the diverse cultural backgrounds of these
peoples, they share an existential base of poverty. We have
suggested that poverty itself involves, for those who experi-
ence it, what must seem to be a struggle against others for
scarce, fixed resources--a struggle which does not encourage
the growth of interpersonal trust or cooperation. The con-
nection between poverty and misanthropy is further confirmed
by studies showing that social trust increases with affluence
both across cultures and within a culture over time.[4] Social
distrust, though it may have other causes too, is thus rein-
forced by a zero-sum economy and weakened by steady economic
growth.

The effects of misanthropy on political ideology are
considerable. Politicians are expected to exploit every op-
portunity for personal gain, civic concerns are greeted with
suspicion and disbelief, and, above all, the function of gov-
ernment is not to serve men but to control them, to prevent
the strong from exploiting the weak by limiting freedom and
punishing transgressors. The logic of a belief in man as an
asocial self-seeker leads directly to partisanship and to a
preference for coercive rather than persuasive strategies.
Social distrust, sustained by the rigors of a fixed social
product, is what lies behind the failure to create effective
and durable groups for common goals in new nations.

3. Short-term Goals

Traditional society manages to contain the centrifugal forces of a fixed social product by virtue of its cognitive and normative consensus and its established social control mechanisms. In the new nations, however, these cultural 'rules of the game' have been eroded or completely washed away by a flood of social change and new values. The break-down of stable expectations in this new setting contributes to a heightened apprehension about the future and greater interpersonal suspicion. The environment seems more and more Hobbesian.

Uncertainty and anxiety about the future in a new nation are not the creation of individual or collective fantasy;they are based on an accurate estimate of reality. The businessman adapts to this situation by maintaining high liquidity and investing largely in commercial transactions with a rapid turnover. He may even try to protect himself against the uncertainty of the environment by bribing key government officials. The politician adapts too: he exploits the rewards of his office while he can, and clings tenaciously to the status he has achieved. He learns that loyalty to persons rather than to ideals, while appealing to tradition too, is apt to promise more security in an uncertain environment. The Burmese may, as Pye says, "prefer not to think too far ahead" because of early training,[5] but it is equally true that long-term strategies require a measure of environmental

ability which is absent in most new nations. There is no
a priori reason to deny a measure of rationality to the poli-
ticians, bureaucrats, and citizens which we are only too
willing to grant the businessman.

When we place transitional man in his environmental
context, many of his central orientations acquire a certain
realism. In the affluent, stable West, constant-pie think-
ing, great social distrust (such as "amoral familism"), and a
short-run "exploitationist" time orientation could justifia-
bly be considered examples of deviant pathology, for the en-
vironment is fundamentally different. But what is pathology
in Great Britain may well constitute, in Malaysia, a success-
ful adaptation to the existential base.[6]

B. The Existential Base and Democracy

Democracy, for the new nations, represents both an in-
stitutional and ideological import. Whether it maintains its
uncertain purchase on the political cliffs of the new states
depends, in part, on the extent to which it is congruent with
the central beliefs of the host culture and, in part also, on
how deeply democratic beliefs have penetrated—on the firm-
ness with which they have been adopted. On neither of these
two closely related scores is there much basis for optimism.

The basic value orientations we have already examined
hardly provide a hospitable climate for democratic beliefs.
An assumption that man is narrowly selfish and lacking in

restraint, that economic life is a zero-sum game, and that only short-run gains are possible, conflict sharply with the long-term cooperative strategies and civic qualities that characterize a democratic style. Moreover, primary sociali- zation promotes both a situational morality and a reliance on authority quite at variance with the stereotypical "democrat- ic personality." Such primary influences could conceivably be counteracted by experiences in school and in voluntary or- ganizations, but in Malaysia, as in most new nations, neither the authority patterns nor the participation style which these structures encourage contribute to a civic culture.

Bereft of both the experiential and characterological support which sustains democratic forms in much of the indus- trailized West, democracy in the new states must rely on the slender resources of manifest political training and, above all, on the ability of democratic government to effectively satisfy popular desires. The demise of democracy in many new nations has occurred, in part, precisely because, during a crisis of effectiveness, the system lacked the "capital" of legitimacy which might have enabled it to weather the storm. And since crises of effectiveness are, for obvious reasons, endemic in underdeveloped nations, we can scarcely be san- guine about the democratic potential of the new states.

Like many foreign beliefs, democratic notions have penetrated the minds of the post-colonial, Westernized elites in a highly selective fashion. Freedom of speech, for exam-

ple, seems more firmly embedded than the more subtle, but equally important, canons of due process. Both beliefs are, however, quite formalistic and tend to crumble when they encounter the existential base and when they conflict with more deeply held values. They have great "range" but little "weight"; they are quickly abandoned when they appear to endanger national stability and unity. Thus, not only do Malaysian elites less often support democratic norms in the abstract than do Americans, but Malaysians are also more willing to cast them overboard when the ship founders.

When we interpret the weakness of democratic beliefs in new nations we must again refer to the existential base. Crises of unity and stability are vastly more compelling to the elites of Malaysia than they might seem to Western elites. Malaysians live constantly in the shadow of communal tension and have experienced, in their lifetime, the Japanese occupation, an internal communist insurrection, and a war with Indonesia. And if they are more prone to deprecate their people's ability to make wise, democratic choices, let us not forget too that the electorate they are evaluating is in fact less literate and more bound by primordial loyalties than its Western counterpart.

Quite apart from the fact that the preference for democracy is weaker in new nations than in the West, there is every reason for the elites in new states to be discouraged—even cynical—about the prospects for democracy. First, the

manner in which they learned about democracy under colonial-
ism has produced an over-idealization of the Western model
that inclines them to cynicism when they measure their na-
tion's performance against it. This cognitive distortion is,
however, by no means the only basis for their disappointment.
Their assumptions about human nature and the environment,
both of which derive from an existential base, do not lead
them to expect either the political tolerance or cooperation
which would help sustain a democratic state. Finally, they
have reason to be disappointed in the performance of democra-
cy as they have experienced it. The race for spoils, the il-
literacy and narrow loyalties of the masses, and the tensions
and social distrust which often accompany rapid change have
in fact crippled the growth of a civic culture in the new
states. The Westernized elites in these states are thus dis-
appointed over the very real handicaps which popular govern-
ment faces among their people. Democracy, like any other
form of government, contains implicit assumptions about the
environment--assumptions which in the new nations, at least,
are not congruent with the existential base.

C. The Existential Base and Paternalistic, Elite Rule

In contrast to the weak resources for democracy, the
resources for firm rule by a benevolent elite are consider-
ably more impressive.

Paternalistic elite rule is quite consonant with the

pattern of both colonial and traditional regimes. Each limits popular participation and rejects demands while accepting popular entreaties; each is guided by an elite which believes it rules by virtue of its superior qualifications; each considers the populace "subjects" rather than citizens--what the people want is less central than what the elite knows is best for them. It was the foreignness of colonial rule more than its style which aroused the wrath of the colonized people.

Post-colonial experience has, if anything, enhanced the attractiveness of strong, paternalistic rule. The Westernized elite holds a virtual monopoly of the education, technical skills, and experience necessary to run a modern state. Furthermore, the traditional masses for the most part look to the Westernized elites with their knowledge and organizational skills for leadership. It is not a question of the educated elites usurping the role of traditional leaders; popular acceptance of, and deference to, the Westernized elites--particularly civil servants--is the rule rather than the exception.

By far the most important basis for strong, elitist rule in new nations, however, is the painful realization that full popular rule might tear the nation apart. In Malaysia, racial antagonisms have more than once threatened the nation's existence. Should the primordial loyalties and traditional preferences of the masses become politicized in advance of any strong identification with the national community,

there is every reason to believe that national unity would perish in the ensuing violence. To say that the elites of the new states are not democrats is in part true, but, as an explanation of why they incline to non-democratic solutions, it fails to do justice to their fundamental dilemma. The fact is that paternalistic, elite rule--or tutelary democracy --makes implicit assumptions about the environment which are congruent with reality in new nations, while the implicit assumptions behind liberal democracy simply do not match the realities.

* * * * *

Malaysia's democratic system has been surely tested in the ten years since her independence. In spite of the accretion of special emergency powers by the central government, she has managed to remain a democracy amidst the inevitable Caesarist temptations and a large measure of credit must be given to her experienced, restrained, and talented elite.

This elite, to speak for once of Malaysia's peculiarities, has ironically profited from the very situation which many observers imagined would surely cause its collapse. I am referring to the more or less delicate balance of power between the Malays and Chinese. As with the Lebanese balance between Muslims and Christians--glossing over the sub-divisions--or perhaps even the Swiss division between French Catholicism and German Protestantism, the Malaysian parity has meant that neither the Malays nor the Chinese can achieve

atter dominance over the other community, save after Armaged-
don. The Swiss example is particularly instructive since
communal compromise was hammered out with France and Germany
waiting in the wings; in Malaysia the modus vivendi is occur-
ring in the shadow of Chinese and Indonesian imperial ambi-
tions. Had the racial balance in Malaysia been more lopsided
its history might have taken quite a different turn; as it
is, cooperation is less terrible to contemplate than its al-
ternatives. Although this compromise is not without its
strains--and it could collapse if the Malays, who have a
slight power edge, should ultimately conclude that the costs
of sharing power are greater than the risks of imposing total
domination--it has now endured over a ten year period. For
the time being, then, democracy is the institutional frame-
work which assures each community that its rights and free-
doms will not be abrogated by the other.

Another factor of equal or greater importance has con-
tributed to the tenure of democracy in Malaysia. In a word,
its government has proved effective. First, it has contained
the fissiparous tendencies of a perceived constant-pie envi-
ronment in much the same way traditional regimes contained
them. The Alliance government has alternately striven to
soften the demands of the communities it represents and
granted what it considers the essential core demands of each.
This coalition has been largely successful in imposing a
'group focused image of change," of which we spoke earlier,

by convincing each contending group that the others would not be allowed to advance at its expense. To the extent that the Malaysian government can continue to persuade its people that it is effectively managing the struggle for the constant-pie, it will help insure its own survival.

The equilibrium that has been achieved is a tenuous one. Social distrust and a constant-pie orientation, compounded by the endemic uncertainties of a transitional society, place the entire structure in constant jeopardy. If persuasive strategies have been more effective in Malaysia than in other new nations, much of the credit is due to the decade of steady economic growth which more or less favorable world prices for rubber and tin have made possible.[7] Thus, in spite of the centrifugal potential of constant-pie thinking, economic expansion has helped create the impression that the government has been distributing the slices equitably. An economic setback or a period of stagnation would end this successful game abruptly and force an increasing reliance on sheer strength and coercion. The painfulness of the distribution crisis would then make peaceful adjustment all but impossible.

For as long as the constant-pie orientation dominates the social landscape of transitional societies, the use of force to contain the incivisme which it promotes will prove difficult to resist. This dilemma is inescapable in the short run. Over time, however, these nations must place

their faith in a gradually expanding economy where the strug-
gle for scarce values evolves from a zero-sum battle à
l'outrance into a variable-sum game, where the experience of
economic growth creates the expectation of progress, where
trust and limited generosity can replace suspicion and oppor-
tunism, where cooperation is a surer road to advancement than
plunder.

This is the nature of the journey the Malaysian people
have so successfully begun. Wisely knowing that no Utopias
await them at the end, her leaders modestly, but nobly, hope
only to lighten the burdens of the trek.

FOOTNOTES

1. Pye, _Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building_, op. cit., p. 202.

2. Banfield, _The Moral Basis of a Backward Society_, op. cit., _passim_.

3. Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty," pp. 252-261, in Kovack and Lekachman, op. cit.

4. Cf. last portion of Chapter 6.

5. Pye, _Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building_, op. cit., p. 204.

6. The same holds true with equal force for "authoritarianism" in many non-Western areas. It may represent deviant pathology in the West but often in the non-West the environment actually resembles what the pathological authoritarian is supposed to imagine it to be. Someone who is actually being followed may exhibit all the symptoms of paranoia but he does not need a psychiatrist; he needs a change in reality!

7. See Gayl D. Ness, _Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia_ (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1967), pp. 62-69, and p. 223.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

The following is a truncated version of the interview guide used to structure conversations with the sample of 17 Malaysian civil servants. Roughly one-half of the first section concerning the respondent's administrative life is borrowed from Murroe Berger's study, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957). The remainder was borrowed, with appropriate modifications, from Robert E. Lane's interview guide used in research for Political Ideology (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962).

PART I

1. Title of post.

   Ministry.

   Grade.

   Department.

2. Year of birth and place of birth.

1. Education through to the university.
1. What is the mission and function of the ministry in which you are employed?
5. What part does your post play in realizing the aims of the ministry?
4. What civil service positions have you held prior to your present post? Starting from the most recent and going back to the beginning, which did you like most and why? Which did you like least and why?
7. How old were you when you first thought of entering the civil service?
8. How did you first obtain your initial civil service job?
9. How did you first learn about the first civil service post you obtained?
10. Why did you prefer the civil service to a non-government job?
11. Did you hold any jobs before coming to the civil service? What were they? Did you like them?
12. Have you ever thought that you might leave the civil service entirely for some reason?
13. How would you describe the ideal civil servant? What qualities should he have? What sort of person should he be? (Probe for specific qualities.)
14. What do you like about government work?
15. What do you dislike about government service?
16. Do you read the newspapers regularly? Which ones?

a. Which section of the newspaper do you read most of-
ten and spend most time on: the news, feature arti-
cles, sports?

b. When you read the news would you say you skim the
headlines, read part way through the main news
stories, or read all the main news stories all the
way through?

c. What kind of news interests you most? (Probe.)

d. Do you have a television? If so, do you watch of-
ten? What are your favorite programs and why?

17. What magazines do you read more or less often? Can you
recall an article that interested you recently in a mag-
azine?

18. Imagine the following situation:

A department head in the civil service asks one of
his staff members, an economist, to prepare a memorandum
in support of a certain policy which has been followed
for some time. In studying the matter the economist
finds that he can defend this policy only if he presents
arguments that differ with what is generally accepted by
most economists in and outside of government.

a. Can the department head expect this civil servant to
prepare such a memorandum?

b. What do you think this civil servant ought to do in
view of his obligation to the government and his ob-
ligation as a professional economist? Should he

prepare the report or should he refuse to prepare
it?

c. Why do you think so?

d. What will other economists think when they find out
he has prepared such a report for his boss?

5. Do you think civil servants should have their own pro-
tective society as doctors, lawyers, and engineers have?
Why do you think so?

7. Arrange the following reasons people have for thinking
highly of a certain post or occupation in what you think
to be their order of importance:

a. Good salary and working conditions.

b. Skill required to do the job.

c. Opportunity to meet important people.

d. Opportunity to serve the public.

e. Opportunity to serve the nation.

11. Imagine the following situation:

A civil servant is assigned to factory inspection;
his duty is to ensure that factories conform to safety
laws. In one factory he sees a floor that looks as if
it might collapse under the weight of a large machine.
According to usual procedure, he telephones his superior
but finds that his superior is away on political busi-
ness and will not return that day. The inspector exam-
ines the floor again and is not certain that it will
hold up for more than a few hours. He tells the factory

owner about his fear. But the owner tells him that
there is no basis for such fear since the chief inspec-
tor had approved the factory only two weeks ago in the
same condition. The owner shows him the certificate of
approval, but the inspector is still doubtful and, tak-
ing the initiative, he orders the factory closed.

a. Do you think the factory inspector acted properly in
   closing the factory? Why?

b. Do you think the inspector's superior should disci-
   pline him?

c. Do you think the inspector's superior will disci-
   pline him?

d. Suppose they find out the next day that the inspec-
   tor was wrong and there is nothing wrong with the
   factory floor.

2. When a new government takes office after an election do
   you think it should be able to dismiss higher civil ser-
   vants and replace them with its followers? If not, how
   can the loyalty of the civil service to the new govern-
   ment's program be ensured?

3. If you were asked to advise an intelligent young man on
   his career, what sort of career would you advise him to
   follow? (Probe for views for or against the civil serv-
   ice.)

4. If a young man wants to become a civil servant, what
   would be the best way for him to do so?

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5. Does your post place you in much personal contact with the public?

6. In order to get an idea now of your daily routine, consider the last three persons, not in the civil service, who came to see you on business. Beginning with the most recent, what was the person's problem, or what was the reason for which he had to consult you? How did he learn you were the person to see? How did you dispose of his case?

a. Is this fairly typical of your daily routine? OR

b. What is your usual daily routine?

7. Consider the following list of posts and occupations and rate them as the general public would, placing the number "1" beside the occupation the general public thinks most highly of, number "2" for the next, and so on.

a. Factory worker	f. Bank director
b. Small merchant	g. Lawyer
c. Doctor	h. Factory owner
d. Government clerk	i. Peasant
e. Landowner	j. Government bureau chief

8. Do you think the general public takes enough interest in the activities of government?

a. Why do you think so?

b. What should the general public do to show a proper interest in the activities of the government?

c. Do you think the civil service would be improved if

the general public took more interest?

5. What do you think the "man in the street" thinks of civil servants? (Allow for autonomous response.)

   a. Do you think the man in the street has enough appreciation of the job the civil servant does? If not, why not?

   b. Does the man in the street respect civil servants? Why?

   c. Does the man in the street fear civil servants? Why?

6. Does the man in the street consider the civil servant difficult to approach or easy to approach? Why is that so?

7. Imagine the following situation:

   A civil servant is officially informed that he is to be transferred from Kuala Lumpur to a new post in another state. He has no objection to service in another state but feels he must be near his aged parents who cannot be moved away from Kuala Lumpur where they receive medical treatment. He therefore goes to the Permanent Secretary in the ministry, who is a close friend of his, and asks the Permanent Secretary to keep him in Kuala Lumpur.

   a. Can this civil servant expect the Permanent Secretary to keep him in Kuala Lumpur?

   b. What should the Permanent Secretary do?

c. If the civil servant's request were refused, and he thought the situation serious enough, would he be justified in enlisting the support of a friend or relative who knew the Permanent Secretary?

2. What are the most important ways in which the civil service serves the nation? (Probe to see if development or legal functions considered more important.)

3. Which group is more important to national development, the politicians or civil servants? Why is that so?

4. When members of the public come to your department to ask for information or to make a request:

a. Do they come as individuals or do they come on behalf of organized groups?

b. What do those who come on behalf of groups usually want?

c. Do people usually come alone or in groups of two or three? Why is that do you suppose?

d. What do these people do if you are not able to help them? (Probe for anger, recourse to another official, threats, so on.)

5. Do you think that those who come on behalf of an organization are really interested in the organization or in their own interests?

6. Do you find that members of the public who come to a government office to make inquiries or requests generally know what they are talking about or must you usually

tell them even the simplest things which they should already know?

a. Are they generally capable of understanding government regulations?

b. Are they generally capable of understanding your problems? If not, why do you suppose that is?

. How can citizens play a role in influencing important decisions which affect them when such decisions are highly technical and complicated and therefore very hard for anyone but the experts to understand?

. How easy or difficult is it for civil servants to persuade farmers to adopt a new seed which is better than the kind they have been using? Why is that so?

a. What is the best way of getting them to change?

b. Do most civil servants go about it this way?

. What are the reasons why some people get ahead in their jobs and others do not? (Probe deeply.)

a. From the following list of some possible reasons why people get ahead choose those factors you think are most important and explain why.

a. Ambition	d. Honesty and high principles
b. A stroke of good luck	e. Intelligence
c. Efficiency	f. Ability to mix easily

. How difficult is it for young civil servants to get ahead these days as compared with the past? Why is that so? How do they feel about that?

Are some civil servants too much interested in promotion only?

   a. Are there too many like this?

   b. How can you tell they are mostly interested in promotion?

Since in any organization there are occasionally arguments, can you recall the last one and what was it about?

   a. How many people were involved?

   b. How angry did people get? How could you tell?

   c. Who finally won the argument? Why?

   d. Are there any bad feelings left over from the argument?

At work how do people usually get along with one another?

   a. Are there some who do not get along very well with others? If so, why is that so?

   b. Is it possible to make friends with two people who are not on good terms with one another? If not, why not?

Do some superiors treat their subordinates too severely?

   a. How is that? Why do they do it?

   b. How should authority best be exercised?

   c. Is it usually exercised in this way?

Can you remember what you did on the last day that you felt you accomplished more work than usual? (Probe for appointments, decisions, reports and so on.)

. Do you feel that your job is quite a heavy load for one
   man to handle alone? If so, why is that?

   a. Would any special training have eased the load?

   b. Do you feel that you have too much routine work and
      not enough time to carry through new ideas? If so,
      what new ideas do you have in mind?

. What do the people you work with like to talk about to-
   gether when they are not talking about work?

   a. Who joins these discussions?

   b. Do superiors and subordinates often talk together
      like this?

. What do you do when you go on leave or a long vacation?
   (Probe.)

   a. Have you thought about what you will do and where
      you will live when you retire? (Probe.)

. How are the important decisions made in your office?

   a. Mostly by the highest official?

   b. Do you discuss decisions before making them with
      others?

   c. Who is part of this discussion?

. Why is there sometimes corruption in the civil service
   of other countries? (Probe to find out whether it is
   the result of bad people or of a bad situation.)

PART TWO: LIFE HISTORY

. Chronology

A. Parents and grandparents: place of birth, personali-
ties, styles of life, occupations, respondent's feel-
ings in describing them.

    1. Would you say that you have been able to get fur-
ther in life than your father?

B. Infancy and pre-school years: punishments, victories
over others, deaths, fights, sibling rivalry, paren-
tal attitudes.

C. Grammar school years (5-12)

    1. Home life, learning experiences, attitudes toward
school, peers, teachers, subjects, playground,
discipline, bitter memories, happy events, mobil-
ity, etc.

D. Junior high and high schools years (12-17)

    1. Neighborhood: gangs, sports, parties, bullies,
feelings of acceptance or rejection, scrapes with
police, sex experiences, etc.

    2. School: same as above.

    3. Home: relations with parents in adolescence, sib-
lings, nature of conflicts, feelings of parental
approval or disapproval, development of ambi-
tions, career goals, parental attitudes toward
girls, religious influences, etc.

E. College years--if any, same as above.

F. Adult life

    1. Social life: friends and acquaintances, duration

of friendships, parties, visits, "hangouts," dating, courting, marriage.

2. Avocations: hobbies, movies, television programs, sports, reading pattern.

3. Present family:

    a. Wife: interests, personality, compatibility, subordination, love of husband, etc.

    b. Children: number, attitude towards, ideas of rearing, etc.

Focused Discussion

A. Sociological aspects of family

1. Parents' national antecedents, occupations, education, religion.

2. Standard of living: sense of want, cars, house, standard of living of neighbors, etc.

3. Inter-group relations: friends of parents, parents' organizational memberships, parents' recreational patterns, etc.

B. Personal aspects of family

1. Images of parents

    a. What sort of person was your father; your mother?

    b. What things do you admire most in your father; in your mother?

    c. Assuming that people are not perfect, what human frailities did your father and mother have?

    d. Which parent do you take after? Which one do
       you like the most? Which one were you most
       influenced by?

2. Power relations between father and mother

    a. How did your parents get along together?

    b. In what ways were your parents most alike?
       Most different?

    c. Who usually made the decisions in your family?

    d. Did any disagreements ever arise in your fam-
       ily that you can recall?

3. Siblings

    a. Could you tell me a little more about your
       brothers and sisters?

    b. How did you get along together?

    c. Who was your favorite brother? Your favorite
       sister? What did you like about him? About
       her? What did he mean to you? What did she
       mean to you?

    d. Could you tell me a little more about the
       quarrels you had with your brothers and sis-
       ters?

4. Image of self as child

    a. Would you say a little more about what you
       were like as a child?

    b. What things about your childhood do you re-
       member with most pleasure?

c. What things did you worry about most as a child?

d. Since almost everybody has had some recurrent bad dreams as a child, what kind of bad dreams did you have?

e. What were your chief ambitions as a child? Do you think your parents approved?

5. Relations with parents

a. Which parent did you feel closer to when you were, say, six? When you were in high school? Now?

b. What were the main satisfactions in your relations with your father? With your mother?

c. Which parent exercised the discipline in your family? If they were to get angry, which one would you fear most?

d. What kind of discipline did your parents use?

e. What kinds of things did they discipline you for mainly?

6. What would you say your major problems were as a child? And as an adolescent?

7. If you had your school years to live over again, what would you change?

8. Health and physique

a. What did you do when you had a bad cold?

b. Were you well as a child?

9. Youthful Rebellion

   a. When they are teen-agers many sons rebel in
      small ways against their parents? Did you
      experience any of these feelings? How? In
      what way? What was your parents' reaction?

C. Major events

   1. Could you tell me if any of the following events
      in any way affected your thinking:

      a. The Depression: what did it mean for your
         family? Who was responsible?

      b. World War II and the Japanese Occupation:
         what do you remember?

      c. The nationalist movement and independence.

      d. The Emergency.

D. Money and Income

   1. What is the most important thing money can give a
      person?

   2. Is it easy for you to save money, or difficult?
      Do you have enough to make ends meet or not?

   3. Some people like to take chances and have a "win
      a lot, lose a lot" attitude; then other people
      are more cautious about money. What is your at-
      titude about this?

   4. Do you think that people who are very rich are
      happier than people who are just average? Why is
      that?

5. What do you think is the best way to teach a child to handle money?

6. What do you miss most that your present income does not allow?

PT THREE: PERSONAL QUALITIES

Social relations

A. How important are friends in a person's life? How do you mean?

B. What attracts you in a friend? Give an example.

C. How do you choose friends? For example?

D. What do you enjoy doing with your friends?

E. Are you the sort of person who has a few close friends or do you tend to have a lot of friends? Which do you think is better?

F. What are the occupations of your best friends outside of work? What do you do together? How did you meet?

G. Think back to the last time you were out in the evening and had a good time. What was it that made it a good time for you?

H. If your job made it necessary for you and your family to move to some other city, how would you feel about leaving your friends here? Whom would you miss most? Why is that?

I. In a group of friends would you describe yourself as "the life of the party," a "good listener," or what?

J. What do you find offensive, annoying, or objection-
able in other people?

K. Do you have any close friends of other races? If
so, how did you meet them? What sorts of things do
you usually talk about?

Self-Image

A. How would you describe yourself to someone who did
not know you at all the way you really are, both
your good and bad points? (Cover: skills, intelli-
gence, knowledge, temperament, exceptionality, task
orientation, orientation to others, leadership,
ability to follow, weak-strong dimension, anxiety.)

Temperament in Concrete Situations

A. When you go to a sporting event do you get excited,
do you get right in there playing the game in your
imagination, or do you remain pretty calm? (Emo-
tionality)

B. Can you remember the last time you lost your tem-
per? What happened? Impatience? Irritability?
Did you have tantrums as a child? (Anger)

C. Are there any recent events which have made you
feel very unhappy and like crying? What were they?
(Does he turn to other people, to action, or to
solitude when unhappy?) (Sorrow)

D. What kinds of things do you worry about? For exam-
ple? Do you lie awake at night worrying? Do you

worry about things that are not likely to happen"
(Anxiety)

E. Some people think they can plan their lives and aim
for long range goals, such as what they will be do-
ing ten years from now. Others say "whatever will
be, will be" and they take things as they come.
What do you think of this? (Ego strength external
dimension)

F. Have you ever made any long range plans either for
yourself or for others? How did this work out?

V. Values

A. What would you say have been the most important les-
sons of life for you?

B. What makes people happy?

C. What are the things you believe in most, or think
the most important?

D. What is the main point of life? Why are we here?

E. Personal values: when boys are growing up they often
have rather farfetched ambitions and ideas about
what they are going to do with life. Could you re-
member what your ideas were of that sort when you
were, say, 18 or 20?

   1. How did things work out? Did events lead you to
   change your ideas?

   2. What are your main ambitions now?

   3. How hopeful are you about them?

4. What kind of people would you like your children to be when they grow up?

F. Social Values: the ideal society

   1. What do you think the perfect community would be like?

   2. How would people behave?

   3. What would people do for a living? Would they have to work?

   4. What kind of government would there be, if any?

   5. What kinds of things that you have to do now would you not have to do in an ideal society?

   6. Are we getting closer to this ideal society? In what ways?

Attitudes Toward Leadership--General

A. Are there any political leaders either living or dead whom you especially like? Who are they? Why do you like them? Are there any others?

B. Are there any political leaders either living or dead whom you especially dislike? Who are they? Why do you dislike them?

C. What might make a person want to run for political office?

D. How would you describe most politicians? What about their skills, motives, backgrounds, intelligence?

E. What would you say makes a man a politician?

F. Would you have more respect for a man if he were the

members of these groups?

4. Do you think some voluntary groups should play
a role in election campaigns? Which groups?
Why? Do you pay attention to what groups think
in an electoral campaign or do you not pay any
attention to them?

E. Religion

A. What does your religion mean to you?

B. How important is it to you in your daily living?
Do you think about it much? How about prayer?

C. Does religion help a person stay honest and on the
right track or doesn't it make any difference?

D. How do your religious beliefs differ from those of
your parents?

E. Do you feel differently about people who belong to
different religions? How so?

F. How active are you in your religion?

G. Do you think that people should all take their re-
ligion seriously no matter what religion it is? I
mean, should they go to the temple or church or
mosque regularly?

H. What role do you think religion should play in po-
litical life, if any? (Probe: general principles,
moralism, selection of leaders)

I. Is there any conflict between science and religion?

members of these groups?

4. Do you think some voluntary groups should play a role in election campaigns? Which groups? Why? Do you pay attention to what groups think in an electoral campaign or do you not pay any attention to them?

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A. What does your religion mean to you?

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H. What role do you think religion should play in political life, if any? (Probe: general principles, moralism, selection of leaders)

I. Is there any conflict between science and religion?

I.   Origins

A.   Do you think it sometimes helps to understand oth-
     ers when you know what group they belong to? Is
     it important whether they are Chinese, Malay, In-
     dian, or whatever? Why is that?

PART FOUR: ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL DIVISIONS

I.   Social Class

A.   Sometimes one hears the term "social class" as in
     "middle class" or "working class." What do you
     think people mean by that term?

B.   What class would you say you belong to?

C.   Do you think it is hard to go from one social
     class to another?

D.   How would you describe the people who belong to
     your own social class? To others?

E.   How important do you think social classes are in
     Malaysia today?

II.   Age

A.   Do you think there are any important differences
     in the way younger voters think as compared to
     older voters? How do you mean?

     1.   Are younger (older) voters more liberal or
          more conservative?

     2.   Which group is more judicious in temperament?

     3.   Do you think much about whether people are

older or younger than you? Do others?

4. Are most of your friends your own age, younger,
or older?

III. Sex

A. What is the difference in the way men and women
look at politics? Do you think that women have
somewhat different points of view or do they simply
follow their husbands or fathers?

IV. Urban-rural

A. What are the differences, if any, between the peo-
ple who live in rural areas and in kampongs and
those who live in the city? Do you think these
different groups of people have different ways of
looking at public affairs? How so? In what ways?
(Probe for differences in need for government serv-
ices; differences in temperament or personal quali-
ties; conflict in interests; whether the respondent
looks upon himself as a "city man"; which is more
important in politics, urban or rural.)

PART FIVE: ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS

I. Roles

A. Citizen: What would an ideal citizen in a democracy
be like? Regardless of whether there is such an
ideal person or not, what kinds of things would he
do? What kinds of attitudes toward politics would

he have? How close do most people come to this
ideal?

B. Party man: What are your ideas about what a good
party man would be like? What kinds of things would
he do? What kinds of attitudes would he have? How
close do most party members come to this ideal?

C. Nationalist: What is the ideal nationalist? What
kinds of things would he do? What kinds of atti-
tudes would he have? How close do most people come
to this ideal?

D. Member of parliament: How would you describe an
ideal member of parliament? What qualities do you
think he would have? How would he behave? How
close do most members of parliament come to this
ideal?

II. Democracy

A. What is your understanding of democracy?

B. What are the advantages of democracy as compared
with some other system?

C. What would happen to you if you lost your democracy?

D. What kinds of things would you consider undemocrat-
ic? Why?

E. Do you think that sometimes in a war crisis there is
need for a temporary dictatorship?

F. Do you think that sometimes democracy creates confu-
sion and prevents important things from getting

done? What things?

G. Are the voluntary organizations to which you belong democratically run? How do you mean?

H. In general, do you think that the people or the elected leaders are more likely to know what is best for the country? Why?

I. Democracy, according to some people, means that everyone, no matter how ignorant or careless, should have an equal vote. Do you agree with that?

J. Some people say that in a democracy most people like to vote for the ordinary man rather than the person with greater ability than themselves. How do you feel about this?

K. Do you think that sometimes the government must force people to do things against their will? What? Why?

L. What do you suppose people mean when they say "a government of laws and not of men?"

M. The future of democracy in the world is generally bright, isn't it? How about Malaysia?

II. Equality

A. What is your understanding of the phrase "all men are created equal?"

B. In your own personal life are there some people whom you regard as not really equal to you? How?

C. How would you feel if everyone received the same

income, whatever his job was?

D. Do you think generally people would not work so hard under these conditions, or would it not matter?

Freedom

A. What does the word "freedom" make you think of?

B. Some people think there should be more freedom, others think there should be less. What do you think? What kinds of freedom?

C. What are the dangers of too much freedom? Too little? What happens when people feel too free?

D. Do you sometimes feel that listening to all the different points of view on a subject is too confusing and that you would like to hear just one point of view from someone who knows? For example?

E. Do you think there is any special way of bringing up children in a democracy? How?

F. Are there any subjects which you think would be better discussed privately instead of in the newspapers and on the radio where anyone can see and hear them? What kinds of subjects?

G. Can freedom of speech go too far? How?

Government

A. Would you say that you are more interested in international affairs, national affairs, or local affairs? Why?

B. Which part of the government is the most important:

parliament, the courts, or the civil service? Why?

C. Do you think there is any difference between those who work for the government compared with those who work for a large business organization? Why is that?

D. How would you describe the job of a member of parliament?

E. How would you describe the prime minister's job?

Interest and Involvement

A. Would you say that you were very much interested in following the last general election campaign? What part of the campaign most interested you? Why?

B. Why do most of the people go to the polls and vote? How would you describe them? What about non-voters? How would you describe them?

C. How did you feel the last time you voted? What thoughts went through your mind as you stepped up to vote? Did you feel your vote made much difference?

D. Do you think a person should go about trying to convince his friends to vote the way he thinks right, or should he be more silent about this and let others make up their minds by themselves?

E. If you had the time for it would you enjoy a political career? (Why? Why not?)

F. If there were some issue in an election which you felt was very important--and you were not a civil

servant—would you go out and work for what you
thought was right on that issue, or would you think
it was better to leave this up to the political ex-
perts?

XI. Environment and Discussion Style

A. Do you find it difficult or unpleasant to have a
political discussion with someone who disagrees
with you? Why?

B. Do you like to discuss national political events
with your friends outside of work? And at work?

C. When a topic or discussion in a group turns to sub-
jects such as an election or something that hap-
pened in parliament, how do you feel?

D. Would you say that in your experience it is more
useful to have a person in a political discussion
who jokes and keeps things from getting too seri-
ous, or to have a person who knows a lot about the
subject and can give the answers? Why is that?

E. It is sometimes said that it is useful to have
someone in a discussion who tends to criticize oth-
er people's ideas because it makes for a better
discussion and better answers. Other people say
that this kind of person is just a nuisance and
keeps things from getting decided. How do you feel
about this?

F. Would you rather be respected for your independent

opinions or for your ability to get along with
people well?

G. When a person changes his mind after a political
discussion do you think this is likely to mean
that he does not have any principles or that he
has principles but is willing to be persuaded by a
better argument?

H. Do you think that most groups tend to be hard on a
person who does not agree with the group on some-
thing like politics, or do you think it does not
matter in most groups? What examples? Why?

I. If you had your way would most of the people you
know have the same political opinions as you?

J. What is the good of political discussion among
friends anyway?

III. Political Information

A. Does the ruler who is chosen to be the Yang di-
fertuan Agong continue to rule in the state from
which he comes?

B. How many members of the Dewan Negara are there?
How are they chosen?

C. Can you describe the way Kuala Lumpur is governed?

D. Could you give me the rough totals of party repre-
sentation in parliament presently?

IX. Current events

A. Do you remember some of the things parliament did

last session?

B. What has the _Tenku_ (Abdul Rahman) been doing re-
cently?

C. Can you recall what has been going on at the United
Nations Organization recently?

D. Has anything your state government done recently
caught your attention?

I. Persons

A. Could you tell me the names of some of these per-
sons?

1. The member of parliament from your district?

2. His opponents during the last election?

3. The head of West Germany?

4. Malaysia's ambassador to the United Nations and
to the United States?

II. The Ropes

A. If you wanted to get something done in your city--
such as having a traffic light installed at a dan-
gerous intersection--how would you go about it?
How do most people go about it?

III. General Focus of Attention

A. What do you think are the major problems in Malay-
sia today? What should the government do about
them? What should ordinary citizens do about them?
Who is to blame for this situation? Which of these
problems is the most important?

I. Areas of Emotional Involvement

A. Has there been anything in the news in the last two years which made you really mad? (For each event probe with: Why did it make you mad? Was it anybody's fault? Did you do anything about it at the time? Do you think anything could have been done about it? Anything else?)

B. Has there been anything in the news in the past two years which gave you a great deal of satisfaction? (For each event probe with: Why is that? How did it happen? Who should get the credit?)

IV. Broad Orientation

A. What do you think causes wars? Will there be any wars?

B. What do you think causes poverty? Will there always be poverty in this country?

IV. Flexibility

A. Do you often change your opinions on national or international questions, or don't you change your opinions very easily? If you do change your opinions, what is the cause usually?

VI. Parties

A. What is the purpose of a political party in your mind?

B. In general do you think political parties are good or bad things?

C. Do you think that elections give political leaders a
   pretty good idea what the people want to have done
   by the government, or do you think that elections
   are too vague to tell the political leaders anything
   the people want? (How do you think the political
   leaders decide what to do?)

D. If there were an election in your city and you did
   not happen to know anything about the issues, to
   whom would you most likely go for advice?

E. Do you feel strongly that all citizens should belong
   to a political party and be loyal to it? Why? Why
   not?

APPENDIX B

ATTITUDINAL MEASURES

Part One: Scales Administered to Higher Civil Servants Who Were Also Intensively Interviewed.

1. Authoritarianism: Ten items (five reversed) from "F"
Scale used by Argus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren
E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes in The American Voter
(New York: Wiley, 1960).

A. The artist and the professor are probably more impor-
tant to society than the businessman and the manufac-
turer.

        __ Agree a lot   __ Disagree a little

        __ Agree a little   __ Disagree a lot

B. The findings of science may someday show that many of
our most deeply-held beliefs are wrong.

C. Human nature being what it is, there must always be
war and conflict.

D. People ought to pay more attention to new ideas, even if they seem to go against the accepted way of life.

E. What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents.

F. Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.

G. It is highly unlikely that astrology will ever be able to explain anything.

H. Sex criminals deserve more than prison; they should be whipped in public or worse.

I. An urge to jump from high places is probably the result of unhappy experiences rather than something inborn.

J. Bosses should say just what is to be done and exactly how to do it if they expect us to do a good job.

C. Faith-in-people: Five items, from Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 690-695.

A. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?

___Most people can be trusted   ___You can't be too careful in your dealings with people

B. Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others or more inclined to look out for them-

selves?

___ Inclined to help others   ___ Inclined to look out for themselves

C. If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.

___ Agree   ___ Disagree

D. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.

___ Agree   ___ Disagree

E. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.

___ Agree   ___ Disagree

III. Social and neurotic anxiety: Twenty four items adapted for Robert Lane by David Sears from an unpublished scale developed by Seymour B. Sarason and Irving L. Janis.

Social anxiety:

A. How nervous or afraid are you when you have to talk in front of a group of several people?

___ Very nervous   ___ Hardly nervous at all

___ A little nervous   ___ Not nervous at all

B. When you are doing a job, how much does the fear that you might not be doing too well keep you from doing your best?

___ It never does   ___ It often does a little

___ It sometimes does a little   ___ It often does a great deal

C. In comparison with other men your age, how much do

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you worry when your boss or superior tells you to
come to see him without telling you why he wants to
see you?

___ I worry a great deal   ___ I get a little worried

___ I get quite worried   ___ I don't worry at all

D. How much do you worry about how well you get along
with people?

___ I worry about it   ___ I worry about it a
quite a lot   little

___ I worry about it   ___ I worry about it
quite a bit   hardly at all

E. How much do you worry about the job you hope to have
next?

___ A lot   ___ A little

___ A good deal   ___ Not at all

F. When you have been in a situation in which you have
done poorly, or felt embarrassed, or made some mis-
take, how much do you keep on worrying about it?

___ I worry about it   ___ I forget about it
for a long time   pretty quickly

___ I worry about it   ___ I forget about it
for a short time   right away

Neurotic anxiety:

A. How afraid are you when you hear thunder or see
lightening?

___ Never feel afraid   ___ Often afraid

___ Sometimes a little   ___ Always afraid
afraid

B. When you go to a dentist, how much do you find your-
self worrying about the pain you will feel?

___ Always worry   ___ Sometimes a little
                                      worried

___ Often worry   ___ Do not worry at all

C. How often do you have trouble going to sleep because
you are worrying about something that has happened to
you or some thought you have had?

___ Very often   ___ Sometimes

___ Often   ___ Never

D. How often do you feel restless or uneasy on days,
like Sundays, or holidays, when you have nothing in
particular to do?

___ Never feel uneasy   ___ Often feel uneasy
     or restless   or restless

___ Sometimes feel uneasy   ___ Always feel uneasy
     or restless   or restless

E. When you are in a high place, how frightened are you
when you look down?

___ Very frightened   ___ A little frightened

___ Quite frightened   ___ Not frightened at all

F. How often do you feel uneasy or uncomfortable without
knowing why you are feeling that way?

___ Very often   ___ Sometimes

___ Quite often   ___ Never

G. How often are you afraid when you find yourself in a
small closed place or when you think about finding

yourself in such a place?

___ Almost always   ___ Sometimes

___ Often   ___ Never

H. In comparison to other people you know, like friends or relatives, how much do you worry about your physical health?

___ A good bit more than others   ___ A little less than others

___ A little more than others   ___ A good bit less than others

I. When you go to the doctor (or when he comes to you) because you don't feel well, how worried are you about what the doctor will say is wrong with you?

___ Not worried at all   ___ Quite worried

___ A little worried   ___ Very worried

J. How often in the past year have you had nightmares or dreams from which you have awakened feeling nervous or frightened?

___ Never   ___ Sometimes

___ Very rarely   ___ Quite often

K. How much do you worry about your mental health, in comparison to other people you know, like friends or relatives?

___ A good deal more   ___ A little less

___ A little more   ___ A good deal less

I. How often do you find it hard to pay attention to your work because disturbing or frightening thoughts

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come into your mind?

  __ Very often   __ Sometimes

  __ Often   __ Hardly ever

M. In comparison with other men of your age, how nervous do you feel about fighting with someone?

  __ A good deal more   __ A little less

  __ A little more   __ A good deal less

N. How afraid are you when you are alone in the dark?

  __ Not afraid at all   __ Somewhat afraid

  __ A little afraid   __ Very much afraid

O. How often do you find yourself worrying about a particular person, situation, or happening, even though you know that there is little reason for worrying?

  __ Never   __ Often

  __ Sometimes   __ Very often

P. How afraid of drowning are you when you are near a body of water, in swimming, or in a boat?

  __ Not afraid at all   __ Quite worried

  __ A little nervous   __ Quite frightened

7. Dominance: Eleven items selected by Lane from sixty items used in Harrison G. Gough, Herbert McClosky, and Paul E. Meehl, "A Personality Scale for Dominance," _Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology_, Vol. 46 (1951), pp. 263-269.

A. I must admit I try to see what others think before I

take a stand.

___ Strongly agree   ___ Disagree

___ Agree   ___ Strongly disagree

B. In a group, I take responsibility for getting people introduced.

C. I have to stop and think before I act, even in trifling matters.

D. I am embarrassed with people I din't know well.

E. I would rather not have very much responsibility for other people.

F. When in a group of people, I have trouble thinking of the right things to talk about.

G. I have a natural talent for influencing people.

H. There are times when I act like a coward.

I. I hate to tell others what to do.

J. I like to give orders and get things moving.

K. I do many things which I regret afterwards.

Anomie: Four items from Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," American Sociological Review, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 709-716.

A. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.

___ Strongly agree   ___ Disagree

___ Agree   ___ Strongly disagree

B. These days a person really doesn't know who he can count on.

C. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the av-
erage man is getting worse, not better.

D. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world
with the ways things look for the future.

<p style="text-align:center">•   •   •   •   •</p>

All scales scored on a straight 0-1-2-3 basis except for
faith-in-people scale (0-1).

<p style="text-align:center">•   •   •   •   •</p>

Part Two: Scores and rankings for respondents
          on above measures

Rankings:

1. Authoritari- anism	:	1 = most authori- tarian;	17 = least authori- tarian
2. Faith-in- people	:	1 = least faith-in- people;	17 = most faith-in- people
3. Social anxiety	:	1 = most social anxiety;	17 = least social anxiety
4. Neurotic anxiety	:	1 = most neurotic anxiety;	17 = least neurotic anxiety
5. Dominance	:	1 = most dominant;	17 = least dominant
6. Anomie	:	1 = highest in anomic feelings;	17 = lowest in anomic feelings

<p style="text-align:center">•   •   •   •   •</p>

	Authoritarianism		Faith-in-People		Social Anxiety		Neurotic Anxiety		Dominance		Anomie	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Sundram	28	3 1/2*	4	6 1/2	8	5 1/2	15	8 1/2	18	5	5	8 1/2
Md. Anim	27	8	4	6 1/2	10	2 1/2	24	1 1/2	18	5	5	8 1/2
Khoo	26	12	4	6 1/2	6	11	10	14	18	5	7	5 1/2
Nordin	27	8	2	16	4	15	9	15	19	2	4	11 1/2
Hussain	27	8	4	6 1/2	6	11	17	6	16	12	7	5 1/2
Ismail	26	12	4	6 1/2	7	8 1/2	12	11 1/2	17	9 1/2	2	17
Abdul Karim	25	14	2	16	7	8 1/2	15	8 1/2	17	9 1/2	3	14 1/2
Tay	26	12	3	13	7	8 1/2	7	16 1/2	23	1	3	14 1/2
Lim	28	3 1/2	4	6 1/2	3	16 1/2	7	16 1/2	23	1	3	14 1/2
Jeganathan	28	3 1/2	3	13	5	13 1/2	12	11 1/2	14	14	11	2
Zukifli	28	3 1/2	4	6 1/2	8	5 1/2	11	13	12	17	12	1
Zaharuddin	22	17	4	6 1/2	8	5 1/2	16	7	17	9 1/2	9	3
Abu Bakar	27	8	4	6 1/2	3	16 1/2	13	10	14	14	3	14 1/2
Ja'afar	24	15	2	16	16	1	24	1 1/2	13	16	8	4
Kamalam	27	8	4	6 1/2	6	11	19	3	17	9 1/2	4	11 1/2
Mahalingam	23	16	5	1	8	5 1/2	7	16 1/2	14	14	5	8 1/2
Mustapha	31	1	3	13	5	13 1/2	18	4 1/2	18	5	5	8 1/2

*Underlined rankings indicate tie.

Part Three: Questionnaire items administered to 110 civil
servants NOT members of the sample intensively
interviewed. Scales not accompanied by a refer-
ence to their origin were developed in the field
by the author.

I. Authoritarianism scale: seven items used by Joseph W.
Elder and reported in his article, "National Loyalties
in a Newly Independent Nation," in David E. Apter, ed.,
Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964),
pp. 77-92.

A. An insult to one's honor should always be punished.

___ Strongly agree   ___ Disagree

___ Agree   ___ Strongly disagree

B. Human nature what it is, there will always be wars
and conflict.

C. Nothing can really be predicted by astrology.

D. It is not good to think too much.

E. Nowadays the courts give more punishment to law-
breakers than they ought to give.

F. People can be divided into two classes: the strong
and the weak.

G. There are so many evil people nowdays that it is
dangerous to go out alone.

II. Other-directedness: six items.

A. One should not become a close friend of someone who
does not pay any attention to the common social cus-

toms of the group.

___ Strongly agree   ___ Disagree

___ Agree   ___ Strongly disagree

B. A person should strive to be successful even if it means he will be unpopular and others will be jealous of him.

C. It is important not to dress or act very differently from other people or else you will lose their respect.

D. My opinion is almost never swayed at all by editorials in the newspapers I read.

E. The negative opinion of others often keeps me from seeing a movie I had planned to see.

F. As long as a person does what he thinks is right, it does not matter at all what his family, friends, and community think of him.

II. "Constant-pie" orientation: four items.

A. Even in a rich country, if population grows rapidly, there is great danger that there will soon not be enough wealth to go around.

___ Strongly agree   ___ Disagree

___ Agree   ___ Strongly disagree

B. Those who get ahead usually get ahead at the expense of others.

C. When an individual or group gains, it usually means that another individual or group loses.

D. Any government that wants to help the poor people
will have to take something away from the rich in
order to do it.

II. Entrepreneurial attitudes: eleven items used by David
C. McClelland and found to discriminate effectively be-
tween industrial managers and administrators in cross-
national research. Reported in McClelland's The Achiev-
ing Society (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1961),
pp. 496-497.

A. I would prefer to work on a project that I could see
was getting somewhere, even though it was far from
where I usually live and work, and among people very
different from me.

___ Strongly agree   ___ Disagree

___ Agree   ___ Strongly disagree

B. An article for sale is worth what people will pay
for it.

C. Seniority should be given greater weight than merit
in giving promotions.

D. Incentive pay should not be used because workers
will overwork and ruin their health or destroy jobs
for others.

E. Workers should not be promoted to managerial jobs
even if they are qualified because it would destroy
the respect for authority which the workers must
have toward management.

F. Part of the price which one pays in joining any organization today is the sacrifice of individual, personal decision-making, and I, for one, am not willing to pay that price.

G. The amount of education a person has should be a major factor in determining his pay scale.

H. I approve of a career or job outside the home for married women.

I. A good son should try to live near his parents even if it means giving up a good job in another part of the country.

J. The most important factor in the success of a commercial firm is the establishment of a reputation for the excellence of its products.

K. A man with money cannot really learn how to behave in polite society if he has not had the proper upbringing.

Risk-taking in decisions: two items.

A. In an important decision, you should not wait until everyone is agreed. It is better to make a few people angry than to delay the decision until it is unanimous.

___ Strongly agree   ___ Disagree

___ Agree   ___ Strongly disagree

B. Usually, it is better to get on with the job and perhaps risk making a mistake rather than delaying a

long time until you are certain there can be no mistakes.

II. Control over future and environment: two items.

A. Planning only makes a person unhappy, since your plans hardly ever work out anyway.

___ Strongly agree   ___ Disagree

___ Agree   ___ Strongly disagree

B. When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already in the stars, so he might as well accept it and not fight against it.

III. Superiors as vindictive and threatening: three items.

A. A subordinate who questions his superior's decisions will usually find that his superior will hold a grudge against him thereafter.

___ Strongly agree   ___ Disagree

___ Agree   ___ Strongly disagree

B. Most subordinates are somewhat afraid of their superiors.

C. Once a person gets a little authority over others, he is apt to use it to boss around others and to show what a big man he is.

All the above items were administered to the following groups:

Group	Number	Sector
Settlement officers and senior hand clerks	24	Public
Audit Department examiners	27	Public
Telecoms trainees	16	Public
Bank Negara (National Bank) trainees	20	Public
National Productivity Centre management trainees	23	Private
Total respondents	110	

. . . . .

rt four: dogmatism and politics questionnaire items admin-
istered to 116 civil servants NOT members of sam-
ple intensively interviewed.

Dogmatism: thirty-six items found significant in dis-
criminating the "dogmatic" from the "non-dogmatic" in
Milton Rokeach, The Open and the Closed Mind (New York:
Basic Books, 1960), pp. 73-80.

1. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

 ___ I agree a little   ___ I disagree a little

 ___ I agree on the whole ___ I disagree on the whole

 ___ I agree very much   ___ I disagree very much

2. Nations which have opposing ideologies have nothing
at all in common with one another.

3. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful
of the future.

4. Once I get involved in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

5. In a heated discussion, I generally become so involved in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what others are saying.

6. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life, it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing."

7. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

8. I would like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

9. Even though I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man like Ghandi, Einstein, or Shakespeare.

10. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness should be hated and despised.

11. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

12. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

13. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

14. If given the chance, I would do something of great benefit to the world.

15. There is so much to be done and so little time in which to do it.

16. In the history of mankind, there have probably been just a very small number of really great thinkers.

17. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for or believe in.

18. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

19. Unfortunately, many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems do not really understand what is going on.

20. Man on his own (by himself) is a helpless and miserable creature.

21. The highest form of government is a democracy, and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

22. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a "wishy-washy" or indecisive sort of person.

23. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

24. I get extremely angry whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he is wrong.

25. It is only natural that a person would have a much better knowledge of the ideas he believes in than

with ideas which he opposes.

26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

27. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a good goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

28. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world, there is probably only one which is correct.

29. A group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for very long.

30. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays are not worth the paper they are printed on.

31. In the long run, the best way to live is to choose friends and associates whose preferences and beliefs are the same as one's own.

32. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what is going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

33. The worst crime a person could commit is to publicly attack the people who believe in the same thing as he does.

34. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

35. The present is all too full of unhappiness. It is only the future which counts.

36. Most people just do not know what is good for them.

5. Rules of the game: eight items selected and adapted from Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," _American Political Science Review_ (June, 1964), pp. 361-382. Where items have been adapted, McClosky's original version appears in parentheses.

1. People ought to be allowed to vote even if they cannot do so intelligently. (. . . _can't do so_ . . .)

   __ I agree a little   __ I disagree a little

   __ I agree on the whole   __ I disagree on the whole

   __ I agree very much   __ I disagree very much

2. I do not mind a politician's methods if he manages to get the right things done. (I _don't mind_ . . .)

3. It is all right to get around the law if you do not actually break it. (. . . _you don't actually_ . . .)

4. In dealing with subversives, sometimes you cannot always give them all the legal rights which peaceful citizens have, otherwise many will escape the law.

5. We might as well make up our minds that in order to make the world better a lot of innocent people will have to suffer.

6. Very few politicians have clean records, so one should not get excited about the mud-throwing that sometimes takes place.

7. There are times when it almost seems better for the people to take the law into their own hands rather

wait for the machinery of government to act.

8. To bring about great changes for the benefit of man-
   kind often requires cruelty and even ruthlessness.

c. Support for freedom of opinion and speech: seven items
selected and adapted from Herbert McClosky, op. cit.,
above. Original version appears in parentheses where
adaptations have been made.

1. People who hate our way of life should still have a
   chance to talk and be heard.

   ___ I agree a little   ___ I disagree a little
   ___ I agree on the whole   ___ I disagree on the whole
   ___ I agree very much   ___ I disagree very much

2. Nobody has the right to tell another person what he
   should and should not read.

36. Most people just do not know what is good for them.

B. Rules of the game: eight items selected and adapted from Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review (June, 1964), pp. 361-382. Where items have been adapted, McClosky's original version appears in parentheses.

1. People ought to be allowed to vote even if they cannot do so intelligently. (. . . can't do so . . .)

    __ I agree a little   __ I disagree a little

    __ I agree on the whole   __ I disagree on the whole

    __ I agree very much   __ I disagree very much

2. I do not mind a politician's methods if he manages to get the right things done. (I don't mind . . .)

3. It is all right to get around the law if you do not actually break it. (. . . you don't actually . . .)

4. In dealing with subversives, sometimes you cannot always give them all the legal rights which peaceful citizens have, otherwise many will escape the law.

5. We might as well make up our minds that in order to make the world better a lot of innocent people will have to suffer.

6. Very few politicians have clean records, so one should not get excited about the mud-throwing that sometimes takes place.

7. There are times when it almost seems better for the people to take the law into their own hands rather

3. Unless there is freedom for many points of view to be presented, there is little chance that the truth can ever be known.

4. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.

5. Freedom of conscience should mean the freedom not to believe in God as well as the freedom to worship in the religion of one's choice. (. . . the freedom to be an atheist as well . . .)

6. I would not trust any person or group to decide what opinions can be freely expressed and what must be silenced.

7. You can't really be sure whether an opinion is true or not unless people are free to argue against it.

2. Applications of freedom of speech and procedural rights: six items selected and adapted from Herbert McClosky, op. cit., above. Original version appears in parentheses where adaptations have been made.

1. Freedom does not give anyone the right to teach foreign ideas in our schools.

    __ I agree a little   __ I disagree a little
    __ I agree on the whole   __ I disagree on the whole
    __ I agree very much   __ I disagree very much

2. A book that contains wrong political views cannot be a good book and does not deserve to be published.

3. If a person is convicted of a crime by use of evidence which is not legal, he should be set free and the evidence thrown out of court. (. . . by illegal evidence, he should . . .)

4. In dealing with dangerous enemies of the nation, we can't afford to depend on the courts, laws, and their slow and unreliable methods. (. . . dangerous enemies like the Communists, we can't . . .)

5. When the country is in great danger, we may have to force people to do certain things against their will, even though it violates their rights. (. . . force people to testify against themselves, even though . . .)

6. A man ought not to be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he is talking about. (A man oughtn't to be allowed . . .)

Political equality: four items selected and adapted from Herbert McClosky, op. cit., above. Original version appears in parentheses where adaptations have been made.

1. The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what's best for them.

___ I agree a little ___ I disagree a little
___ I agree on the whole ___ I disagree on the whole
___ I agree very much ___ I disagree very much

2. It will always be necessary to have a few strong, capable people actually running everything. (. . . few strong, able people . . .)

3. Political "issues" and arguments are beyond the understanding of most of the voters. ("Issues" and "arguments" are beyond . . .)

4. Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run.

7. Economic equality: four items selected and adapted from Herbert McClosky, op. cit., above. Original version appears in parentheses where adaptations have been made.

1. The government ought to make sure that everyone has a good standard of living.

___ I agree a little   ___ I disagree a little

___ I agree on the whole   ___ I disagree on the whole

___ I agree very much   ___ I disagree very much

2. I think the government should give a person work if he cannot find another job. (. . . if he can't find . . .)

3. There will always be poverty, so people might as well get used to the fact. (. . . used to the idea.)

4. Every person should have a good house, even if the government has to build it for him.

8. Cynicism toward politics: six items selected and adapted from Herbert McClosky, op. cit., above. Original version appears in parentheses where adaptations have been made.

1. There is practically no connection between what a politician says and what he will do once he gets elected.

___ I agree a little   ___ I disagree a little

___ I agree on the whole   ___ I disagree on the whole

___ I agree very much   ___ I disagree very much

2. I usually have confidence that the government will do what is right.

3. To me, most politicians don't seem to really mean what they say. (Most politicians don't seem to me to really mean what they say.)

4. Most politicians are looking out for themselves above all else.

5. No matter what people think, a few people will always run things anyway.

6. Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country.

Political futility: three items selected and adapted from Herbert McClosky, op. cit., above. Original version appears in parentheses where adaptations have been made.

1. It is no use worrying my head about public affairs; I can't do anything about them anyhow.

___ I agree a little   ___ I disagree a little

___ I agree on the whole   ___ I disagree on the whole

___ I agree very much   ___ I disagree very much

2. Nothing I ever do seems to have any real effect on what happens in politics.

3. Political parties are so big that the average member has not got much to say about what goes on. (. . . average member hasn't got . . .)

ll the above items were administered to the following
groups:

Group	Number	Sector
1. Postal service trainees	23	Public
2. Financial administrators	18	Public
3. General Staff administrators	28	Public
4. Senior clerks	19	Public
5. Senior Financial administrators	14	Public
6. State Assembly members	14	Politicians (all Alliance Party members)
Total	116	

*   *   *   *   *

Part five: Sentence Completion Test. Some items were de-
vised in the field and others borrowed from among
items used by Ronald Provencher (San Diego State
College) and Herbert Phillips (University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley), both anthropologists who have
administered these items in Malaysia and Thailand
respectively. A key follows the listing of par-
tial sentences.

1. When he planned for the future he. . . .
2. He felt he owed his first loyalty to . . . because. . . .
3. When he knew that sticking to regulations would delay the
   project, he. . . .
4. When the other man insulted his personal integrity, he.
   . . .

5. He most often gets angry when. . . .

6. The only person he could depend on for help when he was in trouble was. . . .

7. Although he did not know it, his friend had. . . .

8. When his friend accused him of . . . he. . . .

9. He challenged the other man to a fight because. . . .

10. When he asked his friend for help, his friend. . . .

11. Although he did not agree with what the other man said, he did not show that he did not agree because. . . .

12. He did not get along well with the others at the office because. . . .

13. Although he seemed to be a nice person, he. . . .

14. He could not forget what happened at the office that day because. . . .

15. When others in the office criticized the report he wrote, he. . . .

16. When he thought about his future, he felt that. . . .

17. When he realized that his superior had made a bad mistake, he. . . .

18. The only way to deal with corruption is to. . . .

19. He avoided criticizing the other man in public because. . . .

20. The reason he did not get the promotion was because. . . .

21. He was afraid of his superior because. . . .

22. He was loyal to his superior because. . . .

23. The reason he got ahead in his job was because. . . .

24. The real reason why he criticized the other man's work was because. . . .

25. The reason the clerk took a bribe for getting the shop owner a license was because. . . .

26. When the other man criticized his work in public, he. . . .

27. Friendships are not permanent because. . . .

28. The superior came into his assistant's office in order to. . . .

29. The Committee Chairman did not force the decision when he saw that some of the Committee members opposed it, because. . . .

30. When a superior asks advice from his staff too often, he. . . .

31. When he made a mistake, his superior. . . .

32. He postponed making the decision, because. . . .

33. The superior did not want to dismiss the man even though his work was badly done, because. . . .

34. When the others saw the civil servant having coffee with the rich towkay, they thought that. . . .

35. He did not think he could do the job, because. . . .

36. When he realized that he could do a better job than they could do, he. . . .

37. The way to succeed is by. . . .

38. When they told him to do a task he knew he could not do, he. . . .

39. When he realized he was not doing a very good job, he. . . .

40. People who always say, "I can't do it" are. . . .

41. People who criticize others in public are. . . .

42. People who are in positions of authority ought to. . . .

43. When his superior gave him an order which he knew was wrong, he. . . .

44. The best way to treat a subordinate is. . . .

45. You cannot trust a person who. . . .

46. Respecting people who are superior to you is good because. . . .

47. When his subordinates refused to do what they were told, he. . . .

48. The kind of person he likes most is. . . .

49. The kind of person he dislikes most is. . . .

50. When he gets angry, he wants to. . . .

51. When he was insulted, he. . . .

52. Quarreling is bad because. . . .

53. When others tried to get ahead of him, he. . . .

54. When he was put in charge, he. . . .

55. When they told him he did not do the job very well, he. . . .

56. People who are always trying to get ahead are. . . .

57. When his superiors ordered him to do something he did not want to do, he. . . .

58. When he is in the presence of an important man, he. . . .

59. The worst way to treat a subordinate is. . . .

60. The kind of person he would most want to be like is. . . .

61. If he could change his occupation, he would want to be. . . .

62. The most important thing in his life is. . . .

63. The best thing a person can do is. . . .

64. The most terrible thing a person can do is. . . .

Key	Items
1. Future orientation	1, 16
2. Loyalty	2, 6
3. Formalism	3
4. "Machismo"	4, 7, 9, 11, 15, 19
5. Causes of aggression	5
6. Instability of personal relations	10, 12, 27
7. Hidden motives	8, 13
8. Affect toward job	14
9. Corruption	18, 25, 34
10. Clash and consequences (see "machismo")	24, 26
11. Power figures (superior-subordinate relations)	17, 21, 22, 28, 30, 31, 33
12. Reasons for success	23
13. Decisions	29, 32
14. Dealing with competition	36, 53, 56
15. Self-confidence and job	35
16. Qualifications for achievement	37
17. Reaction to impending failure	38, 39

Key		Items
18.	Reaction to achievement failure	40
19.	Public criticism	41
20.	Definitions of use of authority	42, 44, 46, 59
21.	Authority of others	43, 57, 58
22.	Trust	45
23.	Authority of one's self	47
24.	Social ideals	48, 49
25.	Handling aggressive feeling	50
26.	Reaction to others' aggression	51
27.	Values toward aggression	52
28.	Reaction to criticism	55
29.	Reaction to responsibility	54
30.	Ego-ideal	60
31.	Aspirations	61, 62
32.	Good and evil	63, 64

The Sentence Completion Test was administered to the follow-ing groups:

	Group	Number	Sector
1.	Senior administrators	18	Public
2.	Personnel supervisors	14	Public
3.	Postal Service trainees	21	Public
4.	Telecoms-Technical College graduates	7	Public
5.	Bank Negara (National Bank) trainees	20	Public
	Total	80	

APPENDIX C

I. Correlations between constant-pie orientation and other attitudinal variables.

A. Authoritarianism: N = 56

	Low in constant-pie thinking	High in constant-pie thinking
Low authoritarian	20	13
High authoritarian	9	14
	29	27

$Chi^2 = 4.22$ 1 df $p < .05$

B. Superiors as vindictive or threatening: N = 66

	Low in constant-pie thinking	High in constant-pie thinking
Superiors as less vindictive or threatening	18	13
Superiors as more vindictive or threatening	14	21
	32	34

$Chi^2 = 3.63$ 1 df $p < .06$

C. Faith-in-people: N = 35

	Low in constant-pie thinking	High in constant-pie thinking
High faith-in-people	10	5
Low faith-in-people	8	12
	18	17

$Chi^2 = 3.93$ 1 df $p < .05$

D. Control over the future: N = 57

	Low in constant-pie thinking	High in constant-pie thinking
High control	22	9
Low control	6	20
	28	20

$Chi^2 = 24.10$ 1 df $p < .001$